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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPI£ OF INDETERJUIttCT
OF TRANS IATION
A.

Sources of the Principle

Willard Van Orman Quine* s principle of the
indeterminacy of
transla tion> outlined most fully in Word and Object
, represents the

convergence of his acceptance of Skinnerian behaviorism
and his re-

jection of an absolute analytic-synthetic distinction. Both
his acceptance of behaviorism and his conclusions about the lack of
defining
criteria for analyticity are sources of the principle of indeterminacy
of translation. A critique of indeterminacy must question the
strict-

ness of Quine’s behaviorism or the soundness of the argument in "Two

Dogmas of En^iricism. " It is, therefore* important to examine both
sources.

Indeterminacy is a consequence of the "empirically uncondi1
tioned variation in one’s conceptual scheme." The "net empirical
import'*

of a single sentence, if any, is the "stimulus meaning", if

any, of the sentence. Commentators have rightly recognized the concept
3

of stimulus meaning as the crucial one in the exposition.

fined as "the class of all the stimulations.

It is de-

.that would prompt" assent
U
or dissent "for a speaker at a date" to a sentence.
Quine acknow•

ledges that "stimulus meaning as defined falls 3hort in various ways of
one* s intuitive demands on ‘meaning* as undefined," but he maintains

that it is nevertheless the "objective reality" available to the
linguist.

Quine’s advocacy of "stimulus meaning" is based on his views

of (l) the process of language learning! (2) the end product* the learned
language! (3) admissible evidence for the lihguist.

2

(1)

Quine accepts, rather uncritically, Skinner’s
analysis of learn-

ing a language as being conditioned to give
and expect predictable

responses to particular stimuli. He does not
go to great lengths to
defend his acceptance of Skinner’s approach.
He mentions in passing

that Skinner "is not without his critics," and
with a bare reference

without comment to Gronsky* s attack on Skinner’s
main work in the field
of language. Ve rba l Behavior , concludes, "But
at worst we nay suppose

that the description, besides being conveniently definite,
is substan6
tially true of a good part of what goes into the first learning
of words. "

In a work where very little is taken for granted, Quine
is content

to start with the assumption that "words mean only as their use
in sen—

tences is conditioned to sensory stimuli, verbal and otherwise."

7

Understanding the sentences uttered by others and constructing
one’s own sentences are possible only because one has been conditioned

by stimulus -response

beards

to do so. The history of each speaker’s

conditioning to meanings is unique, and yet, in a speech community, all
are speakers of a cannon language. Since there is nothing more to
language learning than being conditioned publicly by mature speakers of
the language, the existence of a cannon language in the face of this
8

"chaotic personal diversity of connections"

appears paradoxical. This

situation provides Quine with a hook on which to hang the principle of
9

indeterminacy.

As speakers of a common language, we are like the bushes

trimmed to look like elepnants (of all things) which achieve this remarkable, uniform result despite the different arrangements of twigs in
10
each case.

3

Quine uses the Skinnerian aocount
not only to explain "the
first learning of xords" but to
explain the entire learning of
,
language, and in so doing he accepts
the "stretched" use of concepts
from entirely nonlinguistio
psychological experiments to account
for
the most complex features of
language.
He also includes features of

U

linguistic development which do not seem
to be justified by the theory
(although Skinner does the same). For
example, he holds that, beyond

the whole sentences learned directly by
stimulus-response conditioning,
some sentences are constructed "fr®
learned parts" on "analogy" to the
12
directly conditioned ones.
How one learns to draw an analogy
to

—

recognize a relevant similarity

— is a

process very much in need of

clarification which neither Skinner nor Quine gives.

This might be

said to be the fundamental question that a linguistic
theory must answer in order to account for a speaker's ability
to construct and unHi
deratand previously unheard sentences.
Chcrasky tends to deprecate a reliance on “analogy’',
but this is

to make his own explanation for the “creativity” of speakers
appear
the only possible one. I«t us grant that the ability to draw
analogies
is a baa ic intellectual 3 id 11, without which we would be hard pressed

to account for language or for any knowledge whatsoever. The question

to be asked is what relation the development and exercise of this ability have to the proposed theory of stimulus-response conditioning. It
looks suspiciously as if “analogy” were inserted to allow for a suffi-

ciently rich language although it has no foundation in the learning
theoiy.

Initially the stimuli involved are nonverbal, or nonverbal to-

gether with verbal, but in order to achieve a language which is more

ll

th “* the " f,nciful:i
y ftncyless medium of unvarnished

15

new,"

provision must be mad. for
sentences to 40t as stimuli
for etoer
sentences, toe so-called
"interanimation of sentences "^One
cannot
account for scientific theories,
or even for an enriched
everyday
language about things in toe
world, without a "sullying of
toe stream"
7
of experience by constructs
and concepts." Ihis must
surely be
granted, but Quine also wants to
hold that oven these relations
be-

tween sentences are established
"by to. mechanism of conditioned response."
For this to be the case in a
nonmetaphorioal sense, learning
would have to be strictly by rote
because the sentences in a stimulusresponse relationship would have to
be always the same, word for word.
There is nothing in a straightforward
account of conditioned
response to explain how one learns to
understand that any one of a
large group of differently worded, but
cognitively equivalent, utter-

ances calls for one of another large group of
differently worded, but

cognitively equivalent, responses in a
particular situation.

The

xaco that this is so raises those troublesome
questions about synorQmy

which are so neatly avoided by evoking conditioned
response. A straightforward interpretation of conditioned response would
have to allow that
a separate bond must be established between each
possible wording of

interanimating sentences, involving a troublesome infinity of
established
conditioned responses for coianunication to be possible.

19

(2) Once one has progressed from babbling infant to speaker of a

language, it is the "totality of [one's] dispositions to verbal beha20
vior"
which are the concern of the linguist. This is, in fact, how

Quine defines language. As recently as February, 1967, he wrote, ”lan-

5

gwge

i*

»rst and
2

havior."

foremost a system of dispositions
to observable be-

One does not mint to restrict
'language' to the totality of

observed verbal behavior, of an individual
or a speech community, because of the arbitrary limits of time,
speakers, situations, as veil as
observed chance errors, etc. And yet one
vants to be empirical, to

speak of verbal behavior, and not of "competence",
as Chens ky does,
22
which is the “mental reality underlying actual
behavior*"

Moreover, dispositions, as we have been
assured by Carnap, Goodman, and in £grd and Object by Quine as well,
are really nothing to

worry

about,.

Despite their kinship with counterfactual conditionals,

they are quite harmless. For example, the "disposition to
assent to or
dissent from’' a sentence, which is part of the definition of
stimulus
meaning, is "no worse" than »x is soluble in water* and that
is aot bad

at all* "fhe disposition ^Lnvolved in stimulus meaning^ may be presumed
to be some subtle structural condition, like an allergy and

solubi-

lityj like an allergy, more particularly, in not being understood*"

23

Again in section U6, when Quine is "explicating" dispositions, he posits
"subvisible structure" for 'soluble* and "some subtle neural condition,

induced by language-learning" for the disposition to assent or dis2U
sent,
and thus eliminates the subjunctive mood from expansions of
expressions containing these dispositional predicates. But this "presumption" of unobservables is convenient but not necessary? "we are

familiar enough in a general way with how one sets about guessing, from
judicious tests and samples and observed uniformities, whether there is
25
a disposition of a specified sort."

Kow does one test, however, for

a disposition to verbal behavior?

6

r

>.

e needn’t test at alls

vre

know all human beings have it* (By the sane

reasoning, one could establish an innate capacity for speech in humans.

The totality of dispositions to verbal behavior? That is everything

that a speaker has said, -will say, could say, and -would say* We can "presume" to attribute the totality of dispositions, structurally, to
"principles of neural organisation”, but that phrase, strangely enough,
26
is Chomsky’s, arch-foe of empiricism i
One night indeed wcnder -what
is so empirical about the "totality of dispositions" except that it is

an extension of particular dispositions, which can be empirically tested
for* At any rate, for Quine, a language is a system of dispositions to

verbal behavior, and stimulus meanings are a subclass of dispositions

in a language.
(3) In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” Quine argues against the veri-

fication theory of meaning by arguing that "in taking the statement as

unit [for confirmation, disccnfirmation by experience] we have drawn
our grid too finely* The unit of empirical significance is the whole of
27
He rejects the empirical -simplemindedness of verifies tionscience."
ism, and the holism of scientific theory, which he espouses in "Two
28
*
Object
Word
and
in
Dogmas," reappears, only slightly qualified,

However, in that later work, with which we are here concerned, he writes,

in a section titled "Evidence," "words mean only as their use in sentences
is conditioned to sensory stimuli, verbal and otherwise* Ary realistic

theory of evidence must be inseparable from the psychology of stimulus
29

and response, applied to sentences*"

If one allows Quine to treat

no great
whole theories as "verbal stimuli", the first sentence quoted is
difficulties indeparture. We have seen, above, that there are serious

7

volved in treating the "interanimation of sentences" as conditioned
responses, bat that is not at issue here* The second sentence quoted
appears to take single sentences as units, and, as it turns oat later

— that is,
language — reveals

in the exposition, the necessity of doing so

of taking the

sentence as the unit of meaning in a

the depth of

the problem of meaning in a language and its dissimilarity to the prob30
lean of truth in science.

The linguists evidence consists of sentences, one by one, as

stimuli and as responses, and of nonverbal stimuli. A scientific theory
does not stand or fall on confirming or disconfiraing "sensory evidence"

for single statements, even viien these are predictions arising from the
31
theory.
Standards of coherence, simplicity, and centrality of or to
system must also be met, and may override sensory evidence* binguis32
tic theories are "-worse off” than scientific theories
because, altiie

though both attempt to account for "systems of dispositions"
sical objects generally and of speakers of a language

—

—

of phy-

"sentences are

33

thought of as conveying meanings severally"

-while "statements about the

external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but
3k
only as a corporate body."
If sentences must b© as signed meanings one by one, what is the
only possible empirically sound ’meaning

1

of a sentence? Stimulus mean-

ing, answers Quine. Only far stimulus meaning can the observer have

reliable evidence, the correlation of verbal and nonverbal stimuli with

assenting and dissenting responses* Quine assumes, but doer net deiend

explicitly because he does not doubt, the reliability, under suitable
is that
controls, of these correlations* Tfoat he quest ions, and rejects,

8

the sort of hypothesis^cmfteaing/disconfirndng evidence that the

scientist looks for is "reliable" evidence for the linguist. On the
contrary, he holds that the consequences of the linguist’s hypotheses
“

_

"can be defended only through the

•

.

•

hypotheses,

35

nw

and forever."

According to the principle of indeterminacy, there is no empirically sound way of determining that two terms, within one language or

between two languages, are synonymous because, beyond stimulus synonymy,

which is not adequate to the job, an indefinite number of pairings can
be made without any defensible way of choosing between them. There is
no way, in other words, of singling out those true statements of a
language which are true solely

try

virtue of meanings, rules of the lan-

guage, linguistic usage, and totally independent of facts of the non-

linguistic world. The arguments of parts 1.-U* of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," which conclude that "a boundary between analytic and synthetic
36
are thus an important prop for
statements simply has not been drawn,"
the approach Quine takes in Word and Object , and it will be useful to

review them here.

Quine distinguishes two classes of accepted analytic statements.
The first includes those statements which are logical truths (i*e., truth-

functional tautologies), true under any interpretation of their nonlogi37
This first class is unproblematic, and philosophically
cal components.
uninteresting. The second class comprises statements which can be transThus,
formed into tautologous truths by substitution of synonyms.

logically true
’Brothers are male siblings* can be transformed into the

’Brothers are brothers’ if it can be established that

?

male sibling- is

to the relation
synonymous with ’brother*. Quine then turns his attention

9

of synonymy to see if it can provide support for the attribution of

analyticity to statements*

Synonymy is not, as might conveniently be thought, established

by definition except in cases of explicitly stipulated definitions
which establish synonymy by fiat. Definitions rest on "prior relations
38
of synonymy"
discovered by the lexicographer, an "empirical scienUO
39
tist".
They are "grounded in usage,"
and the criterion of synonymy

used by the lexicographer "has still to be clarified, presumably in terms
hi
relating to linguistic behavior*"
Quine does no more in this essay
than assert that compiling dictionaries and providing for the possibility of translation and paraphrase (intra linguistic translation) is the

business of the lexicographer. Just how much of an "empirical scientist"
the lexicographer really is becomes an important issue in "The Problem

of Meaning in linguistics" and of oentral importance in Chapter II of

Word and Object* The point made about definition here is merely that a
dictionary definition cannot justify -transforming a statement which is

not a tautology into one which is. Unlike a definition in a logical calculus, a dictionary definition is the end product of an empirical in-

vestigation. It is as strong or as weak as the procedure, assumptions,

and data which have produced it. It is not prescriptive.

Quine does not mention this, but another weakness of dictionary
sorting
definitions, overlooked by those who put their faith in them for
that standard
out truths of language from truths about the world, is
"factual" from
(as opposed to ideal) dictionaries do not distinguish
The Preface to the
"purely verbal" components in the definitions given*

clear boundary.
Concise Oxford Dictionary recognizes this lack of a

10

book is designed as a dictionary* and not
as
an encyclopaedia j that is* the uses of words and
phrases as such are its subject matter* and it is
concerned with giving information about the things
for which those words and phrases stand only so
far as correct use of the words depends on knowledge of the things. The degree of this dependence
varies greatly with the kind of word treated* the
difference between cyclopaedic and dictionary
treatment varies with it* and the line of distinction is accordingly a fluctuating and dubious
one.
U2
The-

The dictionary reader must sort out the verbal from the factual compo-

nents himself* if he can* Those who rely on dictionary entries to sup-

port synonymy implicitly use soma further criterion* such as the inconceivability of the contradictory*
The next approach to synonymy is through interchangeability*

Granting that any substitution of terms changes something (the inscription itself* psychological or metaphorical associations, etc.), what

sort of substitution preserves "cognitive synonymy"
is

— and

— whatever that

provides a basis for the second class of analytic statements?

Quine simplifies the problem by considering as indivisible words compound terms* including terms in quotation marks. Thus* we need not worry
that we cannot substitute
or in

"

f

male sibling* for *brother* in *brotherhood'

’Brother* is a two-syllable word." He does not discuss the prob-

lem of distinguishing different senses* or readings* of a terms a
’brother* of a religious order may appear in sentences in which it can-

not be considered a compound term* and yet one would not want to re-

quire substitutability of putative synonyms with all readings of both
terms. Quine also does not discuss here substitution into intentional
li3

contexts of believing* looking for* hoping* etc.

However* Quine finds

reasons to reject the criterion of interchangeability even for the

11

simpler oases) a fortiori , it wi 11 not do for the more problems tic
ones.

Interchangeability which preserves the truth-value of the
3ta tenant is found to be too -week as a criterion of synonym for ex-

tensional languages*

Tene which have

the same extension (i. e*, are

true of the same entities) include both those pairs apparently related

by linguistic conventions only (e*g*

,

•brother 1 and 'male sibling 1

and those pairs related by any facts at all (e.g.

,

)

•creature with heart’

and ’creature with kidneys’)* Such interchangeability cannot be the
criterion for a synonymy which supports distinguishing analytic truths
(about language) from synthetic truths (about the world)*

On the other hand, interchangeability does not serve as an inde-

pendent criterion in languages which include modal operators (e.g*,
'necessarily') because the inclusion of such terms presupposes that

meaning has been given to 'analytic' • An attempt to distinguish pairs
of interchangeable terms which cannot but be paired in the language in

question from pairs which are not, but could be, unrelated, cannot make

any headway without the use of concepts intrinsically connected to
to sufthe concept of analyticity. "Cognitive synonymy” itself appears
preserves
fer from the same malaise* it is the sort of synonymy which

analyticity*

At this point, Quine gives up looking for

a firm support for

such as those
analyticity in synonyny, and turns to semantical rules,

any treatment
formulated in artificial languages* He does not consider
languages*
of "rules of language" other than for artificial

conclusion is that constructed languages use

5

is analytic

1

main
and ’soman-

12

tical rule* as unanalyzed terras, and cannot
therefore illuminate the

nature of analyticity. A metalinguistic definition
of ’analytic* in
a constructed language, which uses the term
’analytic', cannot clarify

analyticity. A statement held to be true by a ’senantical
rule’ like-

wise does not explicate

1

true-due-to—language—only

•

in a natural

language. What are semantical rules in a natural language? In
a con-

structed language, they are not characterized, but only listed
under
the heading, ’semantical rules*. These comments reveal
a sharp difference

of opinion between Quine and several commentators on what formalized

languages can contribute to the understanding of natural languages.

Martin is a good representative of this other viewpoint, parti-

cularly since he addresses himself directly to some of the arguments of
"Two Dogmas". Martin asserts that "Quine’s demands for a definition of
’analytic in L* in ’L' ranging over the natural languages is exorbi-

tant." A demand for a definition "ranging over all formalized language
bh
systems is ... at best premature."
Carnap’s work has been on lan-

guages "having a very simple structure," and the "hope" of such work is
that, in time, the definitions given for these simple languages can be
US
"extended".
Such explication oonsists in "making more exact, clear,

and precise an older, less clear, less precise concept.

.

•

•" "That

the new concept is an explication for the older concept is indicated by

using the same word for both." To this assertion, which seems to overlook the fact that "using the same word for both" is insufficient to insure that the new concept is an explication of the older, Martin adds
that to c all the new concept by a less "tendentious" name, as Quine

suggests, since it is an unanalyzed

"

*analytic-for-Lo’ ", "would be to

13

U6
miss the point.”

b-truth uses the term ’analytic' to "indicate” that
U7
it is an explication of analytic truth.

To Quine’s complaint that he does not know what "semantical
rules” are, Martin answers that, in a constructed language, they are
U8
definitions in the metalanguage.
He implies that Quine is being per-

verse in not acknowledging this. In answer, Quine has added a parah9
graph to the essay.
He knows what definitions, postulates and asrf run.

are in a logical calculus, and he knows what "semantical rules" are in
a formalized language. His point is that, apart from being selected as

"semantical rules" for a particular formalized language, there is nothing
intrinsically semantical-rule-like about the statements so specified.
"Semantical rules" are relative to the purposes and procedures of the

languages for which they are formulated. Any statements could be semantical rules in a language. Thus, "no one signalization of a subclass of
the truths of L is intrinsically more a semantical rule than another;
and, if ’analytic’ means ’true by semantical rules', no one truth of
50
L is analytic to the exclusion of another."

Martin's defense of the use of formalized language systems to
clarify concepts in natural language has two prongs t (l) one can clari-

fy concepts in a simple structure which resist analysis in a complicated

— and not

systematically complicated

— one;

(2) one can, with further

knowledge (of an unspecified sort* perhaps of the structure of natural

languages? perhaps of formalized languages, comparatively?) extend the
results of explication in simple artificial languages to natural language.

With reference to this, consider, as Quine does, the application
to natural language of Carnap’s explanation of an analytic statement as

one which is true in *11 state-descriptions/

Quine holds that this

method is not applicable to natural languages
because they contain
some mutually dependent pairs of sentences.
This can be clearly sham,
as follows
(jl)

(2)

(x)vx is a bachelor)

-r

— (x is married)

purportedly analytic

(x)(x is a bachelor)
married)

’p

*

(x)«i»(x is

both statements,
or neither, hold

in all statedescriptions
(3 )

(U)

(

5)

a is a bachelor, b is a bachelor.
-(a is married), -(b is married).

•

•

.

.

*

(x)

* 1
all substitutioninstances of its
scope hold in all
state-descriptions

Tom is a bachelor

state-description* may
be T or F

Tom is married

state-description* may
be T or F

S uate -description-^

S ta te-de 3 cripti on^

(U) is T
(30 is T

(U) is T
(S) is F

State-description^

State—description

(U) is F
(S) is T

State-description^, in which *Tom is a bachelor* and

’Torn is

(U) is F
($) i3 F

married*

are both true, is obviously at variance with the conditions (2) and (3)
of the analyticity of (l). In natural languages, which contain such

"synonym-pairs" as ’bachelor* and ’not married’ , this method will not

pick out the su3»stitution-of-oyrionyrQs-type analytic statements.
The above is merely an example of Quine’s general point about the

limitations of explicating concepts in natural language via simple con-

structed languages.

Appeal to hypothetical languages of an artificially simple kind could conceivably be useful
in clarifying analyticity, if the mental or behavioral or cultural factors relevant to analywere somehow
whatever they may be
ticity

—

—

sketched into the simplified model. But
a
model which takes analytic! ty merely as
an
irreducible character is unlikely to threw
light on the problem of explicating analy—
ticity.
£3
One might say that the failure, which "Two
Dogmas" so neatly

shows, of the traditional criteria of analyticity
has led Quine to
his holistic view of knowledge, expressed in various
picturesque xaeta9x
phora s fabric, field of force, arches and blocks.
All statements are

open to review; all statements can be held "come what
may"; all
statements have some, at least indirect, relation to experience.

Whether some statements can be asserted to be analytic on the
basis of inductively established synonymies ia a question to which
Quine turns in "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics" and, in greater
detail, in fiord and Object. In this undertaking, his results can be

criticized by questioning the strictness of his inductive procedures

and the stopping-point of the investigation which his behaviorism dictates, as well as by meeting the "Two Dogmas" arguments. Such criticisms

will be taken up, below, after we see the consequences of giving up the
absolute distinction between analytic and synthetic statements and of

determining to give an account of language in terms, exclusively, of
observable behavior, as Quine conceives it.

B.

Two Expositions of the Principle

It might be interesting to look first at a brief, earlier formula-

tion of indeterminacy of translation which appeared in the essay, "The
56
The situation ia similar to that
Problem of Meaning in Linguistice".

in Chapter II of Word and Object 1 a linguist finds himself among speakers

16
Of «n

unknom laneuage whose culture

is very different from hie
oro.

He observes correlations between
-KeUb." utterances and "the other
7
things that are observed to be
happening."" H. form, hypotheses
.bout
these uttenenoes as wholes and tests
for them. After "picking up some
Initial Kalaba vocabulary,"
he tries breaking .hole utterances
down

into shorter caoponents and correlating
these with English words. He
tests these correlations "as best he
can"

and ultimately compiles

his Kalaba-£ngliah lexicon#

The serious theoretical difficulty with
this procedure, «s Quine
sees it, is that "the relevant features of
the situation issuing in a

given Kaleba utterance are in large part concealed
in the person of the
speaker,"

and by this Quine does not mean only the speaker's unique

language-learning history but what he sees his experience "as"
because
of the structure ol his language* The formula ticai
of indeterminacy of

translation in this essay is more explicitly IShorfian than that
in Word

and Object* To read the following statements, and to view this presentation as equivalent, in capsule farm, to the one in Word and Object,
61
is to understand why Jonathan Cohen sees Quine as the heir of Wharf*

Theoretically the more important difficulty is
that, as Cassirer and Whorf have stressed,
there is in principle no separating language
from the rest of the world, at least as conceived by the speaker# Basic differences in
language are bound up, as likely as not, with
differences in the way in which the speakers
articulate the world itself into things and
properties, time and space, elements, forces,
spirits, and so on. It is not clear even in
principle that it makes sense to think of
words and syntax as varying from language to
language while the content stays fixed) yet
precisely tills fiction is involved in speaking of synonymy, at least as between radically
different languages*
62

17

Wlat provides the lexicographer with an entering wedge is the fact that there are mny
basic features of men’s ways of conceptualizing t,heir environment*
to all cultures.

•

•vdiich are coma on

I have suggested that our lexicographer’s
obvious first moves in picking up some initial Kalaba vocabulary are at bottom a natter of exploiting the overlap of our cultures.

63

Quine appears to be stressing the cultural factor in language
differences and similarities in these passages. However, even his

Whorfian starting point takes account of most of the criticisms one
can make of T»7horf’s relativity thesis* Quine does not go so far as to

claim that "basic differences in language” determine "differences in
the way in which the speakers articulate the world itself into things

and properties, [etc*]" He says that these two sets of differences are
6U
"bound up” with each other, a much weaker claim.
He recognizes that
one cannot think of the "content" of an utterance as fixed, independent-

ly of the way a given language slices up experience. This is also the
essence of "Whorf’s claim, but Whorf, unlike Quine, does not think it

inconsistent to "translate” Hopi locutions at the same time that he is
insisting that they cannot be translated, almost as If he proves his
65
point by showing how odd the translations are*
Perhaps most importantly, Quine sees that the undertaking of

translating a radically different language, from the very start, "en66
because it begins
courages the misconception of meaning as reference"

by pointing (and other ostensive procedures) and then proceeds by resting as much as possible cm the "presumably common, fund of eonceptuali67
Thus, even if the linguist keeps testing
zaiion" among human beings.
his hypothetical translations, "the clarity of any possible conflict
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decreases*"

Even in the most cloarcut, public situations, the terms

of the English sentence may simply not pick out the same "relevant

features" as the terras of the Kalaba sentence. The English sentence

and the Kalaba sentence may both denote 'that, over there* without
having the same meanings. The farther one gets from reports on 'that,
over there

1

,

the more important the conceptual structure of a language

is to the translation of a sentence. Part of Whorf

5

s

puzzle

ccxues

from

his failure to distinguish meaning from reference. Perceiving that Hopi

enshrines different features of experience as relevant, Whorf concludes,
not only that Hop! sentences have different meanings from their putative translations in English, but also that the Hopi experience of the

world (i.e.

what in fact is sensed) is different from the American69
European experience of the world.
,

The linguist's procedure rests on interchangeability aalva ve ri ba te

plus an attempt to get beyond, this thoroughly inadequate standard

of synonym (see above, p. ll) by projecting "himsolf, -vdth his Indo70

European Weltanschauung ,

into the sandals of his Kalaba informant.

His completed lexicon, the result of

tills

method, has more than the

usual inductive weaknesses. If this were all, further field work could
locate mistranslations and confirm correct ones. But in the case of a

lexicon coiaoiled in the absence of a criterion for synonymy , there is
71
.'
"nothing for the lexicographer to be right or wrong about

For the second formulation of indetexiidnacy, in

v«

1

ord

arxi

Object ,

Quine sets his linguist up in an even more explicitly forbidding situato his own,
tion. The language he is to translate is totally unrelated

without any
or to languages familiar to him; the culture is likewise
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points of similarity to his own or related cultures*
nor have the
people had contact with any outsiders* Furthermore he does
not have
*
72

the services of an informant. It is not a practical case*

but a Ge-

dankenexperiment intended to make the conclusions stand out more
sharply and with more plausibility

—

one English-speaking observer

and a number of Other-speaking natives. "liadical translation" turns out
to involve problems no different in principle from those of translation

between closely related languages* even by one bilingual speaker* or of
paraphrase or understanding within one language. The purpose of this

approach is* first* to overcome resistance to the principle of indeterminacy of translation by demonstrating its plausibility in an extreme
case* and then to show that it does not result from cultural peculiar-

ities but from problems with synonymy and with the limits of observability.

The linguist begins by matching stimulations (controlled for

clarity* duration* etc*

*

by him) with utterances * taken to be sentences*

and from these correlations derives the only empirically sound results
in his translation of the language* stimulus meanings of highly observational occasion sentences. He moves from these* on peril of increasing
uncertainty* to "results" which are ultimately neither confirmable nor
falsifiable.
"Stimulus meaning" is defined for any one speaker, for a sentence*
as his disposition to assent or dissent from the sentence -when con-

fronted by it in conjunction with one of a class of stimulations at a
given time. Two sentences are stimulus-synonymous when they have the
same stimulus meaning for a speaker j "socially” stimulus-synonymous

20

when this correlation holds overwhelmingly throughout
the speech community* A sentence is stimulus -ana lytic -when a speaker would
assent to

it or to nothing, or react with shocked disbelief and sudden doubt
of
his questioner's grasp of the language to the denial of the sentmce.

Stimulus -ana lyticity can also be "socialised" by taking it to apply to
those sentences to -which almost all members of the speech ccmsaunity

would so react*
Stimulus meaning is granted by Quine to fall far short of the

traditional concept of meaning* Stimulus synonymy and stimulus analyticity, since they are based on stimulus meaning, also represent only a
73
"behavioristic ersatz"
for the concepts of synonyny and analyticity*

They represent for Quine how far

— and it

is not very far

— the

lin-

guist can go on available (acceptable) evidence. Before sketching the
linguist's next steps, beyond the evidence, as it were, we will look at

what Quine means by "stimulations" and at the kinds of sentences for

which stimulus meaning adequately represents meaning* Perhaps even more
important is his rationale for correlating stimulations with sentences
rather than with words*
7U

The stimulations are taken to be "repeatable event farmjjij",

and they are counted as similar, if not identical, for different speakers if the speakers are similarly placed with respect to lighting con-

ditions, distance of objects, etc*, on assumptions about "the anatomical
75
As Quine writes in a later paper, "It is the
resemblance of people*"

stimulation at the bodily surface that counts, and not just the objective existence of objects of reference off in the distance, nor yet the
76
events deep inside the body*"

21

Other factors may influence a speaker’s assent
or dissent in a

particular case, such as the duration of the stimulation
(too long or
too momenta xy), the speaker’s condition, "intrusive
infommtion"
oj

given

another native speaker on the scene or known through
experience by

the queried speaker himself (but not by the linguist)* Some
of these

factors can be controlled and compensated for by the linguist,
but not

all of them. "Intrusive information", particularly when it is widely
shared in the community, cannot be reliably stripped away free the

disposition to assent or dissent to sentences in the presence of stimulations* This is, of course, a homely illustration of the lack of a

boundary between facts about language and facts about the world. Quine
writes that "we have made no general experimental sense of a distinction

between what goes into a native’s learning to apply an expression and

what goes into his learning supple mentary matters about the objects
78

concerned.

Some kinds of sentences are "less susceptible than others" to
79
the influence of intrusive information*
If "occasion" sentences are

distinguished from "standing" sentences by the fact that the former

command "assent or dissent only as prompted all over again by current
stimulation" whereas for the latter assent or dissent may be prompted
80
be
the
of
prompting,
repeated
absence
then "observation"
or may
in

sentences are those occasion sentences "whose stimulus meanings vary
81
Observation
information."
none under the influence of collateral
sentences may be an idealisation} at least, however, there are "degrees
82
of occasion sentences# Stimulus meaning, accordof observatianallty"

ing to Quine, is moaning for highly observational occasion sentences.
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Pairs of sentences can be matched for stimulus
synonymy, and sentences can be tested for stimulus analyticity, even
if the sentences

are not observation sentences, but these sentences
cannot be trans-

lated except 'with the help of ’’analytical hypotheses”*
Observation

sentences can be translated by their stimulus meanings*

83

One could ask why the linguist starts by correlating whole

utterances with stimulations. The first reason is that, initially, he

obviously does not know which are the independent parts of any utterance* It is true that, given differences in conventions about the

rise and fall of the voice, and pauses, in different languages, some
’’whole” utterances

may be larger units than single sentences* However,

any number of sentences in an utterance can be taken to be one sentence which is a conjunction of the contained sentences* It seems

evident that the linguist could make more mistakes by premature segmenting than by taking as a sentence an utterance which is actually two
or more sentences. Quine* s view of the primacy of sentences is based

on a number of different lines of reasoning, which go beyond this prac-

tical one.

With respect to learning a language, even one’s native language,
he believes that words are learned as parts of sentences, or as one-

word sentences, and that many early compound sentences are learned as
8U
wholes. Sentences, therefore, have a genetic primacy*

Conventions for identifying well-formed sentences are more reli85
With words, one has
able than those for identifying separate words*

the problem of words contained in words or bridging words* not only
•bachelor* s-button

1

or •bachelorhood* but also ’cat* in ’cattle’ and
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,

xce’ in ’I scream’

(whan spoken)* There are also numerous "formula”

expressions in a language which consist of at least two nords
habitual-

1/ joined: o*g*, ’How do you do?*, ’pure creamery butter

1

,

etc* This

is not to say that ’how’ never exists alone or in other combinations,

but, just as ’cat* is concealed in the wal'd ’cattle’, ’how’ may be

thought to be concealed in the "word" ’Howdoyoudo 1 .

Another reason for the primacy of sentences is found in "The
86

Problem of Meaning in linguistics’

1

.

"Primary synonymy"

is between

fairly long segments of discourse* Sentences, on this view, are the
shortest units which could have the same meaning* In some cases, the
scope has to be extended to sentence pairs or whole paragraphs* So-

called synonymy between words, according to Quine, amounts only to
87

"lame partial synonymy plus stage directions*"

One only makes the

effort with words because the pairs of truly synonymous long segments
88
are "altogether limitless in number and variety,"
and therefore uncampilable* Dictionaries are a convenience. However, because dictionaries

exist, and because we look up "the meaning" of a ward in them,

we mistakenly

cents

to think that synonymy i3 a relation between words*

Not 30.
The most important reason for the primacy of sentences, however,

is the one that has already came up in connection with the plight of

the linguist in "Meaning in linguistics"* An English and a Kalaba utter-

ance were both correlated with the same public experience, but there
was no presumption from that that they meant the same, in & fuller sense
of ’meaning* than "stimulus meaning", or even that the terns in each

sentence denoted the sane entities* As Quine puts it in »Iord ana Object,

2U

"Occasion sentences and stimulus meanings are general coin; terms and
89
reference are local to our conceptual scheme."
There is even a sug-

gestion in the passage from which this sentence

cotaes

that syntactic

features may be so radically different between the two languages that
the linguis t can do violence to the language he is trying to translate

by hypothetically constructing and analysing sentences from and into
"parts". But Quine is mainly talking about the conceptual categories

to which terras belong

— is

’gavagai’, as a term, ’rabbit’ or ’rabbit-

stage’ or ’part of scattered rabbithood’, etc. ?

— and he may be

think-

ing of syntax, as Wharf does, in terms of the semantical correlates of
syntactic categories.
The inaccessibility of both the extension and. Intension of

tenas is the basis of Quine’s answer to Carnap’s proposal in "Meaning

and Synonymy in Natural language." Carnap has his linguist engage in
a series of questions and answers with "ICarl" to determine the intensions of terms, after taking it as "granted" that the extensions of
90
Quine notes tliat a considerable command of
terms can be determined.
91
but that would
the language is required to cany on this questioning,

be a practical matter and a question of time, if it were all* Thu real

flaw in the procedure is that questions which would elicit the intension of a term must be couched in the "provincial" concoptxial frame-

work of Karl’s language which the linguist doss not knew

— and which,

to know
according to the principle of indeterminacy* he cannot get

in Karl’s
even with empirical probability. As he frames his questions

mean to Karl is
language, without this lowwledge, what the questions
inscrutable to the linguist.

25

The linguist must ask Karl such questions as "Is that].
(stimu-

lation of a rabbit) the same as that (stimulation of another
rabbit) ?"
2
or

M Is

that (stimulation of a horse -with a horn in the middle of its

forehead

—a

picture) a 'Pferd' ?"

The reliability of the answers

depends entirely on the accuracy of the linguist’s hypothetical trans-

lation of ’the same as 1 and 'Pferd'* The same responses which would

confirm his hypothetical translations could also confirm other* entire-

ly disparate hypothetical translations, as well as the actual intensions of the terms for the native speaker* If ’the same as* does not

mean 'is the same kind of thing as* but ’is part of the same scattered
rabbithood as’, the responses will be the same, but the linguist, interpreting 'is the same as’ as 'is the same kind of thing as’, will be

wrong in his subsequent translation of ’gavagai’* Likewise, ’Pferd* may
not mean ’horse’ to the native speaker, but 'that participant in the
92

tribal totem with cloven hooves’*
It is important to see, as Carnap apparently does not, that the

extension of a term is as much in question here as its intension* The
linguist cannot determine the range of entities to which Karl is willing
93

to apply a term with only "the uncertainty of all inductive inference,"
because, after the first few responses, he must formulate an hypothesis

about the extension and intension of the term in question, and his
hypothesis will determine the sorts of stimulations he presents to Karl.
His results may therefore show areas of positive, negative and uncertain

responses and yet not be a map of the extension of the term*
Imagine a Kalaba-epeaking linguist investigating English, who

wanted to determine "at least" the extension of the

terra ’blue*.

After
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the first few assents and dissents of his informant to presentations
of small physical objects, eyes, sky and clothing, he hypothesizes that

the sound ’blue* picks out a quality of being not readily edible. With
this in mind, he presents a variety of edible, inedible, unappetizing,

and possibly edible things to his informant. As long as he works with
that hypothesis, he will leave totally out of account certain kinds of

testing presentations, and his results will only show the areas of
responses within the range of presentations which have been chosen with
the hypothesis in mind.

It has not seemed possible to discuss why stimulus meaning is a

relation between stimulations and sentences, rather than terms, without
bringing in the linguist* s hypotheses. ’’Analytical hypotheses”, as

Quine calls them, are directly responsible for the indeterminacy of
radical translation* Quine does not demonstrate that such hypotheses
are not also involved in the determination of stimulus meanings.

?liis

requires a brief defense.

After all, one does not know intuitively what signs speakers give,
9U
dissent.
and
assent
for
gestures,
or
behavior
orally or by their
them to estabIt wE.ll take seme sort of hypotheses and the testing of
universal, and the
lish this. The nod, headshake, and shrug are not
out on his first try
Kalaba linguist may well get them wrongly sorted

hypotheses is that
with English speakers* The point about these

the;

is slow or has bad luck with
are veiy limited, and even if the linguist

out, with djffergrt
them, he idll soon have tried them *11

r*nMa

(sines

and determine which is
assent and dissent are contradiotory attitudes),

be tested in this way.
which. Analytical hypotheses cannot
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The as sumption ia being made that there is something
equi-

valent to ’Yea

1

and ’No’, in words and/or behavior, in any language, and

it might be argued that this is not necessarily so. In that
case, the

linguist would have to go home prematurely in abject defeat. However,

it seems more fruitful to assume that, both for any kind of reasoning,
problem-solving, etc. , and for survival itself (there has to be a
of giving in when your arm

lias

ivay

been twisted long enough), acme expres-

sions of assent and dissent are basic

— and

even conspicuous

— in

human communities.
From this assumption about assent and dissent, Quine also derives
the translatability of truth-functional connectives, ’and

1

,

'or 1 and

’not*. These can be given behavioral meaning in terms of assent and

dissent to sentences combined or negated. Their translatability rests
on a further assumption, closely related, however, to the first, that
9$
One is not
there must be this much implicit logic in any language.

imputing the knowledge of logic in some form, or logically consistent

behavior most of the time, to members of all societies, however primitive, but merely some means of making distinctions and resisting self-

contradiction, again for the sake of survival (which should probably be

taken to include pr dblem-s olving )
This justification of the universal existence of assent, dissent,

and truth functional logic in languages by the need to "survive’’ is not
to be found explicitly in Quine's writings. It is ay attempt to 3tate

presuppositions of his linguist's starting point which are consistent

with Quine's general position. Peter Winch, in an article which argues
infor attempting to understand "native" beliefs and practices through
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teraal, rather than externally imposed, criteria,
nevertheless explicates tnc "necessity" of rationality in ary language,
on somewhat more

restricted grounds, as follows?

Where there is language, it iaust make a difference what is said and this is only possible
where the saying of one thing rules out, on
pain of failure to communicate, the saying of
something else.

%

The question might arise, after this line of argument, whether,

in this sense, the higher primates are not also "logical” in their
behavior. "Logic" is certainly being defined very broadly here. Furthermore, if one accepts Vygotsky’s analysis that, in a child’s mental

development, there is a stage of pre-linguistic thought (problem97

solving) and pre-logical speech (the earliest expressive utterances),

why is it not possible for

a very simple society to have a language

which is expressive but not logical, although they can go about the
business of survival as animals do? Quine might answer that we simply
could not understand a nonlogical language, and if a linguist found

such a society, he would conclude that they have no language. (In fact,
I believe that there are no known cases of societies with incoherent,

babbling languages. The degree of complexity of language has resisted
98

all correlations with the degree of complexity of society.
Let us return to the Quinian linguist. Having translated highly

observational occasion sentences and logical connectives by stimulus
meanings, and having identified stimulus-analytic sentences and stim-

lua-«ynanymou3 pairs of sentences, the linguist begins to segment

utterances into units, which he takes to be the wards of the language,

and to match these up with words in his own language. From observing

29

the important daily activities
and preoccupations of his native
speakers, he

oara to conclusions about wlat brief expression*"

there

are likely to be (e.g., a term for rabbit
in rabbit-banting country-;
severs x words for kinds of snow among Eskimos).
^xt.

i

Experienced, perhaps,

several languages, the linguist’s guesses
are infoimad by his

sharpened sense for formal similarities among
languages. The "typical
case" of formulating an hypothesis is where the
linguist "apprehends
a parallelism in function between some component
fra©r»nt of a transla ted whole nativa^sentenoe and some component word
of the translation

of the sentence."
3 enhances

He tents his tentative definitions against the

he has already translated by stimulus meanings and those

identified as analytic and synonymous. When the latter two kinds are
translated, they should encouragingly yield analytic and synonymous

sentences in English. And so

lie

goes on, "thinking up” hypotheses, test-

ing and rejecting, until he has compiled his lexicon which, he believes,
conforms to the "totality of speech behavior" he has observed, and even
102
to dispositions beyond what he has observed.
The analytical hypotheses "extend the working limits of trans103
latian beyond where independent evidence can e:d.st. "
They do this

primarily by -shat may be a most skillful and subtle perception of analogies. Thile there may be no denying that the analogies (i.e.

,

simi-

larities in certain respects) perceived by the linguist do exist between
the language under stu^y and, say , English, thi 3 in no way entails

tiiat

these features in the unknown language, on which the analogies are based.

have the same significance, or any significance, to the speakers of that
language. It also does not ontail that all English-speaking linguists
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would perceive the same analogies* There is nothing in the
overt behavior, elicited or spontaneous, of the native speakers which
could

falsify an analytical hypothesis* The completed English-Other lexicon
is nwoefully under-dete^Mine^u^'

.jy

the stimulus iiieaning translations of

10U

observation sentences*

The translations of these sentences and all

the observed behavior of native speakers are compatible with countless
105
"rival systems of analytical hypotheses."
Nothing that the linguist

has observed, nothing that the liiiguist can or could observe, can se-

lect a "right" system of analytical hypotheses or elimixiate a "wrong"*
Translations based an these hypotheses are supported by the coherence
106

of the system of hypotheses, and by no tiling mere, "now and forever*

There is no criterion for choosing among different 'translations
of a sentence, each supported by a different system of hypotheses* A

systematic criterion, such as simplicity, is not wanted here because,

at the level of comparing different indiwidual sentence-translations,
the simplest system may have produced a translation which is wron^ :

which has a different truth-value from the sentence translated.
Here we are at the heart of the problem* The ascription

of'

synonymy

between terms is supported by a system of analytical hypotheses,

-*uiy

such systems are possible, each self-c ohe rent and consistent with all
dispositions to verbal beluvior in both languages. However,

tiie

mapping

of synonymy-r ela ti ons between terms vdll differ in different systems in

3uch a

my

that one Other sentence will receive several

ways even truth-i unc ti ona Uy equivalent

— translations

— and not

al-

in English#

Quine h«3 accepted with equanimity a theory-relative concept of
108
,
,r
fiat transla tional
I4ay v» conclude," lie ask3,
truth for science*
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«t it# worst is no worse off than truth
in physics? To be
109
thus reassured is to misjudge the
parallel.”
To assert that a
aynorgragr

statement is true, where ’true* means 'true
according to Newtonian
physics’, is to be ready, if challenged,
to support the claim with
other statements from the theory. This
is, in fact, what happens. The

reasons given becaas increasingly theoretical,
if the challenge is pressed

far enough, until one comes to the basic
assumptions of the theory. In
a conflict between A, defending common sense,
and B, defending

modem

physios, with respect to a statement which A claims is
true and B claims
is false (e. g. ,

VS

A chair is solid. ”), the supporting statements made

by A and B will quickly enough get down to fundamental assumptions.
One
may not persuade the other, but neither will be puzzled at the end
as
to why they disagree on the truth of the statement.
On the other hand, the analytical hypotheses used in compiling
a lexicon are hidden from view. They are not even entirely explicit for
the lexicographer himself, and are not available for settling disputes

about variant translations of a sentence. One does not, on any account,
lode to principles of translation for support far the translation of a
sentence. A sentence is thought to have a meaning, related to the meanings of its constituent words and it® syntactic form. One would look up
the wards, check a grammar, and if A and B found one Other-word trans-

lated by two entirely different and Incanpatible English wards or expressions in their two lexicons, they would conclude that one lexico-

grapher had made an empirical error which could be settled by a field
trip and usage-questionnaires. The trouble is that a given word in the

unknown language could be translated in the following assorted ways for
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the following assorted* but
unstated

Native words

Lexicon

English translation

A

’animal’

*

7

*

reasons
Plunko*

Analytical hypotheses
There must be a word for ’animal 3
because many kinds of animals are
hunted and indiscriminately stored*

spirit dwelling in
all animals 1

Tessa is used only in sentences
which appear to function as prayers*
expressions of awe, wishes* etc*

spirit dwelling in
all living things*

as above

result of a success—
ful hunt* or disposition to be such*

language nominalizes effects* not

’portion of running*
or disposition to
be such*

things*

language nominaliaes actions*
viewed as divisible who£si7'not
things*

This may give some hint of the drastic differences possible* which
can-

not be dissolved by further field work because they are all compatible

with all the observations and depend on interpretations of those observations*

The problem cannot be solved by bilingual linguists* because a

bilingual only represents an internalized system of analytical hypotheses* one of

inasny*

and two bilinguals could find the same "differences
110

in net output" between themselves as between two rival lexicons*
Furthermore* the problem of indeterminacy exists* although in a practi-

cally much less troublesome form* in translating closely related languages*
111
or languages of closely related cultures*
It even exists* as a dis-

tinct theoretical possibility* in understanding and paraphrasing the
112
How often* for
utterances of another speaker of one's own language*
example* in conversation* one makes allowances for another’s slips of
the tongue, false starts* deviant usages* etc* If* instead of making al-
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lowances, one sought to make sense of
them by hypotheses about their
-meaning”, one could do so in a number of
ways, with the same result-

ing inability to choose the -right” way,
as in radical translation.

Quine does not dai^ that the linguist may come
across genuine
"c-ulturai contrast©

which are not merely cases of Indeterminacy
of

translation. He gives the example of a language
which contains an oc-

casion sentence assented to in the presence of
half-brothers or pelicans, but which does not contain a sentence assented
to in the presence
of a member of either class exclusively, and
contrasts this with Engllsh.

An Eskimo language having numerous words for kinds of snow,

but no generic term for ’snow 1 , and the opposite case in English,
is

presumably also a case of cultural contrast. However, when the linguist
comes up with really exotic translations, such that we can barely ccm-

prehend the way the speakers appear to think

— as Whorf did —ru

;

we

are more likely coming vp against the results of indeterminacy than of
cultural contrast. Quine has become less Whorflan than he was in -Meaning in Linguistics”.
One frequently hears it urged £ footnote to
Cassirer* Lee, Sapir, WhorfJ that deep differences of language carry -with them ultimate
differences in the way one thinks, or looks
upon the world. I would urge that what is
moot generally involved is indeterminacy of
correlation.
115

When the culture is very different from the linguist’s, it is more difficult to distinguish cultural differences from failures in translation
due to indeterminacy. However, indeterminacy exists, although it does not

alwayB intrude as a practical problem, all along the continuum from two

speakers of the same language to two speakers of totally unrelated languages.

3U

CHAPTER

II

THE PROGRAM OF REGIMENTATION

A.

Purpose and Procedure

In turning to the subject of this chapter we are following
,

Quine's own course in Word and Object* The relevance of the problems
raised by regimentation to indeterminacy of translation will be de-

veloped in the course of the discussion. At first, however, it looks
as if Quine is abandoning the virtually impossible

tween languages

— the

—

—

translation be-

in order to deal with the manageable and promising

clarifies tion of ambiguity within one natural language by logic.

Using the case of radical translation, Quine has argued that the
extensions, as well as the intensions, of terms in two languages can1
not be matched on the basis of "surface irritations", but only via

analytical hypotheses which are unempirical because they are not falsi-

fiable by any observable behavior. Although, in principle, the English
of A and the English of B can be considered two different languages

—

as, in seme ways, they are, with respect to language-learning history

and numerous differences in usage

— and

thus subject to the same in-

determinacy as the English of A and the Kalaba of Q, A and B manage to
communicate in English, making allowances for isolated peculiarities of
each other's utterances, and avoiding speculations about irresolvable
differences of meaning between them. Quine therefore proceeds to outline

how a child learns the referential devices of his native language, in
this case, English, and then, taking "the mastered language as a going
concern.

.

.

considerfs] the inde terminates ancjirregularities of refer-
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ence that pervade it*”

Quine puts aside, after Chapter II, the
indeterminacy of translation of terms, which so drastically hinders
the linguist in his enterprise, and turns to problems in communication
between speakers of a

common language which could not even arise for the
linguist attempting
radical translation. There are two preliminary comments*
(l) the theoretical indeterminacy of translation between two speakers of
the ”saine”
language, and the practical problem of different speech
sub-communities

within the "same” language, play no part in the discussion of these
problems in communication) (2) the problems dealt with are no longer
those of a fictional linguist, but of a philosopher concerned with "logi-

cal grammar”.
The problems arise from several kinds of ambiguity (of terras, of

particular constructions, of syntactic structure, of scope) and of the
3

failure of reference in indirect discourse and intentional contexts.
There are two stages in the procedures for dealing with them. The first

stage involves "practical temporary I "opportunistic" J departures from
L
k
5
ordinary language” "for getting over a sudden block in communication."

These may be the use of variables to clear up problems of cross refer6
7
ence, the use of parentheses for problems of grouping, the "such
8

that" construction for problems of scope,

and the distinction between
f

referential and nonreferential position to clarify one s intentions in
- 9
sentences of believing, hoping, thinking, doubting, etc.
The second stage is "regimentation". Regimentation is not differ-

ent in kind frcta the paraphrasing operations of the first stage, which

also drew on the standardizing and simplifying functions of logical
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theory in the use of parentheses,
variables,

etc

The ultimate pur-

poses are different: on-the-spot paraphrasing
has as its purpose "get-

ting over a sudden block in coranrunioation”
j regimentation lias as its
10
„
purpose "simplification of theory".
We regiment, rather than merely
patch up ordinary language -when "we are
limning

structure ol reality. "

trie

true and ultimate

In this posture, we adopt a more severe
atti-

tude toward the expressions of ordinary language
than the usual attitude
12
of using words without intending to postulate
the entities they name.

This more severe attitude is the acceptance of the
"ontological conrnit13
ments" of our discourse.
Quine's "double standard" is the differential-

ly rigorous treatment of expressions in ordinary language, depending
on
1U
one's purposes: everyday or scientific discourse.

A paraphrase intended to clear up an ambiguous construction in
everyday discourse may use fragments of logical notation in a sentence
of English, for the sake of the clearer standards attending the use of,

for example, parentheses in logic than of commas and relative word
position in English. In a regimented paraphrase, the logic must be more
thoroughly "digested" by the English sentences than it is in its "opportunistic” use above. In order to make all one’s commitments explicit,

and to take advantage of deductions possible in quantified first order
logic, English sentences must be "transformed" into logical notation

"adapted to the theory."

The English sentences may be drastically al-

tered in the process. Some redundant constructions

vri.ll

be assimilated,

some puzzling ones eliminated altogether. The quantity of change exceeds that of the first stage because the motive for change is different.

Quine compares paraphrase in regimentation to the refomilation of a prob-
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lem being programmed for machine
computation* it prepares the way for
"the methodical manipulation of formulas
according to fixed rules of
algorithm”.

Whether the ambiguity of grouping attending
*pretty little girls 1
camp' i 3 clarified by the use of parentheses,
as

camp,

1

*

(prettyClittle girls')

depends on wiiether the speaker or writer intends
to refer to a

pretty camp for little girls or rather to a camp for
girls who are both
pretty and little. The sentence-paraphrase in full
"canonical notation"
must also bear a relation of some sort of equivalence to the
pre-paraphrased sentence. If not, there is no gain in the undertaking. It
would

be difficult to count how many times Quine reiterates in these
pages
that the ordinary-language sentence and its paraphrase in canonical no-

tation are not synonymous . What does this negative claim amount to?
Let us take the following two ambiguous sentences i
(1) Everyone in the room knows

(2)

at least two languages.

At least two languages are known by everyone in the room.

Both of these sentences are ambiguous because it is not clear whether
the two languages are the same two or any two.

The following paraphrases

are the two ways of resolving the ambiguity*
(3) (x)(3y)(3x) (x is in the room

guage
(U)

QyKWOc)

. r> •

(x is in the room

guage

•

3

•

• y is a language
x knows y and a)

•

z is a lan-

y is a language
x knows y and z;

•

z is a lan-

.

Paraphrase (3)* with its arrangement of quantifiers, resolves the ambiguity in favocr of any two languages (which does not entail, of course,

that each person in the room must know different languages from every
other person in the room), and paraphrase (U), with its arrangement of
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quantifiers, resolves the ambiguity in
favor of the same two languages.
j-t

(l) qj

.

not.

v

2)

is cleai

-hat neither

(3 )

nor (U) is synonymous with either

simply because (l) and (2) are ambiguous
and

(

3 ) amt

(I*)

are

(1) and (2) have each two possible
interpretations, and therefore

two possible truth-values for any given
utterance, while

(3 )

and (U)

have each a single interpretation and only
one truth-value for any given
utterance. In this sense, no paraphrase,
successful in resolving ambiguity, can possibly be synonymous with the
ambiguous ordinary language

sentence to be paraphrased.
I«t us consider the following two sentences, in
what Quine calls
18
"semi-ordinary” English*
(p)

Each person in the room is such that there are two languages
that he knows.

(6) There are two languages such that each person in the roam

knows them.
(5) is synonymous

with

(3

),

and (6) is synonymous with (U), or might

"naturally enough be spoken of a synonymous", according to Quine, because
(3) and ft) "mechanically" expand into ($) and (6), respectively,

by

19
the metalinguistic rules of the logic.

to assert synonymy of either (l) with

But, from this, one cannot move
(

3 ) or (l) with (5). The transi-

tion from (l) to (£) involves settling on one interpretation of the ambiguous sentence as well as accepting rules in the logic for the significance of the order of quantifiers and the "such that" construction.

With respect to the order of quantifiers, whether in logical notation
or in "semi-ordinary" English, the user is strictly coomitted by them to

determinate interpretations as

lie

is not by the inversion of word order
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in ordinary English, which
nay be used merely fur
empheeis, poetic
meter, or emotive effect*
In the above

exiles, we did not

touch the questions of what

"knowing a language" is, or, for
that natter, "being a (distinct)
language", because, problematical
as these predicates are, they
are
unrelated to the ambiguity of
sentences (l) and (2). There
are cases,
however, where paraphrasing must
directly attack the predicates.
Examples are found on pages
1S2-15U of Wwd and Object, when Quine
is
dealing with the referential
"opacity" of particular verbs. One
brings
out the propositional attitude
implicit in "The commissioner is looking
for the chairman of toe hospital
board" "by expanding -look for* Into
enoearor „o find'.”
"Anyone is ready enough to paraphrase " "
'Qior-

gione was so-called.

.

"Just as looking for

1|

to shoot or capture."

into " 'Giorgione was called 'Giorgione*.

2*
.

.

>«

endeavoring to find, so hunting is endeavoring
The underlined words show the expressions
Quine

uses in substituting predicates for one another,
T&thout ever claiming

that the substituted predicate means the same
as the predicate substituted
,

for. His insistence on the nongynonyny of
sentences vtith their para-

phrases applies fully to cases of paraphrase which
involve changes of

predicates.
Qaj.ue

fakes a very permissive course with predicates, even
in the

process of full regimentation. There is "no inventory of allowable
23

terms,"

—

"a fixed, closed vocabulary of simple terms" in the manner
2i|

of Carnap

—

and no intrinsic distinction between "simple" and "ccra2$
plex" terms in the manner of Russell.
Any predicates are, in principle,
acceptable, however complex, however unobservable their referents. Some-

Uo

tiaes paraphrase -will nevertheless involve analysing
predicates, not

because the theory requires it but because the paraphraser finds
it
perspicuous to do so, and these predicate-pairs are not to be consi-

dered synonymous# Indeed, two paraphrases of one English sentence
may
exhibit wide differences with respect to analysis (or "translation”)
of predicates# Stimulus synonyuy of general terms, even within English,
26
is likely to be "too loose"
to individuate finely enough# How, then,

can they be compared with each other and with the paraphrased sentence

?

To this question, as well as to the one about comparison of
paraphrases and paraphrased sentences generally, the answer is that it

all depends on the purposes of the paraphraser# It is assumed that the
paraphraser is also the utterer of the English sentence which is being
27

paraphrased# This is at least the "paradigm case”#

He knows what he

means, and he knows if the paraphrase resolves difficulties and preserves

what he intends to preserve of the "meaning”# He can compare alternative
paraphrases, and choose between them on the basis of his intentions# He

may be advised by others, and even on occasion persuaded, "but his choice
28
is the only one that binds him."

Two speakers of English, both engaged

in the regimentation of discourse, van, by "semantic ascent”, make clear
to each other what they are doing, and perhaps why, but, for a given

English sentence, there are no common standards for choosing the paraphrase of one over that of the other, nor for determining that one paraphrase

— or both,

or neither

— is

a paraphrase of that English sentence#

Quine 1 s argument seems to turn on the acceptability of any predicates, and the problems that follow from that# He does also mention
oi
that there is no mechanical procedure for determining the equivalence

Ul
quantixicational sentences in notation, "no general
limit to the length
29

of inquiry that may be required."

The more crucial premise appears

to be the dependence of the "survival" or "disappearance"
of general
30
terms on the "momentary purposes" of the para phraser.
Comparing sentences in notation involves comparing both their logical forms
for

equivalence and their predicates for synonymy. However, this test for
"structural synonymy" mistakenly emphasizes predicates, because, in reed31
mentation, their choice is "wholly casual".

He rejects, as we have seen, altering this state of affairs

by-

formalizing a vocabulary of science. Regimentation is not system building in the Camapian manner. Quine* s arguments against the usefulness
of formalized languages for analyzing ana lyti city apply here. He char-

acterizes the specification of only certain predicates as acceptable in
32
notational paraphrases as "arbitrarily assembled groundwork".
One

cannot expect to delineate "the true and ultimate structure of reality",
the expressed task of regimentation, from such a base.

Once we grant that all predicates are acceptable, we are up

against the problems raised by the principle of indeterminacy when we

try to match them. Paraphrase is a kind of translation, after all, and,

beyond stimulus meaning, which will fail to distinguish sufficiently in

many cases, there are no satisfactory criteria for "meaning the same".
33

Without drawing explicitly on the conclusions of Chapter II,

Quine

repeatedly denies synonymy claims and proposes the criterion of the paraphraser* s purposes.

The question that arises is how "purposes" can be specified and
compared. It is hard to believe that Quine is sketching a state of affairs

U2

in which individual philosophers,
with idiosyncratic purposes,
regiment
ordinary language for the sake of
expressing an "ultimately true" world
view, not measurable against anyone
else’ 3 . This would be absurd.
Indeed,
and more reasonably, in his discussions
of particular explications in
matneraatics, the "purposes" are spoken
of as ccmmon purposes/

Anyone
interested in certain problems is interested
in certain devices or lo-

cations, which are generally agreed to serve
particular purposes with

respect to the problems in question. The
"purposes" are thus given,

in the context of the device and the field of
discourse. Regimentation
is the procedure by which one redefines the
device ao that it serves

its purpose more clearly and effectively. Explication
will be discussed

next, and these features will come out in some detail.
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can be viewed as a sustained, and even virtuoso,

effort uo interpret scientific discourse within the framework of
an
35
n
A
„
"austerely" extensianal logic.
If it now turns out
and it seems

—

to be far from hidden in Quine* s exposition

— that

"purpose" and "func-

tion" are fundamental notions, has he not built unquestionably nonex—

tensional concepts into the foundation of his extensional superstructure?

And if there are good reasons for using these concepts as fundamental,

why can they not be used with equal effect in translation? These questions
will

ccsne

up again in later sections.

Seme paraphrases achieved by regimentation have the status of "explications". Explication is often held to be the fundamental task of

philosophical analysis. It is the clarification of an important, but
ambiguous or otherwise troubling, expression by reformulation. How is the

reformulated expression, the explication, related to the original expres-

to

sion?

We do not claim synonymy. We do
not claim
to make clear and explicit what
the users
of the unclear expression had
unconsciously
in
1** a *^ along* Wq do not
expose hidden
“t
meanings, as the words Analysis*
and *expiication’ would suggest) we supply
lacks.
We ilx
the particular functions of the
unclear expression that make it worth
troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to
our
liking, that fills those functions. Beyond
those conditions of partial agreement/
dictated by our interests and purposes,
any
traits of the explicans come under the head
of "don’t cares".
36
Note that determining the functions of
the expression "that make it

worth troubling about" is one step in this
procedure, and that "devisfing]
a substitute.

.

.that fills those functions", and (implicitly) deter-

mining that the substitute fills the functions, is
another step. There
37

.

is no "uniquely right" explication

again

— but

— here

is Quine as relativist

iu is clear in this section that there are standards for

being an explication of a given expression. "Explication is
elimination
38

but not

a-J.

elimination is explication*"

The former, because explica-

tion always eliminates seme unclear features of an expression! the
latter, because some pruning may disqualify the expression from serving
the function for the sake of which it was cleaned up. Elimination is

explication "just in case the new channels parallel the old ones suffi-

ciently for there to be a striking if partial parallelism of function

between the old troublesome form of expression and some form of expres—
39
sion figuring in the new method."

Quine recognized this requirement well enough in "Two Dogmas,"
although it is expressed there in terms of "contexts" of the use of an

expression rather than of "functions"
of an expression* But the
function of an expwaaion is its use
in seme contorts, so this difference of terminology is not
important, 'Shat is significant is
that

explicate* is mentioned in "Two Dogmas"
as a kind of definition, and
the point Quine rents to make about
all definitions, except stipulative

defmitions-bjr-fiat, in that essay is that they
rest "on prior relations
oi synanyuy."

For explications, the prior synonymy
is between contexts!

Any

vrord worth explicating has some
contexts which , as wholes , are clear and precise enough to be useful $ and the purpose
of explication is to preserve the usage of
these favored contexts while sharpening the
usage of other contexts* In order that a
given definition be suitable for purposes
of explication, therefore, what is required
i3 not that the definiendum in its antecedent usage be synonymous with the definiens, but just that each of these favored
contexts of the definiendum, taken as a
whole in its antecedent usage, be synonymous
with the corresponding context of the defin-

iens*
:L°£d

Ul

and jojoct , Quine insists that explica ta are not synonymous with

their expli ca nda a and he does not mention "contexts" of the expressions

at all* However, there i3 a germ, in the similarity between the discussions of explication in both works, of a theory of sameness of meaning which rests on sameness of function or purpose (however that may be

measured)*
It might be useful to go from this abstract discussion to a con-

crete illustration of explication* We will consider Russell *s theory of

definite descriptions, "that paradigm of philosophy," according to Ramsey,

and then Quine s extension of it, the elimination of all names and sin1

gular terms* We will be interested in seeing what the salient features of

Wilts

the«y are, and In trying to see .hich
.options are central

ana which fortuitous. With respect
to Quine, we will raise the
question
Of the extent to which his
"extension” of Russell’s theory is
a signifieant modification of it, and how the
program of regimentation looks
in the light of the consequences of
this example of regis^ntation.
B.

Two Examples of Explication* Russell
and Quine

Russell's treatment of uniquely denoting
phrases can be readily
seen as an explication by Quine’s standards.
Russell has "fix[ed] on the

particular functions of the unclear expression that
Fake it worth
troubling about” ; he has elimina ted sane features
and preserved others.
The substitute expression serves the desired functions
of a uniquely-

denoting phrase while avoiding the problems which Russell
wished to
avoid. When we come to Quine's modification of the theory
of definite

descriptions, we shall see that among the undesirable features far
him
is a distinction which Russell particularly wished to preserve,
in such

details are the different purposes of philosophers made manifest.

Russell wants denoting phrases in propositions to be meaningful,

whether or not there 13 anything in the physical world which is actually
denoted by them, because he believes that much of our "knowledge about"
kz
things is expressed in this form.
He also wants to keep the distinction

between such "knowledge about” and knowledge by acquaintance which, for
him, entails preserving the distinction between descriptive ohrases and
43
proper names.
Russell alms to selectively define " 'the* in the singu-

lar.”

Indeed, this aim has been taken by some, for example, G.E. Moore,

as the sole purpose of the theory of descriptions, but this seems too

narrow because Russell demonstrates the
same technique with respect to
indefinite descriptions*

rather than

»a»

Descriptive phrases beginning with ’the*

are more likely to deceive, according to
Russell, but

’the 1 phrases differ fron ’a* phrases only
in implying uniqueness^ and

he is more seriously concerned with existence
than with uniqueness*
-ax purpose of Russell’s analysis is the closing of
truth-

value gaps. Every proposition expressed by a sentence
containing a

uniquely denoting phrase is either true or false. Strawson’s
criticism
of this feature of the theory is based on the supposed
fact that in or-

dinary conversation we take certain statements containing descriptions
1|8

to be "neither true nor false"*

This may be, but Russell sees the

closing of truth-value gaps as a "great advantage"

not as a reproduc-

tion of the vagaries of ordinary language* From the viewpoint of the
logical simplification of the analysis of language, it certainly is an
$0
advantage*
Of course, from Strawson’s point of view, simplification
is a mistaken goal* Fundamental differences of approach are at issue here*

Russell wants to avoid attributing significance to a denoting
phrase as a unit in isolation, that is, apart from the meanings of the

constituent words of the phrase and apart from the meaning of the whole
proposition* He believes that the meaning of the phrase as a whole can

$
only be its denotation*

The argument runs as follows* The meaning of

the denoting phrase is the meaning of its denotation* If ’the author of

Waverley ’ denotes, it denotes a person. In this case named Scott* The
meaning of the denoting phrase is, therefore, the meaning of ’Scott*,
and the meaning of ’Scott*, according to Russell’s doctrine of proper
names (see below), is the man Scott*

hi
If the phrase does in fact denote something
existent, then the

sentence ’Scott is the author of Waverley ’ is reduced
to a trivial

statement of identity, ’Scott is Scott,’ which Russell
says is "plainly

different" from the first sentence.

What he seems to mean by "plainly

different" is that the former sentence conveys information
(i.e., there

were people who knew of Scott and who knew Waverley and who did not

knew the fact expressed in the sentence because the work was pseudonyraously published) while the latter is a tautology. This is really an il-

lus oration o_ the inadequacy of a denotational theory of meaning,

53

but

Russell does not see the problem that way because of his theory of proper
names. If the phrase does denote, and if its meaning is its denotation,

then taking it as independently significant changes the meaning of the

sentence as a whole.
If, on the other hand, the phrase do©3 not denote anything exist-

ent (e.g., 'the round square*), then there is a fatal metaphysical temptation to posit "subsistent" or "nonexistent" entities which Russell wants

to avoid at all costs in the interest of "that feeling for reality which
ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies." "There is only

&

one world, the ’real' world."

To preserve the meaningfulness of the whole proposition while

denying meaningfulness to the denoting phrase in isolation, Russell
shows that in a "rightly analyzed" proposition of this type the denoting
55
or rather appears "broken up" in a "fully expressed
phrase disappears,
56
In Principia Mathematica , in sceaewhat different terms,
proposition".
he "proves" that descriptive phrases are "incomplete symbols" which
57
The logical apparatus which al—
have meaning only in use, in context.

U8

lows him to do this includes variables,
propositional functions, and
quantification. Variables stand for entities nameable
by proper nanes.

Propositional functions "define the property that
makes a thing a soand-eo."

The distinction between what Russell means by
a "proper name"

and a descriptive phrase is crucial.
Although, in practice, "almost all uses of what look like proper
59
names" are "abbreviated description [s]",
the distinction is important

in principle. A proper name has meaning "by itself, without the need
of
60
any context. "
A proper name "directly designates an individual which

61
is its meaning."

The individual so named is a "constituent" of the

fact or proposition expressed by the sentence in which the name appears
62
as subject.
A proper name cannot appear meaningfully as subject in the
sentence

exists 1 because, if it is a name, it must name something,
63
something which is.
It is because none of these statements are true
1

of descriptions that descriptions, unlike proper names, depend on their

context for their meaning and do not necessarily denote anything. It
is curious that Russell wants to maintain that there are proper names,

64

in his sense, when they are admittedly so elusive and rare.

The examples

he uses, Socrates' and *Scott*, are not real proper names at all. All

that concerns us here, however, is that he does maintain this distinction
in all formulations of the theory, and that we may accept it as import-

ant for him.

Russell has no doubts on the score of the meaningfUlness of single
65
words.

In the proposition ’I met a unicorn,* the whole
four words together make a significant proposition, and the word * unicorn* by itself is sig-

nil leant, in Just the same sense as
the
word ’man’*
66
*1

met a unicorn*. . .is a perfectly
significant assertion, if we know what
it would be to be a unicorn. • • i.e.,
what is the definition of [a unicorn •
J

67

He passes, without stopping to explain or justify,
from the apparentname subjects in descriptive phrases (e.g., ‘father*,
’author’) to

verb-phrase propositional functions (e.g., *hegat», ’wrote 1

on the

)

basis of his unquestioning understanding of the meanings of
single words*

Moore, in commenting on and generally approving of Russell’s
analysis
of descriptive phrases, comes up with an incredibly trivial
objection,

namely that an author need not have written a work since he might have

composed it within an oral tradition

i

Moore suggests that an author

is one who has "invented or composed [the workl without the collabora-

68

tion of any other person” subject to seme other conditions.

After

pages and pages of this, Moore grants that this is not an argument

against Russell’s theory since this point (i.e., the adequacy of the
propositional function chosen in that example) is ”no part of the
69
theory.”
Moore might have questioned the validity of tire procedure

in general, but he does not. In the remainder of his essay, using the
’King of France’ example, Moore does not bother to "translate” the sub70

ject-term but uses ’is a king of France’ as the propositional function*
71
Russell does the same with this example
but "translates” his other
72

examples.

As for the analysis itself, for an example where something is
predicated of the presumed referent of a uniquely denoting phrase.

Russell offers an existentially quantified conjunction such that, if

50

any conjunct is false* the proposition is false.

73

In its ordirary-

language formulation, for *The author of Waverley was Scotch, 9 it looks
like this %
(1)
(2)
(3)

at least one person wrote Waverley g
at most one person wrote Waverlsyg
whoever wrote Waverley Ws^cotch.

7h

More formally,
w

f {(1x)(<f>x)]

(3c)ifx,

^x S 8

ife

Df

"
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or, in M a emi-ordina ry" language.

There is one entity such that 9 seme thing is _ * if
and only if that * something* is the entity, and the
entity is (also)

The descriptive phrase, in words or notation, has indeed been analyzed
out and no longer appears. The existential assumption in the correct

use of a definite description stands revealed.
76
Strawson® s criticism of Russell,
to the effect that a proposition containing a non-denoting phrase is not false but neither true nor
false, rests on his refusal to acknowledge that the implicit existential

assumption is binding in all such statements* Strawson 3 s position is that
if one does not explicitly assert the existential part of such a state-

ment, existence is not being asserted, even though it is presupposed,
78

77

"implied

99

(in an "odd", ncnlogical sense),

"signalled"

fcy

the ut-

terance of a sentence containing a denoting phrase* Strawson grants that
the utterance of such a sentence is "evidence" for the speaker* s belief

in the existence of the denotaturai it "shows but does not state" that
>

79

the speaker thinks the "existential conditions" are fulfilled.

Now it is literally true that what is not audibly and explicitly
But there
asserted is not an audible and explicit part of the utterance.

51
is a sense in which we mean more than
what we say: the sense in which

we stand ready to respond to queries and
challenges to our utterances,
to clarify, to act on, to elaborate. This
is the sense in which what
is implied or assumed is also asserted
even if it is not audibly-

uttered.

However, althougi many of the examples Strawson
gives are

subject to this analysis, there are undoubtedly
sentences which are
not. One is reminded that explication is not the
repixxiaction of or-

dinary language in a different fonn, nor the supplying of
"hidden
meanings", but it i3 a recons tructi or. of an expression, preserving
its

useful functions and eliminating its problems.
Does it natter to Russell 1 s theory what is substituted for the
'4*

:

in the propositional function *4>x*

?

In most of the exanples he

has chosen, this is not a problem, pace Moore. However, he writes as

if one should normally transform what appears to be a name in the denoting phrase into a propositional function (or conjunction of proposi-

tional functions) by selecting the relevant property or properties and

expressing it in verbal or adjectival form. This is what he usually

met a man* is translated as
81
always false."
does.

’I

" *1

Thus when we say *x was the
II' we not only assert tKat
relation to Charles TT, but
else had this relation. The
tion. • .is expressed by *x

met x, and x is human* is not

father of Charles
x had a certain
also that nothing
relation in quesbegat Charles II* •

82

Russell assumes that the analyzed sentence is equivalent in meaning to
the preanalyzed sentence. Moore is right in saying that these translations of apparent-names into predicates are not part of the theory.

Russell offers no guidance on how one should go about selecting defining

52

properties, but he takes it for granted
that it can be done.
It is interesting that Russell left the
’King of France' example

^transformed, substituting for the
'f
France',

'

in this case 'is -King of

because a more complicated propositional function
is involved

here than in the other examples ho uses. Re may
have -wanted not to get
embroiled. Consider the contrast between it and his
other examples

i

'Author' may be do fined as one -who tribes (or composes)
books.
(2) He is the author of x but he did not write x.
^i)

(3)
(li)

'Father* may be defined as one who is male and has begotten a child.
He is the father of x but he did not beget x.

'King' nay be defined as one who is a king.
(5)
(6) He is the king of France but he is not the king of France.

As the 'King of France* example has been treated, (6) is self -contradictory as are (2) and (U). However, only (6) is purely logically selfcontradictory. The other examples depend on a relation of synonyny be-

tween the predicates and the apparent-names. Russell had no misgivings
about synonymy in principle, and, in any event, (l) and (3) are reason-

ably acceptable definitions in English. What would be the defining property of being a king?
(7) 'King* may be defined as one who is male and rules a

state.
He
is the King of France but he does not rule France.
(8)

We can see from

(8) that this is not an example that lends itself to ana-

lytic statements. Seme one may be king in name only, a figurehead} someone may be king but in exile} someone may be king and refuse to perform

his functions.

And yet merely being called 'king of France* will not

do.

It
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would be simple to make false statements
true and true ones false if
that were allowed. ’The World’s Best
Bakery*

may be, for advertising

purposes, a good choice of name, but

"

’The World’s Best Bakery* is

not the world's best bakery” is not
self-contradictory. Similarly, the

most power'ful man in Washington is not likely
to be called that, but

may be called ’Assistant Secretary

3

or 'Boss So-and-so 3 . To move from

denoting phrase to propositional function on the
basis of x being

caUed whatever

the words of the denoting phrase are is to treat
the

denoting phrase as a name, as a mentioned, not used,
tem, within quo04
tation marks.
As Russell puts it, a denoting phrase within quotation
8c;

marks ”is merely part of the symbolism by which we express our
thought."

He goes on to assert, "What we want to express is something
which might
(101

example) be translated into a foreign language) it is something for

which the actual words are a vehicle, but of which they are no part."
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This translatable "something" is commonly called a proposition.

To admit propositions is to grant translatability, because propositions

are meanings which are not tied to a particular language. One may choose

to retain the wording of the denoting phrase in moving to a propositional function (e.g. , from ’the king of France* to ’is-king of France’),

but the theory neither requires it nor favors it. Russell's epistemology
does favor translation into relatively simple predicates, but this is
separable. What cannot be as easily removed from consideration is that

admitting propositions entails adnitting raeanings and sameness of meaning.
The sentence explicated by Russell's analysis means the same as the un-

explicated sentence (with its assumptions spelled out) because they both
express the same proposition. It will be important, in comparing Russell

with Quine, to remember that the former
but not the latter assumes
that criteria exist for synonymy and uses
the concept in his analysis.

Russell has explicated descriptive phrases by
analyzing them out
in favor of quantifiers, predicate letters,
variables, and identity,

while retaining the desired functions of those
phrases in propositions.
He has shown that descriptive phrases always
have meaning in context,
even in cases where they do not in fact denote anything* By
making the
implicit existential assumption explicit, and separating
it from the

meaning-in-context of the descriptive phrase, Russell has also
achieved
the not quite incidental advantage of making all such statements
either

true or false and eliminating previous truth-value gaps.

-
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.

second stage of what Quine does

is, with only minor notation—

al variations, the same as what Russell has done: he shows that sinpu88

lar descriptions are eliminable.

However, in the stage preliminary to

this Russellian maneuver, Quine shows that all singular terms are eli-

minable in favor of singular descriptions, or, as he puts it, can be
89
M reparsedn

as singular descriptions*

This is a step that Russell de-

cidedly did not want to take, since he wanted to preserve the name/

description distinction*
Before we take up Quine’s motives and justification for this move,

we should notice just how vast is the scope of this particular act of
regimentation* Quine is not merely explicating those phrases which have

the form of descriptions, definite and indefinite, as Russell is. His
is a sweeping regimentation of the entire referential apparatus of a
language. Henceforth, we have only to deal with general terras

—

predi-

&
cates

— -which are

"true of” whatever entities we allow as referents

of bound variables, plus variables, quantifiers,
identity, and truth-

functions. If

an

terras

are general terras, one can adult, without

qualws, any words to terrahood and "safe” predicate
position. We are
only comnitted to the assertion of the existence of
an entity when we

allow it to be designated by a variable. One cannot avoid
quoting

Quine *s ^famous mot at least once, "To be is to be the value of
a variable."

Just because this reform is so vast, it is doubtful that one

should call it an explication, comparable to the explication, far
91
example, of * ordered pair*.
It would be hard to ask if the explication
fulfills the function far which the explicandum was considered worthy
of attention. Quine is dealing here with the referring and predicating

functions of expressions in a language, and these are functions of very

high generality. One can inquire whether, with the materials Quine assembles, it is still possible to predicate something of a unique individual, to assert or deny the existence of an individual with a particu-

lar set of properties, and so on. It is difficult to frame the questions

generally enough, and difficult not to fall into expressing them in
post-regimentation terns. Is there anything the reformed referential-

predicative apparatus does not let us say which we could have said before,

with the exception of just those ways of speaking which Quine wants to
avoid? Perhaps this can be more meaningfully discussed after an exposi-

tion of Quine* s procedure and reasons, and perhaps we can then give
mare substance to what Quine means by the "function" of an expression.

Singular terms have the troublesome feature, for Quine as for

%
Russell, that they "always purport to name
an object, but Tare] powerless to guarantee that the alleged object be
forthcoming. *
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like

Russell, Quine rejects positing special entities,
existing otherwise

than physically, to stand for the objects named* In
"On

TRfhat

he does this partly in a spirit of aesthetic
fastidiousness*
•2£

There Is,”
93

In Methods

almost in Russell’s words, he rejects "existence in nytho-

logy” as a way of preserving the namehood of Cerberus:
afyths are literally false,

and it is sheer
obscurantism to phrase the matter othervdse* There is really only one world, and
there is not, never was, and never will be
any such thing as Cerberus.
9U

But whereas Russell is content to deal with singular descriptive phrases,
including scow names which he, on grounds which are seldom mentioned but

which involve his philosophy of ’’logically proper names”, recognises as
9$
"abbreviated descriptions",
Quine oasts his net wider and finds that
the same difficulty attends all singular terms* He includes all apparent
*
96
97
names,
algebraic (i*e*, combinatory) singular terms (’x plus y’),
98
demonstrative singular terms (’this apple’),
descriptions in forms
99
quite different from ’the ...* and *a •*•’ phrases,
and even class100
names, attribute-names, and relation-names*
Pundamientally, the difficulty is that whether or not there is an

object named by a singular term "cannot be systematically spotted by
101
If there is no such object in a particular case,
notational form*"
one’s statements purportedly referring to it and predicating things of

it are meaningless, and to say that it does not exist involves one in

the Parmenidean self-contradiction with which Plato struggled in the

Sophist* Quine succinctly states the problem in Mathema tical Logic :
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To say that something does not exist*
or that
there is something which is not* is clearly
a
contradiction in teisnsj hence (x) (x exists)*
must be true.
102
*

Russell writes that

3

x exists* is meaningless*

which I take him to

\jy

mean empty* giving no inf ormaticn* which amounts
to the same thing in
that context.

If graiaaatical namehood alone qualifies
a term to

stand in the place of *x** then all sorts of things
have a claim on
10U
existence* and Russell’s "robust sense of reality
would be rendered
1

*

anemic. What exists is a matter of fact and not of grammar. To
allow
.some terms the status of names

— which

is Russell’s way

— depends

on

being able to recognize which apparent names really name. Subjecting
all

singular terms to the same treatment that Russell devised for singular
descriptions

:,

is a way of maintaining control over questions of voca105
bulary independently of questions of fact."

Before departing from Russell in sweeping away all singular
terms* Quine considers an "impractical sort of reform" which "recalls*

if only in caricature* Russell’s early philosophy of proper names and

descriptions." One might keep as singular terms only those words learned
as single words "through the primitive kind of conditioning that ante106
dated the learning of compound singular terms."
This means retaining
a special category for those "few hypothetical" "names which we may be
107

supposed to have learned by direct confrontation with name and object."
This is "impractical" indeed because we don’t remember which words we

learned by os tens! on* and because the set of such words would be differ-

ent for each speaker of a language. It would be a small, dubiously instantiated* purely subjective category* and there is not even much

reason to suppose that keeping it would clarify the problems attending
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singular terms* Evan ’mama

’

*

if x’s ’mams* no longer lives* -would not

avoid confusion in singular term position in a sentence
uttered at the
present time*

Quine *s conclusion* therefore* is that the category of singular
terms is an unnecessary one* It creates

setae

problems: deciding which

words belong to it* and it does not solve any* It Is* furthermore
* tied
to a particular theory of knowledge. The advantages of analyzing out

singular descriptions can be extended to all singular terms "tfthout
108
prejudice to epistemology or ontology."
This move is "at the level

strictly of logical grammar*" a decision an which categories to a&ait
to the regimented language, and it is a decision in favor of "the pri109
macy of predicates"*
No entities are eliminated by this move* but

entities become not "things which names name" but "things which predi110
cates are true of*"
in some cases uniquely*

General terms and singular terms "are properly to be distin1
guished" by their "contrasting roles" in predication*
In prereginiented logical grammar* ’Socrates is a man* would be represented

by ’Fa** where

*a* stands

for a singular term ’Socrates 1 * and 'F 3

stands for a general term ’man 3 * For purposes of predication* *F* may

have the form in English of a verb phrase (’drinks hemlock’

)

or an

112

adjectival phrase (’is snub-nosed') as well as that of a general

noun*

113
’Is

3

or

3

In the

is a* may be regarded as a predicate-forming prefix*

course of showing that all singular teiros can be reclassified as gener-

al terras* with general term roles in predication* Quine is more explicit about what is, in effect* a reinterpretation of ’is'. ’Is* or
111
®— ' remains "a separate relative term" only between variables j

other—

$9

wise, it acts as a predicate-forming prefix
to a general term# The
general term thus formed contains ‘is* as an
"indissoluble” part, as

in 'is-s nub-nosed' or even ’is -Socrates'. The effect
of this i3 to
combine 'is* or

»

= with a general term or
*

a

singular term to form a

new general term.
There are two important consequences of this reinterpretation.
The f~rst is bhe e limi nation of the need to deal separately
with singular terms. By the "theorem of ccnf inability"

confined to the context

*

-

a singular term can be

a* in which it is merely a part of an in-

dissoluble" general term which functions as a predicate rather than as
a name. The second is the rejection of the notion that "translation" is

necessary to

cany

a singular term into a general tom. Superficial
116
grammatical considerations are irrelevant.
In parsing English, we

would not consider 'is -Socrates' a predicate, but it is a predicate in
the regimented grarmar because it occupies predicate place in a sentence, according to the reparsing effected by regimentation. Episte-

mological considerations are irrelevant. How we could know that it is
true or false to predicate 'is-Socrates* of an x is beside the point.

We might turn our attention to this problem in the course of another
kind of inquiry, but it need not concern us here. For Russell’s theory,
translation of apparent names into predL cates was, as we have seen, if
not forced, then at least strongly suggested by the theory of knoriedge

mixed in with the theory of descriptions. Quine deliberately rejects this.
This second consequence

— the

casting aside of "translation"

—

is obviously of considerable importance to an inquiry into regimentation,

particularly one which seeks to relate

regimentation to iraietermnacy
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of translation. This is the point on which Quine has altered
the word-

ing of his exposition and the manner of presentation more from source

to source than any other. In "On What There Is"

(191+8)

Quine suggests

coining predicate-words where convenient.
In order thus to subsume a one-word name or alleged
name such as •Pegasus* under Russell’s theory of
description, we must, of course, be able first to
translate the word into a description. But this is
no real restriction. If the notion of Pegasus had
been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat
translation into a descriptive phrase had offered
itself along familiar lines, we could still have
availed ourselves of the following artificial
and trivial-seeming devices we could have appealed
to the ex hypothesi unanalysable, irreducible
attribute of being Pegasus , adopting, for its expression, t|ie verb * is -Pegasus * , or ’pegasizes*.
The noun 1 Pegasus* itself could then be treated
as derivative, and identified after all with a
description; ’the thing that is-Pegasus', ’the
thing that pegasizes*.
117

Two lines of criticism follow from this, for which Quine’s own
text can be cited, and which lead to conclusions unacceptable to him.
One is that the statement resulting from reparsing singular terms as

descriptions and then eliminating the descriptions must be "cognitively
synonymous" with the original statement, and that Quine’s rejection
118
Quine
of synonymy undermines his own program of regimentation.

writes in this essay, in approval of Bussell’s contextual definition,
"No unified expression is offered as an analysis of the descriptive
phrase, but the statement as a whole which was the context of that

phrase still gets its full quota of meaning

—

^

whether true or false.

If we look at the underlined phrase, we can see that it appears to be
outlined
out of line with Quine’s standards for "explication" which we
120
The claim that post- and pre-regimen ted sentences are
earlier.
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synonymous is repeatedly rejected in

Wwd

and Object . "Pull quota of

meaning" is not the clearest expression Quine
could have used had he

wanted to refer to synonymy between statements.
Possibly significance,
not synonymy, is the intended concept, and yet
significance i 3 not a
121
matter of degree, at least not for Quine.
The words "full quota"
suggest that the regimented statement does not
mean less than the original, which leads one to an interpretation that the
regimented state-

ment means the same as (is cognitively synonymous with)
the original
because we do not operate with concepts of more or less meaning,
but

with concepts of 3ame and different.
Note, however, the curious tag end of the quoted sentence,

"—whether true or false." The hyphen is ambiguous here. If it were a
comma instead, we could clearly read that both true and false state-

ments still get their full quota of meaning. This way, it is possible

to interpret the whole sentence as asserting that, under the program
of the elimination of descriptions, true statements come out true and

false statements false. This interpretation would seem more in keeping

with Quine's allergy to synonyny, although it is a very weak justification for contextual definition since ary true statement and any false
statement would serve to fulfill the condition. Quine's position on
synonymy undoubtedly hardened after "On What There Is" so we need not

expect complete consistency. It is at least plausible to interpret this

formulation of the elimination of singular terms as resting cm cognitive
synonymy between statements. Both Quine* s close juxtaposition of Russell's program with his own, and his ambiguous language, encourage the

interprets ti on.
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The second criticism focuses on the choice
of ’pegasizes* as
tho

‘artificial and trivial-seeming device:

.

•

.[appeal! to the ex

unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus .
This choice of words led Quine into a dialogue
with his imaginary

debating partners, McX and Wyman, in the pages of the
essay itself,

where he denies that the selection of the coined predicate
commits him
to recognize the existence of a corresponding attribute,
meaning, or
other sort of uni-wersal.

He undoubtedly wanted to argue these points

and coined the predicate because it raises predictable objections.
However, from the point of view of the program of eliminating singular
terms, it was probably unwise to raise the spectre of appearing to in121*

troduce an "undefined property terra”.

’Pegasizes* stands on uncer-

tain middle ground between a translated predicate such as

ley

*

*

wrote Waver -

and a name made a predicate solely by being in predicate form and

position 3uch as

'

i3-£ocrates

5

.

’Is-Pegasus' is introduced as an alter-

native to *pegasi 2es' from the start, but critics and canmentators have

usually referred to the more colorful of the predicates, and sometimes
to the issues apparently associated with it.
3h Methods of Logic (195>0) coined predicates are abandoned, and
the futility of a standard of synonymy is expressed but not lengthily

argued.

Whether a proposed deduction is to enjoy the benefits of a descriptional premiss depends, evidently, on whether a given singular terra can
fairly be translated into the form of a description. Now fairness of translation is a vague
matter, hinging as it does on the concept of
synonymy which was so dimly regarded irjpara.J 33«
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[from para. 33] Perhaps it will even
be found
tnat of [ significance and synonymy]
only signiiicance admits of a satisfactory criterion.
ano, that all effort to make sense
of synonymy’
imist be abandoned along with the
notion" of
*

meaning.

Given any singular term of ordinary language,
•
•
.
the proper choice of »F» for" translation
of the term into ('f x)Fx ? need in practice
never detain us. If a pat translation such as
\ f x)(x wrote Uaverley )
lies ready to hand,
very well; if not, we need not hesitate to admit a version of the type of (1 x)(x is-Socrates )’. • • since any less lame version would,
if admissible as a translation a_t all, differ
at moat in expository value and not in meaning .
'

*

1

125

One would think that Quine's conclusion should be
that since "fairness
of translation" does rest on synonymy, and since synonymy
lacks de-

fining criteria, the attempt at translation should be given up altogether. And yet, if there is a "pat translation", "very well". Strange-

ly enough, Quine selects 'wrote Waverley

'

as an example, ignoring

Moore's quibble over just this translation. If there are no satisfactory standards for sameness of meaning, what makes a translation "pat"?
Leaving this aside, and looking at the underlined phrase, what is

even more curious is that Quine appears to justify predicates of the
'

is-Socrates

!

type on grounds of synonymy

i

The argument runs as fol-

lows:
(1)

'Socrates* is a singular term 'a' which we want to transform
into a descriptional phrase '(1 x)?x*.

(2) 'Athenian philosopher who drank hemlock' is suggested as a
choice for *F» which "translates" 'Socrates' into a predicate.
(3)

'is-Socrates' is suggested as a ("lame") choice for 'F*

which takes the singular term and joins it to a copula,
forming a predicate.
(U) The predicate suggested in (2) is acceptable as a translation
of 'being Socrates* if and only if it is taken to mean the

same as 'Socrates' and to be substitutable (no conditions
specified) for 'Socrates' in *x is Socrates'.

G)
(

The predicate suggested in ( 3 ) clearly
fulfills the conditions of (.4), an the grounds that (x)(x x).

6 ) If the predicate suggested, in (2) is accepted
as a translation,
cuen it, means the same as the predicate
suggested in ( 3 )
because of the transitivity of identity.

The best that a suggested predicate can do
is to mean the same as the

singular term it is intended to translate. It cannot
possibly mean as

midi the same (to be deliberately paradoxical) as a predicate
using the
exact word(s) of the singular term. The latter kind of predicate
is sv126
nonymous on any criterion of synonyny.
The "less lame version.
valtfe.

•

•

.

.

differ [s] at most in expository

•" That is, a translated predicate gives
information that a

particular singular term means the same as a particular description.
Identity is seen in this passage as the limiting case of synonymy, but

no one would claim that

”

'Socrates* means the same as 'Socrates' "

has any expository value. However, whatever information is conveyed by
a translated predicate is irrelevant) the predicate is acceptable to

the extent to which it "means the same” as the singular term. One might

expect Quine to conclude that the "lame" predicate is preferable to the
"less lame", on grounds of equivalence, and because his program is not

tied to a theory of knowledge for which "expository value" is wanted.
However, he is only arguing for the acceptability of these predicates

despite their artificiality.
In Word and Object (i960 ) the 'is-

'

type of predicate is not

a second-best, but has become the model for taking a singular terra into
a predicate. Starting with the case where the singular term is in "purely
127
Quine shows that, by substitutivity of identity
referential position",

and a few moves in elementary quantification logic, a sentence containing

6$
a singular term is equivalent to
a sentence of the form

U

w
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X vX - a

as
term.”

and

.

.

.x.

.

•)».

a^whlch, "taken as a whole

The singular tern appears only
lsjln

effect a predicate, or general

Quine shows that nan-referential occurrences
of a singular

term can be so paraphrased to be acoorrsnodated
to the same procedure.
These paraphrases involve placing the singular
term in referential
130
position at least "with respect to its immediately
containing sentence."

We will stay with the simple case because it
illustrates the nontranslation

of

singular terms as well as any other.

A singular term can be transformed into a general term
without
verbal translation because it can be moved into predicate position

according to permissible transformations of the logic. Quine speaks of
"manoeuvering" or "getting it down to" predicate position.

131

That thi3

can be done, and that doing it removes the problems of reference and

existence attendant upon singular terms, justifies the procedure. However, Quine does not suggest an indiscriminate use of the elimination
of singular terms in this way.

On the contrary, we suddenly find ourselves face to face with
the "purposes of the paraphraser" as Quine reminds us that "on pain

of introducing new problems of analysis of general terras” we should

limit the reparsing of singular terras "to those singular teims that
132

have no internal structure we care to perpetuate.

"

Which terms these

are is "purely relative to varying projects in hand", "the particular
needs of the argument or investigation that we may imagine ourselves
133
engaged in."
In other words, we should move a singular term ‘a' into
the position

a’

only if we are not interested in the meaning of the
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term, however complex it may be. Such
a singular term is "simple-,

because we choose to deal with it as an
unanalyzed whole, and Quine
rather mischievously suggests calling it
a

’’name’',

in the sense of a

proper name, whoce^meaning in natural language
we also choose to ignore
for most purposes.

If our purpose seems to c all for analysis
of

a singular terra into a conjunction or disjunction
of general terras,

tnere are of course no guidelines here for going
about it. The selection of particular general terms in such cases will
also result in the

elimination of singular terms, according to the same procedure
with
respect to quantification and identity, but not with respect to
"manoeuvering" the singular term into predicate position.

cannot very well ask, 'Well, what is the purpose of a para-

phraser in thi3 project?' because, as was noted above, the scope of
the reform effected here is so wide that innumerable projects can be

carried out within its

terras.

However, Quine himself attempts to ask

if, in achieving the elimination of the undesirable existence claims

of singular terras by reparsing singular terms as general terns, and

thus restricting referential position to variables, other useful func-

tions of singular terms have been tampered with. His conclusion is that

Directness aside, no losses are sustained.
It can be shorai that everything that used to
be demonstrable or deducible from given premisses when 'Socrates' was manipulated unquestion ingly as a singular term is still
demonstrable or deducible from those same
premisses with the added help of the uniqueness premiss ’(3 y)(y is Socrates and y only)'
... when 'Socrates' is repareed as a general term.
13 £
The function of an expression, according to this statement, is its role
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in a deduction. A given expression,
regimented with respect to its

singular terms, still performs its function
in a deduction if it permits the same and only the sane inferences
to be made. An expression

regimented by this procedure Tail not permit
false conclusions to be
inferred Tram true premises, nor true conclusions
from false premises.
It is the case that the class of statements
which exhibit a non-denoting

name

j.n

referential position will cone out false after
regimentation,

whereas they were uneasily neither true nor false
previously. "But this
136
was a purpose of the re-parsing.
Thus, one can claim for the eli**

mination^

"simple" singular terms

be shown

— that

— and

it can easily, if tediously,

in those cases where the content (or meaning) of

the singular term is irrelevant to the deduction in wliich
an expression

containing it appears, Quine* s transformation of singular terms directly into *i 3 -

*

predicates does not adversely affect the function

of the containing expression.

Quine deals with an objection that perhaps "the purport of

uniqueness" is part of the meaning of a simple

singular

terra, a

"name".

Quine grants that this "may be conceded to be somewhat intelligible,
whatever its cogency," a rather hack-handed concession, but reminds
those who would press this point that some general terras also "obey

laws that seem accountable to the meanings of the terms and not to con139
tingent fact" (cf. the symmetry of ’cousin*).
Nothing prevents a

weak implication of uniqueness ("one at moat") from being part of the
"very meaning" of some general terms. Strong uniqueness ("one exactly")
has, for good reasons, been externalised and made fully explicit in
1U0
the formula, '(3y)(x) (x ±s-Socrates if an only if x - y).'
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One wonders why Quine is willing to
grant this much in the way
of "meaning” to "names". Singular
terms may be treated as "nanEs" and

reparsed as general terms by 'is-

*

predicates in cases where the

resulting predica tes^are "no more than dummy
predicates, blanks in a
sentence diagram.

"

One can, at increased length but with no
logi-

cal losses, transform ‘Socrates’ from singular term
to predicate position, supplying the existential quantification
and the uniqueness

premise, in deducing ’There was a philosopher who drank
hemlock in

399 B.C.

‘

399

'

C.

from 'Socrates was a philosopher, and he drank hemlock
in
The use of what is in ordinary grammar a proper name
may

lead us astray here. Of all the range of singular terms and singular

descriptive phrases, we may choose any to transform, treat

airy

as

'names'

in this legislated sense, "that have no internal structure we
1U2
care to perpetuate."
Such singular terms can be "systematically
1Ii3

spotted by notational form"

after we have chosen them and regimented

the expression accordingly, but not before. W© are not dealing only

with examples like ‘Socrates'.

V?e

are, however, dealing only with ex-

amples of singular terms whose meaning is not relevant to the argument
in which they appear.

Consider the deduction of 'Someone wrote both Waverley and Ivan hoe' from 'The author of Waverley wrote Ivanhoej' an exercise pro31

posed by Quine in Methods of Logic .

*
Not actually to object to as-

serting that an 'author' can be said to have 'written' a work of which
he is the author, it is clear that this deduction depends for its vali-

dity on a meaning-relation between 'author' and 'wrote*. 'The author
of Waverley * cannot be taken into predicate position as 'is-«uthor of
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Sa verley

'

without changing the function of the sentence
in the deduc-

tion from one which establishes the conclusion
to one which does not.
One could only deduce ’There is someone who
is-the author of Wa verley

and who wrote Ivanhoe .

*

To sum up Quine’s most recent formulation of the
elimination of
singular terms:
(1)

All singular terms are eliminable.
a) Some singular terms are eliminated because of the
problens they create.
b) All other singular terms may be eliminated by the
same general procedure for the sake of the simplification of logical theory and the clarification of
ontological commitment.

(2) ’’Simple" singular terns are trivially eliminable by the
’
formation of ’is predicates.

a) Simplicity is relative to the deduction in which the
expression containing a singular term occurs.
b) Singular terms which are not ’’simple" should not be
’
eliminated via ’is predicates.
(3) Singular terms which are not "simple" may be eliminated if
the para phraser finds it perspicuous to do so.

a) How this is to be done, "toe nature of the more minute
analysis", depends entirely on the paraphraser. 1U5
b) "We are reminded once again that paraphrase makes no
synonymy claim."
1U6

Quine has set up a procedure for regimenting a vast class of expressions in a natural language, and one might agree that the scope of
this procedure is justified by the considerations referred to in (l)b.

However, he disclaims responsibility for that part of toe regimentation

which involves questions of meaning and synonymy. Russell was not much
more satisfactory with respect to predicate translations. He merely took
it for granted that translations could be made and that the analyzed

and pre -analyzed propositions (with respect to a determinate interpretation of questions of existence) meant the same. Quine also assumes
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that there are cases where predicate "translations” vdll be made,
bat he might not even agree that there are limits to ivhat would be

considered a "minute analysis" of a particular general term, although
it seems unreasonable to allow translation "ad libitum".

Quine has

no standard within his theory of language for setting Units. H© has
UU8

insisted that the choice of predicates is "wholly casual".

All that

he definitely has is stimulus synonymy which, it is quite clear, can-

not even begin to serve the purpose.

We are left with the uneasy situation of a regimenting procedure

with many advantages, but without standards of adequacy for the resulting regimented expressions. In cases where "more minute analysis"
is judged by the paraphraser to be required, one can determine whether

the regimented expression

lias

the same function in a deduction as the

pre-regimented expression only by understanding the meanings of the
terns in both. There are no grounds far this understanding within the
theory. Furthermore, the paraphraser is in no way constrained by some-

one else’s evaluation of what he has done.

A foggy appreciation of this point is expressed
in saying that there is no dictating another*
meaning} but the notion of there being a fixed,
explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in
the speaker* s mind i3 gratuitous. The real point
is simply that the speaker is the one to judge
whether the substitution of S* for S in the
present context will forward his present or
evolving program of activity to his satisfaction.

1h9

Does the "real point" really provide a sufficient criterion of adequacy

for an activity that purports to clarify language for scientific

purposes';'
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The Program of Regimentation Reconsidered

Regimen ta ti ai , as presented by Quine* is a technique for moving
from a sentence in a natural language to a formula in a logic with

rather meager resources. The purposes of regimentation are (l) clarifying or eliminating ambiguity; (2) making it possible to bring to

bear some of the mechanical advantages of the logic; and (3) simplifying theory by reducing the variety of idioms of natural language to
those few constructions and modes of combination allowable in the logic*
The first purpose is also served, more informally, by piece-

meal paraphrasing within the natural language or with same help from
logic-

*f it were not for the other two purposes, full-scale regimen-

tation would not be called for* The second purpose is important although, as Quine points out in "On the Application of

Modem

Logic,"

we are far from being in the position of physics vis-a-vis mathematics

when we draw on the resources of logic to mechanize deductions* W© are

at such an early stage in the analysis of our concepts that we can use
the resources only of elementary logic* The advantages of more power-

ful logical tools await the refining of our ability to paraphrase sentences.

(This can be seen by noticing how simple are the logical oper-

ations used in the notatlonal parts of most philosophical arguments*

The third purpose is repeated often enough, but never made as clear as
on© might like. Is the "theory” that is simplified by regimentation
l£l
1$0
outlines?
general
most
scientific theory in its
logical theory?
the theory of the referential-predicative part of language? or perhaps

not theory but theoretical language? Are these perhaps not alternatives
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but related to one another?
We have noted earlier that regimentation
is not system construction. Quine rejects system construction
largely because of the artifi-

ciality and arbitrary limitations of a system
*ith respect to allowable
terms. The situation he envisions is one
in which the philosopher

keeps moving between severely regimented
language, in which the prin-

ciple of minimum resources prevails, and fairly
ordinary language, with
its conceptual untidiness but greater directness
and brevity of expression. This is the stance of Quine’s in which he
shows most strongly

the influence of Neurath, whose often-quoted simile about
rebuilding
a ship on the open 3ea appears at the beginning of Word
and Object .

In the same paragraph in which the simile appears, Neurath
writes,

^3 gftbt kein Mitt el , urn end gill tig g csicherte
3aubere rrotokol ls dtze sura AusgangBininkt der
Wissena c haften zu machen. Es "gibt keine taHla
* 1$2
rasa. Wie iichiffer sind wir. . • etc

* There is no way to produce absolutely unadulterated protocol sentences as a point of
departure for the sciences. There is no tabula
rase* W'e are like mariners who must rebuild
their ship on the open sea, without ever being
able to bring it into dock and erect it anew
from the best materials.
Quine adds the commentary, "Our boat stays afloat because at each al153

teration we keep the bulk of it intact as a going concern.

With
15U
respect to "theory-building”, "we all must start in the middle."
"

And, one could add, in a sense we all must stay in the middle. A
closed system, which is what a formalization is, can do as little justice
to

hop/

theory relates to the world as an insistence that any departure

from ordinary usage is to be avoided. Neurath writes, "The imprecise
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’conglomerations' [unanalyzed terms from ordinary language] are
always

somehow part of the ship. If the imprecision i 3 restricted in one
place, it can very well turn up strengthened in another.

Regimentation does have systematic consequences, related to
purposes (2) and (3)* However, with respect to (l), clarifying o^

eliminating ambiguity, there is every reason to think that we are entitled to consider the results of regimentation one by one, that we
can compare the ambiguous natural language sentences with their clari-

fied counterparts in logical notation, and do so at a sub— systematic
level. Judging a sentence to be ambiguous involves singling it out

from the corpus of sentences of the language. There is no such thing
as an ambiguous language. Quine considers it a distinctive feature of
languages that
1

ally."

” sentences

are thought of as conveying meanings sever-

!

It is proper, therefore, to expect that, in carder to judge

particular applications of regimentation we can match sentences with
formulae, and that not all the formulae which could be offered will be

acceptable. This last point is not as silly as it seems. If any formula

at all were acceptable as a clarification of a given ambiguous sentence,
then "clarification” would trivially be merely the replacement of the
157
This is not what we normally mean by clarisentence by any formula*
fication* We normally mean that a sentence which was subject to more

than one interpretation has been reformulated, or put in linguistic
or nomlinguistic context, in such a way that it is now subject to only
one interpretation, and that that interpretation is the one intended,
or probably intended, by the speaker or writer*

The Quinian notching of sentences with formulae is one which

7U

rejects a criterion of "meaning the same"
in favor of a criterion of

"functions the sane". Both criteria need to be
qualified by "in some
contexts" because a sentence would not be a
candidate for regimentation
if there were not some problematic contexts to
revise or do without

as well as some Important contexts to preserve. The
regimented sentence
cannot "mean the same" without qualification because,
at the ve*y
least, regimentation eliminates ambiguity. It also cannot
"function

the same" without qualification. Quine* s rejection of
a criterion of

meaning goes back to the "Two Dogmas" arguments* hecan find no criteria
for "meaning the same" which are both defining and independent of

other undefined concepts.

To function the same in a deduction, two sentences must be inferrable by the same rule of inference from the same premises, and

must permit the same inferences by the same rule of inference. If these
requirements are compatible with two sentences having different (intuitive) meanings, so much the worse for meanings, on Quine's view.

According to the "maxim of the identification of indis cemibles * Objects indistinguishable from one another within the terms of a given
l£8
discourse should be construed as identical for that discourse.

"Function", as a matching and individuating criterion,

win

result in

quite a different correlation of sentences to sentences, or sentences
to formulae in the logic, than "meaning". However, for Quine, the ad-

vantages all lie on the side of "function" because "function", in this

restricted sense of

with

an

"•

•

.in a deduction", is an extensicmal criterion

the straightforwardness that "meaning" so notoriously lacks.

Perhaps one should now put a fundamental question to Quine* Why
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is regimentation a good way to clarify ambiguous
sentences in a natural

language? Quine's answer might include these points?
(1) What is ordinarily called 'grammar' in a natural language
is
inadequate to the task*
(2) Paraphrasing ordinary language sentences into logical notation yields "a sharp analysis of concepts, a revelation of

fundamental structures" previously undetected} logic can be
1#>

a "source of syntactical insights'',

(3) Sentences paraphrased into logical notation can be handled

by "methodical manipulation. . .according to fixed rules
of algorithm." The advantages of efficiency, speed and
accuracy are similar to those of .achine calculation* 160
(U) Regimentation offers the systematic value of simplicity*

As argued in "Simple Theories of a Complex World," and in
Word and Object , the simpler theory, or base, accounts for
more data, establishes more interrelations , has a wider
margin for error, and is therefore more reliable than a
less simple tneory.
161
(3)

and (U) are, in effect, versions of purposes (2) and (3) of

regimentation* (See above, p« 71*
tages*

)

bet us grant that these are advan-

(l) i3 an interesting claim* Quine is only one in a long tradi-

tion of analytic philosophers who, without a very careful study of lin-

guistics, conclude that the "logic of language" and the syntax of a

language have almost nothing in common, and may even be at cross-purposes. This tradition, which includes Prege , Russell, and Wittgenstein,

takes it as conceded that traditional syntax makes distinctions which

are unimportant to

tine

logical analysis of language and overlooks dis-

tinctions which are essential to this analysis* One can hardly chastise
these philosophers for their assumptions since grammar in the mold of

matin grammar and its successor, descriptive taxonomic grammar, were

not very promising as tools of logical analysis.
Transformational grammar, on the other hand, decidedly claims
to include in its province the clarification of ambiguity. This re la-
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tively now approach to grammar has
appropriated the distinction

between surface, or superficial, and dee£, or
underlying, grammatical
structures which philosophers of "logical grammar"
have previously

used to demonstrate the insufficiencies of
grammatical (taken to mean
surface grammar exclusively) analysis# The deep
structures determine
the semantic interpretation of a sentence. In fact,
the border between

syntax and semantics is not drawn, and every attempt is made, by
Chomsky at least, to include as much as possible of semantics
wit’nin
the territory of syntax. This is done by the use in syntactic
analysis
of such categories as ’abstract’, ’human’

,

’animate’, as well as

’transitive’, *pre-adverbial’, etc, each associated with context162
limiting rules.
If thi3 could be satisfactorily worked out, it

would be a way, within syntax, of accounting for many kinds of aifblguity. It is interesting that Chomsky is trying to include so much

within syntax \ his distrust of ’meaning*, of "unanalyzed semantic in163
tuition"
is not far from Quine’s, and his attempt to rely on the
loh

syntactic component, identified by purely formal features,

is per-

haps parallel to QuineVs choice of an extensional logic for the regi165
mentation of language.

Whether transformational grammar has the means to clarify all
the ambiguous constructions which are of interest to philosophers re-

mains an open question. It is certainly not yet established, and when
166
Word and Object was written, it was hardly a possibility.
On any
account, Quine ha3 opted for a program of clarifying language which
proceeds directly from sentences in natural language to formulae in
I67
and the claim that we have to consider is the cave made in (2)i
logic,
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{*) sentences in natural language can be non trivially
transformed

into logical formulae j and (b) this procedure does clarify
sentences
of a natural language*

Quin@ s as we know, assumes (a) and is enthusiastic about (b).

Another way of stating this claim is to say that truth-functtonal predicate logic with quantification and identity can be considered a suitable, and rewarding, model for either English alone, or for all

some

— natural

— or

languages* Taking up the questions of the restriction

of the domain of application of the model first, is it plausible to

restrict the domain of application to English? Quine deals only with
English* He introduces regimentation only after the principle of in-

determinacy of translation has undercut an inter linguistic concept of

meaning beyond stimulus meaning of observation sentences* He writes

that "the artificial notation of logic is itself explained, of course,
168
in ordinary language"
and that sentences, regimented in "canonical
notation", are a "sub-class of the eternal sentences" of the language
169
in question*

On the other side, Quine* s rejection of the putative "prelogicality" of some cultures, and his attribution of this apparent charac170
seem to be evidence for a belief that
translation,"
to
"bad
teristic
this logic can be a model for all languages* Only the truth-functional

part of logic can be behaviorally determined and translated, however j
indeterminacy sets in for the predicates and even for the quantifiers
171
"
One might
extension.
"beyond
because the criteria for these go
conclude that every language could be mapped on to the fuller logic,
as English can be, but that it is not possible, because of indeterminacy.
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to correlate these mappings interlinguistically* It -would be, if true,

an astounding linguistic universal, but perhaps an empty

one. If the

logic is interpreted in the language which is to be mapped on to it,
then, without further restrictions, the universal might be only that

the particular set of symbols which constitute the logic can serve as
a model for every language individually* But any 3et of symbols, with

an appropriate interpretation, can serve as a model for any domain*

Returning to the main part of Quine 3 s claim, that truth-functional
predicate logic with quantification and identity can serve as an il-

luminating model for English (at least), let us consider what is implied

by it*
(1) The English language, or at least the assertive part of it,

is the field of investigation we are trying to illuminate, and logic,

as specified above, is the "more familiar, or better-organized secondaiy
172
domain.
(2) There is some structural relationship between the original
(3)
and the secondary domains* According to Black, it should be “identity

173
of structure,"

and according to Swanson, the property of symetxy

that identical structures possess is not wanted because a good model
has "surplus sub-structure", is richer in structure than the original
17U
Swanson argues that a model Identical in structure tc its
domain*

dosain of application is "conceptually vacuous'

*

"Explicit or implicit rales of correlation are available for

translating statements about the secondary field into corresponding
17$
statements about the original field*
the dona in of the model can
(U) Inferences that can be made in
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be translated by (3) and applied to the primary domain*
(?) These inferences can be " independently checked’

1

in the pri-

mary domain*
If these conditions are satisfied, the logic proposed is
a suc-

cessful model for English*
Gan English and logic, respectively, take the roles of field of

investigation (primary domain) and model (secondary domain), according
to the above requirements? There is some structural relationship between

English and logic, but clearly not structural identity* Is the logic we
are contemplating "richer" in structure than English? It depends on

what we mean by

»

structure*. The logic is

a more

familiar*8 and "better

organized") rules of inference are explicit and inferences are more
secure. However, Quine often writes as if we are to map the more ccia-

176

plex structure, English, on to the simpler, logic*

Explication, after

all, is elimination which still preserves desired functions* The demon-

stration of the eliminability of all singular terns illustrates as well
as anything that mapping, in this case, proceeds from the "richer" to
the simpler.

On the other hand, if we consider structural relationships
rather than structural elements, the logic can be seen to be richer
than English* The number of elements and the number of relationships

are correlative in a system* the fewer the elements, the greater the
number of relationships that can be elaborated in terms of them.

%

mapping English, with its multiplicity of idioms and relatively few
relationships, onto a logic with a very small sot of elements highly
interrelated, one is mapping the simpler on to the more complex struc-

80
ture.

Condition (3), which calls for "rules of
correlation" between
th® doraains > Presents Ul« greatest problem
for the program of regimentation. If this, and related condition
ik) are not satisfied, we need

not caisider

(f>)

at all because we can not get that far. There
are

"explicit or implicit" rules for translating the
logical connectives,

and probably also the quantifiers (since we are
operating within

English
tiie

now,. .

However, the sweeping away of ail but general toms,
and

lack ol guidelines about the degree of minute analysis of
general

terras,

deprive us of even "implicit" rules of correlation between

ohe two domains.

Thera will be cases where the standard of "functioning

the same" works perfectly well, but there will also be cases where

"function", in the narrow sense in which it is here used, will be un-

satisfactory because it does not wake fine enough distinct! one. Vfl*n

predicates appear vacuously in arguments, there is no problem in transferring inferences from the secondary to the primary domain., and in
checking them by '’function in a deduction". When predicates appear

nan-vacuously, however, we can neither translate nor check with assurance.
Because of the freedom allowed the para phraser with respect to

predicates, Quine rules out a standard of synonymy between sentences

and paraphrases. Conversely, the difficulties that Quine sees with
synonymy remove any grounds for restricting the paraphrase r

!

s freedom.

A regrettable consequence of this is that there v&ll be cases where
the sentence and the paraphrase are functionally equivalent by fiat
of the paraphraser alone, and this greatly weakens the "rules of correlation" between the domains and, therefore, the claim for the model.
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CHAPTER

III

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO QUINE'S PROBLEM

The program of regimentation is justified by its alleged efficacy
in eliminating ambiguity from expressions of a natural language, and on
the other grounds discussed in the previous chapter. Regimentation is not

required because of a principled indeterminacy of translation of terms.

Quine does not justify turning to logic by the failure of full-blooded
concepts of meaning in natural language. However, the ways and means of

regimentation are affected by this failure. Quine's denial that there is
a relation of sameness of meaning between the expressions in a natural

language and the logical formulae which regiment than is a direct consequence of his belief that meaning is an insufficiently precise and opera-

tional concept. His restriction of regimentation to one language, and
his denial of the possibility of interlinguistic meanings for logical
formulae, are directly related to indeterminacy of translation. A closer,

critical examination of indeterminacy of translation, therefore, may well
have consequences for the procedure of regimentation, if not far its
rationale.

Indeterminacy of translation deserves another look on its own

account as well. It is a "shocking** doctrine, appearing to undercut supposedly empirical labors in linguistics and anthropology, as well as
denying any empirically sound concept of meaning beyond ’’stimulus meaning'
It has received relatively little response in the professional litera-

1
ture.

Often, when it is mentioned, it is dismissed without serious coun2

terarguments as something too foolish and obviously false to bother with.
concept
Sometimes Quine is taken to be proposing "stimulus meaning” as the

•
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3
of meaning adequate for describing
or translating a language.
This
is an easy enough straw man to
knock doro, but it is certainly
not
Quine's position. Quine holds that,
if you are a behavioral empiricist,

you cannot defend mors than a "behavioristic
ersatz" for "intuitive"
semantic concepts.

"Stimulus meaning", the behaviorally
justifiable

substitute for meaning, will not take
you as far as meaning} therefore,
there is indeterminacy of translation*

At the beginning of Chapter X, it was
asserted that Quine’s behaviorism and his "Two Dogmas" argument against
an exhaustive analyticsynthetic distinction were the two strands in
his thought chiefly responsible for the principle of indeterminacy* It
might ba interesting to

examine some criticisms of these positions, and some
alternatives to
them, to see how much and what kind of change in
Quine’s behaviorism or

in his view of analyticity would be necessary to produce
a change in the
doctrine of indeterminacy of translation#

These two strands are obviously not completely independent of each
other. A linguist wants to investigate whether ’brother' and ’male sibling' mean the same for a sample of speakers of English* This is the

linguist as "empirical scientist",

and the methods allowable to him

depend on the behaviorist strand* But what is to count as 'meaning the
same

’

?

Aff iraative answers to the question under investigation will vary

with the respondents’ interpretation of ’meaning the 3ame'. The linguist’s
operational definition of 'meaning the same' "in terms relating to lin6
guistic behavior" will depend on his choice of interpretation for 'raean7

ing the sane’*

The decision on a definition of 'meaning the same' depends

on the analyticity strand. Different behavioral tests will be applicable
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to different theoretical
criteria.

^ can teat empirically for the meaning of

-waning the same'

if *e take aa data that
certain pairs of words
are
other pairs are not
synonymous. wa ear test
for the synoz^ of
ooiar pairs of words if
we fix on ,n interpretation
of
the
sane, and derise a
behavioral criterion for
it. W9 cannot vezy
toU
test in the abaenoe of
any fixed points.

^

Wing

a.

behaviorism* Ianguage-Description,
and

One can distinguish
a description of
language-learning from a
language-description. According to
Quine's account, learning
a language
13 being conditioned,
-trained",
society, by means of
zvarards aaa
9
penalties, to respond correctly
to stimuli. As aid, most
stimulusresponse theories, learning
is viewed as a zmther
passive process. Because
me is hard put to account for the learning
of language, even the "first
learning of words-, ty simple
ass<*iati* of words and things,
albeit
reinforced by rewards and penalties,
Quine posits a -sort of prelinguistic
10
quality space" as part of the
infant's innate equipment.
This is held
to be a -prior tendency to weight
11
qualitative differences unequally."
Indeed, the prohlen for an
association^ theory is that "a dozen reinforcements of his response 'Red', on
occasions where red things were presented, would no more encourage the
same response to a thirteenth red
12
thing than to a blue one,"
but one would not think that positing
such

*

a specific Innate discriminatory ability
would be preferable from an em-

piricist's viewpoint than abandoning association
for a more creative process. Quine puts it a little differently
elsewhere' one learns a word

"by induction from observed instances where
it is applied," and therefore

8U

the instances must be sufficiently alike to
"afford fthe leamer7a besis

of similarity to generalize upon."

"Prelinguistic quality space" is

not mentioned here; the viewpoint is external instead
of internal (i.e.,
the ward must only be applicable in cases where.

.

.

etc.

;

y.ho

determines

and enforces this?), and the criterion for "sufficient" likeness
i3
not made explicit.
In the case of radical translation, the linguist can not
count on

induction to determine even the extension, much less the intension, of
a term. The likenesses that he perceives may not be the role van t liknnesses, and he has no way to discover his error.

If the child learns his

native language under the same conditions in which the linguist attempts

to translate that language, what accounts for the child* s succeeding and
lU
the linguist’s failing?
Surely Quine would not want to defend children
being born with a prelinguistic conceptual set for learning a part i cular
language.

Quine grants, furthermore, that, in principle, indeterminacy may
exist within a language because of the individual language-learning histories of the speakers. How,

common language?

Tfaat

.ve

my

ask, do specters come to speak a

answer can Quine give that is not metaphorical, in

terns, for example, of "trimming" shrubs? language is "the complex of

present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same
language have perforce come to resemble one another;" "it i3 to the interests of caammication to efface" the individual variations in language15
His answer is that it is a matter of practical necessity*
learning.

if they didn’t come to speak the same language, they couldn’t speak to
each other. However, this is not an explanation.
The point we are getting to is thi3* Quine rules out a difference
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in kind between the case of the linguist and the
case of the child. He

even grants that a linguist can fluently learn the
language he is out to
translate, particularly if he "simulates the infantile
condition”.

But

if the child and the linguist arc equally held to the same
kind of evidence, how can either one learn a language that goes beyond

" stimulus

meanings "?

Jonathan Cohen asks how, using Quine's standards of acceptable evidence, it could be dete mined that
(1) anyone can adequately learn to speak and understand his native

language?
(2) there is a speech community beyond observational sentences and

17

their truth-functional compounds?

Quine does not regard (l) and (2) as doubtful. He assumes that a child born
in a speech community will, under normal conditions, learn to speak and
understand the language of that community. Although he makes a point of
the fact that, in learning a language, each person is condi tioned differ-

ently, these original associations are not remembered, and the result is

the " trimming u of each speaker into the shape of the language. He also

assumes that one can speak of a single language in one speech cousnunity

which goes well beyond these sentences translatable by stimulus meanings.
Quine explicitly presents indeterminacy of translation as an intralinguistic as well as an interlinguistic problem. Two speakers of a language may interpret a given sentence of that language differently; that
is, they may choose different paraphrases of it or infer different con-

clusions from it (by equally valid procedures). One native speaker may
n

to all.
18
^eshis dispositions to verbal response to all possible stimulations.

impute '‘unimagined views” to another which nevertheless conform
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pite this acknowledgment of indeterminacy within as
well as between languages „ Quine sees no problem, at all in distinguishing the
intralinguis^ic and int® rain guis tic cases* The fonasr, the ^domestic"
c&se^ has no

serious consequences#

,r

Positiv±stic reasonableness” tells us "that if two

speakers natch in all dispositions to verbal behavior there is no sense

in imagining semantic differences between them.” It is in the inter linguiatic case that ’'semantic indeterminacy makes clear empirical sense."

19

Quine simply bypasses the question of the individuation of languages, although it would seem closely related to indeterminacy# He assumes that
can speak of a speech community, a language, and that indeterminacy
20
does not require positing one language per speaker#
In the case of radicone

cal translation, the linguist attempts to translate a totally unknown

language, not the set of languages spoken and understood by the speakers

within a certain geographical boundary.
Given Quine 9 s assumptions about the ability of speakers to learn a
caramon native language, plus his granting that a linguist can learn a

foreign language as a child learns his native language, it would not seem
that the difference between the native and the foreign cases were more
than a difference in degrees of difficulty®

Let us go back for a moment to the case of the linguist’s success
in learning the language fluently which he remains unsuccessful in translating. It is a little surprising that Quine is willing to grant this

possibility, but, as Cohen points out, Quine does not want to conclude

that a language is unleamable. If one denied the possibility of learning
the highly exotic language we are dealing with to the ma ture linguist,

despite his experience, we could always arrange for the linguist’s infant
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to be born and spend his first decade among native speakers,
learning the

language as any other infant would, and learning English as well frcm
his

English-speaking parents. It is significant that the test of a bilingual's

adequacy in both languages is "observing the fluency of his communication
21

in both communities.

It would not be enough to test the correctness of

"

his stimulus meanings against the standard of the community. Quine assumes
that there is more to the language than this, and therefore what one tests
is his ability to get along with other speakers of the language in a va-

riety of language-using situations. Does he make himself understood? Does
he appear to understand what is going on? Does he respond in nonanotaalous

ways, and do the others behave normally toward him? This is not terribly
precise, but it is reasonable enough.

Cohen’s criticism is that, with the tools allowed by Quine, the

linguist could not judge either his own child’s successful learning of
the language unknown to him or any other speaker's mastery of it. The

test of "fluency of.

•

.ccEmunication", proposed by Quine, is not justi-

fied by his own standards of evidence. The linguist can only, on those
standards, certify the existence and meaning of "sentences asserting the

immediate presence of conspicuously segregated objects.
22
functional compounds.

•

.and their truth-

In the same way, the language-learning procedure that Quine endorses shrouds in the mysterious perception of similarities and analogies

everything beyond the learning of the first few words. A passive process
of association of words and things, or words and other words, cannot ac-

count for how one learns to isolate the correct properties picked out by
of
words, nor for how one learns to understand and use a word in a variety

use and
contexts, including in new contexts, nor far how one learns to
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understand^ *ord dlsorlmlnattogly
with respect to beHef and
other in_
tentions.
A natural language, of the
richness that Quine as

-.veil

as

most People take for granted,
cannot be learned by a process
of cenditioning.

In describing the learning of
a language, one can plausibly
reproduce utterances in the order learned,
and rely on one’s psychological

theory of learning to explain hem these
utterances are related to events
withm and outside the learner. In describing
the speaking of a language,
as a native speaker or a linguist might,
one is concerned to do more than
that. Short of attempting to translate,
or give equivalences for, ex-

pressions of the language being described,
one will attempt to correlate
things said with observable situations. One
can begin by taking "obser-

vable situations" in the large, rather than
trying to narrow them down to
the "prompting" elements. These situations will
then not only be the

presence of objects which appear to prompt particular
utterances, but

mil

include a variety of human actions and inferred purposes,
attitudes, expectations, etc. In observing infants learning to speak, we
rigfrtly fail

to impute a complex conceptual background to what we directly observe;

we assume that children acquire a language and a conceptual framework to2U
getlier.
We therefore have only the very limited evidence of uttered
noises plus the presence of objects, grimaces, clutchings, movements, our
25?

knowledge of the time of the last feeding, and so on.
It is true that the expression of inner states by outer movements

may vary drastically in different cultures. Error is likely, and complete
eventual success doubtful. The question is whether, when describing the
language of mature speakers, one is required by sound empiricism to rule
out, at the start and forever, any evidence but the evidence for the
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stimulus meanings of observation sentences? One can give
up stimulus-

response associationism without giving up the view that
"language is
a social art.

In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersub26

^actively available cues as to what to say and when. "

Let us take the

strong view that there are no specifically linguistic innate mechanisms

required

try

a theory of language. Everything that becomes a part of the

learned language is learned by "intersubjectivoly available cues”. Let
us even grant Quine that "entification begins at arrays length," that

ordinary physical things are in "sharpest focus”, and that words de3ig27

nating them are learned first.

Hone of this commits us to limiting our

description of a language to a description of the conditions for the use
of those words. Hot all "surface irritations", not all of the "past and
28
present barrage of non-verbal stimulation",
derive from those ordinary

physical things whose paradigms are stones and apples and rabbits. To

doubt that we can always infallibly identify what someone is doing is
perfectly right} to entertain a general doubt that we can ever identity

what people do, intend, expect, etc. is not rigorous empiricism but un29

reasonable skepticism.

I would like to take up a few examples of this broadly-conccived

way of describing a language. The examples are very different from one
another, because the writers proceed from different starting points for

different purposes. The first is Stanley Gg veil's essay, "&ist We
30
What W© Say?".

liean

The significance of the title is as follows « Gavell is discussing
statements about the use of ordinary language of the type, "When we say.

90

•

•

•

s' vre

mean, imply, suggest, etc. that

•

.

.

(where the se-

cond blank is not merely a paraphrase of the first, but a specification
31
the "pragmatic” implications, presuppositions, etc.).
He i 3 asking
in the title, and examining in the essay, whether such statements are

necessary truths. He concludes that they are, although in a special
sense. On the one hand, they are "obviously" not analytic, and, on the

32
other, "the question of evidence is irrelevant."

Their "necessity"
33
resides in the norma tiveness of "ordinary use itself."
On the existence

of a relationship, he argues
that something docs follow from the fact that a term
is used in its usual ways it entitles you (or, using
the term, you entitle others) to make certain inferences, draw certain conclusions. (This is part of what
you say when you say that you are talking about the
logic of ordinary language. ) Learning what these implications are is part of learning the language ; no
less a part than learning its syntax, or learning
what it is to which terms apply! they are an essential
part of what we communicate when we talk. ... We are,
therefore, exactly as responsible for the specific
implications of our utterances as vre are for their
explicit factual claims. And there can no more be
some general procedure for securing that what one implies is appropriate than there can be for determining
that what one says is true. "
3U

On the necessity of the relationship.
If truth consists in saying of what is that it is,
then ( this sense or source of) necessary truth con35
sists in saying of what is what it is.

Max Black subscribes to this point of view, and, in "Presupposition
and Implication," draws some interesting contrasts between "what is said
36
1
He interprets implication in
implied".
is
in so many words* and what
these contexts nonlogi cally , as neither material implication nor strict

implication, but rather as belonging "to the same family as 'suggest,'
37
‘Ihese are "two modes of expression" and
'hint,' 'insinuate'. ..."
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the latter, "implicit comunication" is important
"for an adequate con,

ception of language" because the former, what is
"said outright", is
interpreted so strictly as only a report of the speaker* s
words in indirect discourse, or even, "under pressure" of a dispute,
quotation of the
38
speaker * words#
This omits such features of utterances as (significant) silences, ^ellipsis, stress, intonation, sentence construction,

choice of words, or allusion" which are expressed by specifiable linguistic devices.

Sometimes one checks whether some implications of the utterance
ho
were intended by questioning the speaker*
He may "disclaim some resDon—
Hi
sibility for his implications*"
"To the extent, however, that the
speaker uses formal linguistic signals of implications, ^alternatively,
"conventional rules for implications
"1
‘
J he forfeits the optical of disclaimH2
ing the implication*
One can distinguish in some cases between what
11

the speaker intended to imply and what his words implied, where the speaker
H3
is responsible for the implications of his words, like it or not.
This
is close to Cavell’s normative "necessity".

The "normativeness" of the ordinary use of language that Gavell has

in mind is not to be opposed to "descriptive" nor exemplified by "preHH
The statements of the type Cave 11 is discussing
scriptive utterances".
are normative because they are action descriptions, and the "most characteristic fact about actions is that they can.
be performed incorrectly."

•

.go wrong, that they can

Something only counts as an assertion, a

question, a command, if it is performed in a certain way. They are rules,

in the sense that they "tell you what to do when you do the thing at all
H6
•

.

thing well, with skill or understanding."
• [not] how to do the

latter sort of directions are expressed by prescriptions, principles*

The
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The ordinary language philosopher, or
indeed any native speaker,
is "entitled, without special empirical
investigation,” to make these

assertions about utterances and their meanings
and implications.

^

k

linguist, on the other hand, can make a
corresponding assertion, but for

him it is the result of empirical investigation,
and therefore not neces40
sar.ily true, not a rule*
The two assertions have the same
truth-condi-

tions, and describe "the identical state of affairs,"
but "the question
of evidence is irrelevant" to the native speaker
because he knows that
U9
his assertion is (necessarily) true because he has
learned his language.
Gave 11*3 chief purpose is to deny that toe ordinary language
philo-

sopher who is a native speaker requires the empirical apparatus of
questionnaires, as Mates has suggested in "On the Verification of State-

ments about Ordinary Language,"

to go about his job.

Native speakers

"do not, in general , need evidence for what is said in the language; they
are the source of such evidence."

No one would deny that native speak-

ers are the "source" of evidence about usage in their language, nor that,
"in general" a native speaker knows her to speak his language. However,

usage is not totally uniform within a speech community so that each speaker
is not a "source" in the same way that all the speakers together, or a

properly selected sample, are. Gavell grants that "to answer some kinds
of specific questions" even native speakers may find it wise to conduct
$2
surveys.

For our purposes, the Gavell essay is interesting for its strong defense of a close connection between some surrounding circumstances of an

utterance-type and the utterance-type itself. Some of these surrounding
circumstances: typical ways in which the speaker is prepared to follow up
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that utterance with others or with nonverbal
actions, typical expectations aroused in the hearer expressed by verbal
or nonverbal responses,

are eminently observable. Since we know it to be
the case that these

connections vary in different subccCTcronities of one
speech community,

and that they vary even within one subcommunity over
time, it is harder
to gra3p what Cavell means by their necessity. He concedes
that there
is temporal ctange in a language but holds that,
because it changes

"naturally", as opposed to artificially (i.e., by stipulation),
ordinary

use at any given point in time (how small?) is normative. He concludes,
both mystically and tendentiously, "To see that ordinary language is

natural is to see that (perhaps even see why) it is normative for what
5U
can be said."

Hie next position we will consider diverges from Gavell on the

question of the noriaativeness of language-descriptions, although norms

have a place elsewhere in this fully worked out theory of meaning. To
understand what Jonathan Cohen has to say about language description and
concepts of meaning in The Diversity of &eaning , it i 3 necessary to un-

derstand the three fundamental distinctions which he makes. (See Figure

1.

The distinction of levels of discourse is the distinction between
talking about particular wards or sentences and talking about what is

conveyed by particular words and sentences. On the verbal level, a quoted

word cannot be translated} on the conceptual level, it can be. On the
verbal level for a language-sentence, one discusses syntactic structure,
paraphrase and translation} cm the conceptual level, one discusses the
55

implications and appropriateness of its utterance.
The distinction between occurrences of words and sentences and

words and sentences in a language is a very important one for Cohen. An

9U

figure 1

Level of discour se

VERBAL

CONCEPTUAL
Kind of
semantics!

Meaning of

\

an occurrence of a
word

"utterance
word"

"saying
word"
"term"

an occurrence of a
sentence

"utterance
sentence”

"saying sentence"
"saying"

de jure

m u *'

a word in a language

"language
word"

"culture
Tjord"

de facto

a sentence in a

language

"language
sentence"

"culture
sentence"

occurrence of a rrord is not a word—token because the duplication oA a

particular utterancc-^vrord (by recording or writing) does not double the
56

number of utterance-words as it doubles the nrnabor of tokens.

An occur-

rence of a word or a sentence is its utterance on a particular date in

particular circumstances which render its meaning fully determinate

anti

other
fixed once and for all. A word or sentence in a language, on the
57

hand, has a meaning which is a "changeable property" of it.

One cannot

words change
specify the meaning of any language-word tirelessly, because
of a languagetheir meanings through time, nor even the correct moaning
Yttrd on

noticeable
September 1, 1968, because meanings change with the

when a new use will be
acceptance of a new use and one can never predict
58
initiated.
counterparts,
Utterance-words and sentences and their conceptual
(the last being Cohen's
saving-words and -sentence and terns and swings

proposed substitute for proposition.),

arc the province of translators

sentences and their conceptual counterand logicians. language-words and

are the province of lexicographers
parts, culture-words and -sentences,

“tween
us to the third distinction,
and historians of ideas. This brings
semantics, which is required for
de jure, or rule-guided, "tiaeless"
descriptive, "temporal " semantics,
occurrences, and de facto, or purely

which is required for language.

factual,
Cohen belabors the totally

and toe
for language words and sentences
descriptive nature of semantics
generalisations.
of normatirenesa from its
absence of the slightest taint
semantic rules
absolute nenfaotualnoss of
the
about
adamant
He is equally
that any empiri
It is highly questionable
utterances.
of
meanings
for the
Cohen's sense, ana teat
"purely" descriptive, in
are
generalisations
cal
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cie

jure semantic rules are independent of any and all factual state-

61
ments, as he claims*

However, Cohen feels that much harm ha 3 been done

in philosophical linguistics by a normative "rules of use" approach to
•word use,

and that a descriptive approach to translation of utterances

and to the correlation of logical formulae

frith

sentences is misplaced*

for the semantics of wards ana sentences in a language, Cohen takes

33 paradigm the procedure of the compiler of dictionaries, the lexicographer* In arguing against the relevance of rules to bhi: branch of se-

mantics, he points out that ’howler’s -.uoexn Ingjisl: I

~.u;,c-

and the Concise

Oxford Dictionary ware written with obviously different aims in view,

even though they had an author in common* The evaluative approach is as
pervasive and characteristic in the i'oxuer as it is rare and superfluous
62
In the Preface to the latter work, the authors
in the latter. ..."
state their purpose as "on the one hand restricting ourselves for the

most part to current onglish, auu on the other hand omitting nothing to
63

which that description

my

fairly be applied."

for a word, "an old word in a new use",

lias

Once a change of meaning

gained sufficient cur-ency

to be recorded in a dictionary, its use is traced, as far as possible,
treated
to its first recorded occurrence* That first occurrence in not
6U
°ne might
one."
new
to
a
obedience
or
rule
old
of
an
as a "breach
tacto and ne jure
open a chink in Cohen's impenetrable wall between ie

which
semantics here* there is no automatic recording machine

s

nply in-

list of actual
gests all uses of all words and prouuce3 an up-to-date

meaning is in * usage. The lexicographer must decide that a new

use "to be worth recording”*

le

•n0US*1

The principles for selecting relevant

lexicographer than for any other
data are no different in kind for the

empirical scientist, ana no less normative.
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Cohen then considers different ways of discussing
word-use in a

language in order to determine the best concept of meaning
for temporal
semantics* The first* and simplest* uses a causal concept of
meaning*

If there is an observable correlation between sound—
patterns and situa-

tions and behavior (on the part of both speaker and hearers), then, with-

out taking anything else into account, the linguist can take the meaning
of an utterance for a hearer as "its causal property of generating such-

66
or— such responses*

"

He can likewise take the meaning of an utterance for

the speaker as a "causal property [of the circumstances] to generate the

utterance."

Cohen finds this restriction of evidence justifiable in

discussing the infant's first learning of words since, in effect, no
other evidence is available* The causal concept of meaning, which is sub-

stantially "stimulus meaning", can be used here because no fuller concept
is applicable* However, we do not continue to think of a word as having

two meanings, one far the speaker and one for the hearer, and we do not
consider utterances meaningless which are not simply "evoked" by situa68
tions*

If the linguist adds to his assumptions that particular utterances

are made for particular purposes and that the speakers know which utterances are likely to achieve which purposes, then he can go beyond corre-

lating utterances with situations and describe speakers as "giving orders,
conveying information, communicating gratitude," etc*, and take "the

meaning of each sound—pattern as the normal purpose for which it is uttered*
This is a simple purposive concept of meaning* The difficulty with a pur-

posive concept in this form is that each sound—pattern uttered ior a purpose is considered independently of every other sound-pattern* A linguist
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cannot account lor the fact that we relate sound-patterns
in reasoning

and often make utterances about other utterances. If same sound-patterns
70

are taken to be "supplementary of their context,”
teilk

the linguist can

about the meaning and truth—value of the remaining sound-

patterns. This amended purposive concept of meaning can account for a

language of a sort, but it is not yet sufficient to account for the
71
T
known natural languages, its
main shortcoming is lack of economy.
,

Utterances are taken as a whole, and individuated by purposes. Learning
such a language, or describing it fully, would be a task of superhuman

proportions, involving ”a number of sound-patterns equal, say, to the

number of non-equivalent statements, commands, promises, etc*, containing
scoe four dozen words or less than can be constructed from the five72

thousand odd words of commonest use in mid-twentieth-century English.”
This concept of meaning fits rather well the foreign language-English

phrase books which one uses to get by for a brief interval in a foreign
country. Anyone who has ever used one knows how difficult it is always

to find exactly the right sentence, and how helpless one is in an effort

to alter an almost-right sentence without knowing the gramnar of the
language.

For an ilberwindung of this difficulty, the linguist must break

utterances down into "words” and must attempt to formulate the grammar
of the language. We know that the impossibility of this is just what

the principle of indeterminacy asserts, but we will not consider Cohen* s

answer to Quine at thia point. The linguist will discover that all words
can appear in different positions in sentences, play different roles, and
that a word* s "meaning" is not exhausted 1yy what it means "when uttered
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in isolation*

Instead the meaning of a word or common phrase
as
dictionaries conceive it is the part it plays in
achieving the normal purposes of the serial arrays
of words in which it occurs* Its moaning is the
function or functions it performs in the utterances
of those who speak the language to which it belongs.

7U

This xs a functional concept of meaning, and according
to it, the meaning
of a word is described by (l) giving another word or
phrase in the same
or another language which performs the sane (semantic)
function, (2) plac-

ing the word among the classifications of the grammar in order to give
its
75

syntactic function,

and, on the conceptual level, giving the implica76
tions and appropriate contexts of the use of the word*

A number of different points are emphasized in this account* Each
single word in a sentence does not achieve its own distinctive ’’normal
purpose", part of the "normal purpose” of the whole sentence* This would
be the image of a sentence as a string of beads, where a word is added to

add same partial purpose to the total purpose* The functional view stresses
the interaction of words in a sentence* a word's meaning in a given sen-

tence is affected by its syntactic category (which may not be uniform far
one word-shape* e.g.

,

'fly* as both noun and verb), its position, endings,

and the other words with which it is associated*
A functional concept of word meaning depends on being able to describe

’’the

function or functions

in the sent® ices of

r
|

i

/

a word} performs, as a matter of fact,

the J language.”

77

The syntactic function can be des-

cribed if the word can be located in a grammar of the language, for which
there are grounds of adequacy, if not of uniqueness* The semantic function

can be described if a word or phrase in the language, or in another language, can be given which can be held, with evidence, to serve the same
or a closely similar function in a sentence with a particular "normal
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purpose". With a purposive concept of sentence-meaning, the pragmatic

function of a word is closely related to the semantic. Indeed, if a word
has no close equivalent in its language, or in the translating language,
one may have to move directly to the pragmatics of its use and specify

the situations in which the ward is used and what are the implications and

consequences of its use. These functions must all be "identifiable.

•

•

in normal utterances" and Cohen compares the approach with functional

description in biology (although he also perceives differences, chiefly
that particular organs, but not particular words, are indispensable for
78

the performance of their functions.).

Cohen* s exposition is again

couched in terras of wholly de facto temporal semantics, and again one

must protest that functions of words are not changed by all actual uses
of words, but that a normative element operates to identify the functions
of words and to trace their changes.

The points at issue between Cohen and Quine are critical ones.

For a functional description of language to be a viable alternative to a
causal, or as3ociational, one, the different kinds of functions must be

identifiable, and yet functions are not observable in the way that the

concomitance of a presented physical object and a prompted (elicited)

utterance is. This may be expressed in different ways* One must observe
raoduthe use of words in situations with a considerably longer "stimulus

79

lus" than Quine would accept as experimentally satisfactory.

One is

but that
committed to holding that sentences are not atomic, isolated,
»p»
they have implications, such that when a speaker says

he is saying

he is doing somesomething that can be expressed in indirect discourse;
information, paying a compliment,
thing like asking a question, convoying

delivering an insult, etc.

;

subjunctive
he is uttering a sentence in the

101

mood or in the past tense or referring to plural
objects, etc.
Words relate to other words in sentences and in the
language} they
relate to nonverbal events of all kinds. These relationships
and implications go far beyond the extensional bounds that Quine
would set. We know

that there is a failure of extensionality in verbal contexts of
indirect
discourse, believing, knowing, doubting, hoping, etc. because of "refer-

ential opacity

11

.

And yet here Cohen is proposing that when one says some-

thing, one is also (simultaneously albeit silently) saying, conveying,

and implying much else besides. Quine would perhaps accept those implications which

cceae

from the truth-functional connectives in sentences. If

x says, ’Cicero denounced Catiline,’ he implies that it is false that
Cicero did not denounce Catiline. However, he will surely not accept those
implications from the use of one word to the use of one equivalent in

function in the same or a different language because the only kinds of
equivalence of words that he recognizes

— and rejects — are

too-weak

extensional and inscrutable intensional equivalence. Thu3 the condemnation of indirect discourse as "perhaps irreducibly non-ex tens ional" can
only be softened by the reflection that it is "in any event at variance
80

with the characteristic objectivity of science, ^t is a subjective idiom.

A regimented sentence serves the same function as its replaced sentence if, in a deduction, the same inferences can be drawn, etc. (See text,pp.

66-67,7h*) There is little doubt that "serving the same function" can
be applied with far clearer standards here than among language-words and
-sentences. There is also little doubt that, on Quine’s concept of meaning

and standards of evidence, determining the functions served by languagewords is a task which cannot be performed empirically. A functional approach

always rests heavily on a working assumption of the universality of some
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functions in the universe under discussion (in this case, speech camaunities). For the description of languages, the number of functions is liable

to be extremely large and the selection of functions vulnerable to the
81

charge of "ad hocness".
Cohen* s defense of the empirical soundness of the linguist's hypo-

theses based on a functional concept of meaning is that they can be tested

in use , by being "acted on", and that they are therefore subject to con82

firmation and refutation as "analytical hypotheses" are not*
proach uses precisely the test -which Quine proposed
grounds for proposing

— for

—

This ap-

but really had no

the fluency of the bilingual* observing his

83

success in communication.

The linguist can himself "act on" his hypo-

theses; two linguists at an impasse or two rival bilinguals can do the
8U
same.
K.L* Pike, whose creation of an imaginary language, Kalaba, as a test
85

case for students of phonemic analysis

inspired Quine's imaginary case
86

studies in "leaning in Linguistics" and Word and Object ,

makes this point

strongly in the section of his monograph on identifying 'words" among the
phonetic data. He writes that "our establishment of phonemic principles

and procedures must ultimately rest upon our observations of native reactions to the phonetic data." The native speaker's "unconscious physical,

linguistic or social reactions to the structural unity of his phonemic
ignored
system may be analyzed by the observer." "A procedure which

[these reactions

j

.

.

.

would be just an arbitrary type of ’algebra’ which

system functiondoes not analyze the facts of the language as a structure!
87
*
ing as a medium of communication

word function*
According to the functional concept of meaning, a
putative syntactic, semantic
both in the language and in the world. The
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and pragmatic functions of any particular
word have plications in the
language and in the world. This means that
a functional
definition of

°°
any one word affects many other words: "families”
or "linguistic fields n

of words which may substitute for each other
in some contexts or associate

with each other in sentences. A functional
definition of any one word
affects many nonverbal contexts in which that
word may be used. There
is more re late ones s in a language so conceived
than Quine wants to giant.

dot only aoes Quine take as the linguist’s only
proper method
the matching of things presently happening (narrowly
interpreted) with

uttera nces,

but he takes it to be a distinguishing feature of language

*****

are •* s*8ned t0 sentences one by one rather than systema-

tically.

In a certain sense, the sentences of a language are clearly

not comparable to the sentences (assertions) of a scientific theory.
This
is the sense in which the sentences of a language are the data for the

theory of that language, and not the theory itself. We may equally' Hinder at" the significance of soma phenomena which are held to be the results of an experiment, if no one has told us the hypotheses being tested
91
in the experiment.
However, the sentences which constitute the theory
of language are precisely like the assertions of any other scientific

theory, and the language-sentences generated by the theory (including

translations, interpretations, paraphrases) are also interrelated to the

extent that there are fami lies of words, limited grammatical categories,
semantic and pragmatic connections, and so on. Ho decision in the theory

can affect only one sentence in the language. A sharp difference of opin-

ion between linguists on one sentence is not a dead end, and is not without empirical possibilities for settling the dispute, or at least for

carrying it much farther along than the doctrine of indeterminacy allows.

lol*

Cohen* s approach undoubtedly ewes much to
Wittgenstein, as he ac-

knowledges* He has, however, been selective in drawing
from the insights
of the later works. He is as critical of “rules of
use" as an illegiti92
mate blend of factual and normative approaches
as he is approving of
93
Wittgenstein's emphasis on “use and on words as “institutions **
11

1

It is a decided risk of the aphoristic style of writing
philosophy

which Wittgenstein practiced that bits of one } s work can be appropriated

by followers of widely different persuasions* Wittgenstein eschewed the
systematic development of his ideas and was deliberately un~ and even
9k
anti-theoretical.
It is therefore not always easy to determine when

his

words are being used in the spirit; of his philosophy, and when not.
For an example which is pertinent to our present concern, Quine
quotes Wittgenstein s “Understanding a sentence means understanding a
95
language “ in support of indeterminacy of translation.
It is possible
1

that he is not really entitled to do so* In context, Wittgenstein is em-

phasizing the interrelatedness of sentences in a language, and the im-

possibility of understanding any sentence of English without understanding English and its whole system of "customs” with respect to such

features as pronouns, pluraHzation, tense, sensation words, etc* Some

stress must be placed on “understanding" j one can surely know how to use

« single French sentence in a specific limited context without knowing
French, but one cannot know how to use a sentence fully and in all possible

contexts without knowing the language*

Quine is extracting from Wittgenstein the expression of a sentence ’ 3
intimate connection to its language, and he concludes from this

x>hat there

15
is no “linguistically neutral meaning* However, what is to prevent Witt-

genstein frem stating as a corollary, “To understand that a sentence in

1X£

English and a sentence in German are equivalent means to understand

both English and German,” particularly since in the Imesti^ations
the sentence we are considering is the purported translation of its

German original, "Einen Satz verstehen, heisst, eine Sprache verstehen,”

which appears cm the facing page?

Another functional approach to language description, which utilizes
the concept of a "linguistic role”, is taken by Wilfrid Sellars and

Bruce Aune. Their point of departure is a critique of an associaticml

concept of meaning* Sellars writes that many theories of meaning which
are nominalistic with respect to ” ’thinking in absence 1 ” "turn out to

be quite ’Augustinian 1 in accounts of

’

thinking in presence 1

?

of those

occasions on which the fundamental connect! on of language with non-iin96
However, thl3 is a mistake, according to
guistic fact is exhibited*”
Sellars. There are no

” selfauthenticating

nonverbal episodes”! learning

to apply a word to a thing presupposes a great deal besides the presence
of the thing and the utterance of the word, such as background knowledge
97
about observers, conditions of observation, grounds for inference, etc.
”De facto correlations of different sound patterns with one another,

with physical movements, and with certain features of reality that we
might regard as occasioning them” cannot determine meanings. To "decode”
sound patterns, the observer needs to know the "criteri* internal to the
98

conceptual scheme” of the language.
There is nothing here that Quine would not assent to when he is

Aune .uke
discussing radical translation, except that perhaps Sellars and
meaning” correlations.
a dimmer view than he does of even the "stimulus
the translation
The Sellars-Aune view reinforces Quine’s argument against

translated observation sentences.
of terms by the same means by which he has

106

The translation of the sentence *G» vagal* is probably acceptable, but one

cannot go on to translate

,

conceptual scheme". This is
sion sentences

gavagai* without "criteria internal to the
just-

what Quine

uearis

when he writes, "Occa-

stimulus meanings are general coin; terns ami refer99
ence are local to our conceptual scheme.
anti

**

However, Quine wants to insist in Chapter I that conditioning
100

(association plus reinforcements ) is responsible for all language learning,

and the challenge of this view is that Quine must explain har such conditioning can account for more of language than can be translated by
stimulus meanings. How is the conceptual scheme of the language (what
counts as an object, as standard conditions of observation, etc.

,

learned

by as ociation and reinforcement? Association alone will clearly not do it,
as Quine recognizes in Chapter

H. Wtat

must illicitly be packed into

"reinforcement" in order for it to make up for the inadequacy of associato
tion? Is it entirely nonlinguis tic ? If it is, it should be available

community.
the linguist in his efforts to learn the language within the
is paying lip
If reinforcement is not entirely noniinguistic, then Quine

responsible
service to association, while not x'eally holding association
101
language.
enriched
the
for learning
separate conAn a3sociational theory of meaning, which postulates

word/word or sentence/
ditioning bonds for each word-sentence/thing or
atomistic view of language.
sentence relationship, fits well with an
hand, tend to emphasize
Functional theories of meaning, on the other

interrelatedness

'•

with action,
of linguistic elements with each other,

and with knowledge, and to stress
writes.

c-he

importance of norms. As Sellars

107

The language of observation is learned as a
whole* we do not have any of it until, crudely and schematically, perhaps, we have it all.
We acquire the ability to use colour words
along with the ability to speak of physical
objects located in space and time. ... etc. etc.

102

Sellars approves of the pragmatist's definition of the meaning of
a term

as "its role as an instrument in the organism’s transactions with its environment’

1

°n3y if this connection of language with conduct is interpre-

ted as "intrinsic to its structure as language, rather than a ’use* to
103
which it ’happens* to be put. ..."
Both interrelatedness and normativeness are brought out by the

notion of "linguistic role". The language, its use, and its related con-

ceptual scheme are conceived as a single system in which different elements play parts. Different languages are seen as different systems of
the same type. Their speakers, that is, are the same sorts of entities,

observably engaging in the same sorts of activities, both sound-emitting

and not sound-emitting. This is the framework in which translation is
viewed as quite unproblematic. With respect to the normativeness of linguistic descriptions, characterizing the role of an utterance is seen as

"subsumfing J it under a network of essentially normative concepts," in the

way that characterizing movements as actions or shapes of wood as chess
10U

pieces involves norms.

Sellars objects to taking the term 'means’ in interlinguistic semantic statements as a relational term, and defines it instead as
a linguistic device for conveying the information
that a mentioned word. • .plays the same role in a
certain linguistic economy. • .as does ^another
and
wordj which i3 not mentioned but used
which occurs 'on the right-hand side' of the seman-

...

tical statement.

10f>

The two central points here are that
ecancny"*
(l) a linguistic element play3 a role in a "linguistic

108

The metaphor of an "economy" is
a very good one for the kind of
system we are considering, an open system,
one in which exchanges are continually taking place, one in which there re
norms , but fluctuating ones,
a

equivalent and nonequivalent values, and one,
finally, which is involved

in both domestic and foreign trade
(2)

l

to play the same role , which is to mean the same
, is perfectly

compatiole with being different in other respects,

e. g. ,

physically, as

shapes*

Aune writes that one role or function "could in principle"
be performed by linguistic expressions "with very different
empirical features",
106
giving the example of
p3q » and Cpq *,
’

'

Both Sellars and Aune use the example of chess and "Texas chess"
(played with different makes of cars on counties) to demonstrate sameness

of role and difference in other grossly observable characteristics* Players can learn to perceive the relevant saiweness, although it is not at

all self-evident* If one’s experience in a particular area includes only
one kind of physical thing performing a particular role, it may take a

while before the sameness of role is recognized in abstraction from the
difference of physical appearance* Sellars and Aune make a good deal of
the fact that a complete language must include linguistic means for ex-

pressing formal analogies between linguistic roles exemplified by empiri107

cally different forms*

Sellars relates this to "theoretical discourse"

and it3 use of models.
The essential thing about a model is that it is
accompanied, so to speak, by a commentary which
but not precisely nor in
qualifies or limits
the analogy between the familiar
all respects
objects and the entities which are being intro108
duced by the theory*

—

—

109

‘

7hile it is true that, without means in
the language for expressing

such analogies, one could not account so easily
for translation and
paraphrase, such a language would be impoverish*
in many other areas

as well. After all, if the perception and use of
analogies are funda-

mental intellectual tools (see text,

p. 3

. )

and if analogy involves more

than physical resemblance, which it surely does, then
any language in
vrfiioh

one could reason at all would be one with such means.
The point is

only that this requirement of a language is not a requirement
for semantics

’

sake alone, nor, perhaps, does one have to argue for it so
hard.
Hotve^/er,

when one tries to see the relation of this concept of

theoretical discourse to behaviorism, its relevance and importance ap-

pear to increase. The discussion occurs in the context of this problem:

what additions must be made to a public language "of which the fundamental
descriptive vocabulary speaks of public properties of public objects
109
located in Space and enduring through Time"
in order to make possible

talk about thoughts, sensations, feelings, etc*

?

Can one, in other words,

remain in some sense a behaviorist while describing a language function-

ally in such a way as to include intentions, expectations, consequences,
etc., of utterances, or crust such descriptions rest from the start on the

positing of though ts and other inner episodes which are sui generis

?

Sellars* position is that no additions are required which diminish the

intersubjectivity of language, and that this intersubjectivity is the
crucial requirement for the empiricist in his commitment to restrict his
evidence to overt behavior.

The first addition to the public language is semantical discourse ,

language for talking about linguistic expressions, presumably down to

no
no
ward-level, about their meaning, truth, reference, etc.

Quine would

not deny that, within a language, semantical discourse is possible. f ot
Sellars, this addition is related to the eventual possibinty of being

able to talk about thoughts because "semantical talk about the meaning
or reference of verbal expressions has the same structure as mentalistic

in

discourse concerning what thoughts are about."

They are both "inten-

tional" in Brentano*s sense of having an object.

The second addition is, for Sellar3, theoretical discourse , as men-

tioned above, with its use of models and hypothetico-deductive reasoning?
between linguisfor Aune, it is language for expressing formal analogies
112
Given the structural, or formal, similarities between the
tic roles.
"aboutnoss"

(or

intentionality) of semantical discourse and discourse about

theoretical discourse
thoughts and other inner states, the resources of
to postulated "inner epimake it possible to apply semantical categories
sodes".

primitive, "extenTheir arguments use an imaginary case of c

do all their reasoning and probsional" speech-cciflinunity in which people
psychological case studies
lem-solving out loud. They could have used actual

children after a stage of "egocenof the development of "inner speech" in
llU
In these situations, if one
loud".
trio speech" which is "thinking out

by
(i.e., the sort normally preceded
were to observe Intelligent behavior
overt verbal behavior, one slight^
overt reasoning) not preceded by such

using a model of speaking.
reasonably formulate a theory of thinking,
theoretical discourse to a lanSellars holds that the addition of
H« holds that the
less intersubjective.
guage in no way makes that language
coroepts be
behaviouristic requirement that all
vocabularyjerintroduced in terms of a basic
with
compatible
is
taining to overt behaviour
are
concept
behaviouristic
the idea that some
concept’.
theoretical
to be introduced as

Ill

The theoretical concepts, that is,
nay be themselves of unobservables,

without bei ng unempirical or unacceptable to
behaviorism, and he gives
the physical sciences as illustrations.
Because overt behavior is evi-

dence in both cases, "concepts pertaining to.

.inner episodes.
117
are as intersubjective as the concept of a positron."
veluine

.

.

.

would object to the interlinguistic use to which
theoretical

discourse can, on this view, be put. Although a model
may be found by a

speaker of one language to translate another language on
the basis of
sorne

of the similarities of function perceived in observing
the behavior

of native speakers, there is no way to justify that model
over any other,

even very different, one. For any given sentence, one
cannot ask if a
translation of it is "correct" apart from the particular model, or
ii

,
general
scheme 01 translation", according to which it was translated.
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If the two sentence translations differ in truth-value, as they may,
one appreciates the quandary of radical indeterminacy# Curiously, a de-

fender of Quine, Gilbert ilarman, chooses as an example a sentence "trans119
lated" from number theory into different formulations of 3et theory.
^ne might answer that, using a kind of sentence with more links to conduct than a sentence in mathematics, one translation might well be found

to be, in testing it by using it, if not "correct" in the sense of unique-

ly so, then at least significantly preferable to the others. "Whether one
accepts that there are empirical grounds for choosing among, or ranking,

different translations, or rejects this, as Quine does, depends a great
deal on whether one stresses interrelatedness within language and between
language and nonverbal behavior or an atomistic view of language in which

all relations are seen as having been separately conditioned. Sellars’
view, which allows for functional descriptions of language, both behavior-

ally respectable and inclusive of mental attitudes, and of functional

112

translation between languages, dearly
stresses interrelatedness.
No one can doubt that theory
occupies a central place in Quine's
view of knowledge. Sven the cmraan
sense knowledge that we have of
ordinary physical things is "woefully
underdete mined" by "surface irritations, vdiich exhaust our clues to
an external world. *
Theory
fills in, and there is no difference
in kind between common sense
"theories’1 and esoteric scientific ones. The
scientific theory is more

"vivid”, by which Quine means more self-conscious
and reasoned, "yet in

point of function and survival value [/’the
hypothesis of ordinary physical objects’^ and the hypothesis of molecules
are alike.” ”So much the
121
better,” he adds, ”of course, for the molecules."
He is not against

unobservables and he is not .against theoretical
discourse. As

a

philo-

sopher whose touchstone is modern physics, he could
take no other positions on these matters, but as a behavi crist, it is -north
remarking on.
It is even possible to tease out of Quine’s parallel accounts
of

the learning of language and the development of science (Chapter I)
same

features close to Sellars* account. After the early stage of learning

words as whole one-word sentences, the child "tends increasingly to build
his new sentences from parts,” but this still involves learning words in

context by learning "the usage of sentences in which the word can occur. "
Note that "can occur" can not be identified with "does occur", but in-

cludes that and "may occur" as

-veil.

Learning this is in fact not differ-

ent from learning the "function" or "role" of a word. Words vdth unobservable referents are partly learned by describing their referents by
123

"the special form of analogy known as extrapolation.

"

limited use, however, because there is no clear

of distinguishing

-way

This is of

only-

what the theoretical objects are frem what the theory says, or posits.

113
121*

of them*

The oi‘e ties 1 discourse is therefore indispensable.

Here Quine* s and Sollars* (or any nou-associationlst's) paths diverge. Learning a scientific theory, for Quine, is being conditioned to

"associations of words with words" (or sentences -with sentences, or words

with sentences). The sentences of a theory nay be associated with each
other by "so-called logical connections" and "so-called causal ones"
"but any such interconnect, ons of sentences mint finally be due to the

conditioning of sentences as responses to sentences a3 stimuli.

.

•

by

12 $

the mechanism of conditioned response."

Quine remarks that he has

represented the evaluation of evidence for or against a theory "to be a

strangely passive affair.

•

.we just try to be as sensitively responsive

ns pos sibli’ to the ensuing interplay of chain stimulations." He suggests

that perhaps even the "vaunted" standard of simplicity is "just a feeling
of conviction attaching to the blind resultant of the interplay of chain
126
strengths."
various
stimulations in their

Quine at times represents his associationism so baldly as to appear
perverse. He does not address himself to the problems of learning a

theory by being conditioned to respond to specific sentences with other
specific sentences, in what would have to be a rote fashion, is there a
condiunique set of sentences for each branch of theory, and is being
no. 18
tioned to respond with sentence no. 19 to a stimulus of sentence

what is meant by "understanding"

a

theory? Furthermore, on this view, the

just as well as
young student would understand the concepts of the theory

contrary to our experience
his teacher once he was conditioned. This seems

from a branch of science,
of school children who can parrot assertions
understanding fully what they
history, mathematics, or whatever, without

liu

have "learned’

,

and also the novice's apparent growth in understanding

of concepts in hi3 field* as evidenced by numerous operational
criteria*

Quine’s lack of attention to these questions can only be explained

by the fact that he accepts stimulus-response learning theory largely
on faith* It is one of the assumptions that he is holding fixed in this

investigation. This was borne out by Quine’s answer to a question after
a lecture

at Amherst- College in March, 1965 when he blandly remarked

that he didn’t think his acceptance of Skinner’s behaviorism was at all
controversial* (Mis colleague at Harvard,
127
a similar attitude to criticism.

B*

? . Skinner, appears to have

Ihe above pages have attempted to demonstrate that the particular

brand of Quine's behaviorism, one which employs an associationist theory
of meaning and takes an atomistic view of language, is directly related

to the conclusion that "stimulus meaning" is the only empirically sound

fragment of ’meaning’, and that this restriction of the concept of meaning cannot help but result in the indeterminacy of translation of all but

observation sentences* Apart from the inconvenience of this conclusion,

which perhaps could remain merely theoretical while translation would
still be undertaken in practice, we have suggested that Quine’s position
undermines the existence of a language which is both enriched beyond
stimulus meanings and common to a group of speakers* Since the theory

does not permit us to account for anyone learning such a language nor to
describe it being spoken, we have neither toe means nor the justification
for asserting that there is such a language* From the outside of a wall

which we can neither peer nor climb over, we can have nothing to say
about what, if anything, is on the other side* However, this unperceived
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and unpcrceiv&blo enriched c canon language cannot "drop
out of considera128
tion" like the beetle in the bOK
because Quine's view of Cleaning de-

pends on there being something there whiaih we cannot get at,
and his view
o-

language, pcrtic ilarly when ho turns fran Ante rlinguistic
translation

to amoiguity in English, is of u language with considerable
resources

and ceman to a speech community*
furthermore, Quine's death blow to translation with his assertion
tiat moaning in language and truth in physics have nothing to do with one

another
..rctc

— his

that o

view of the linguist’s enterprise as entirely different

any other empirical scientist

—

is u conso< ju ence of his

seeing the sentences of a language as indepenuent of one another* An

atomistic view of language holds that an interpretation or translation of
a single sentence has no consequences apart from setting a weaning for

that sentence* It follows naturally enough from a theory that language
learning is an accretive process of establishing separate conoitioned
bonds*

Although science r^pr.. cuts

’the-

highest values for Quine, and he

recognises the complex relationships between theory and experience in any
science, his insistence on learning by conditioning makes learning a

theory something rather mystifying* To insist upon this learning process,

and to speak of "so-called" logical and causal connections between sentences of a theory, makes it seem entirely fortuitous why the assertions
of a theory comprise the theory as they do* A scientific theory can cane

to seem as atomistic as a language, if the connections are all duo to in-

dividual conditioned bonds.
On the otnor hand, if we delete associationism from Quine’ 3 view of

116

the cosplenentarity or theory and
experience, end recall his emphaais
cm the indivisibility of knowledge,
then there appears no particular

reason to exclude linguistics from the
empirical sciences. If on- views

translation on the model of mapping one set
of symbols on to another,
then, formally, there can be a "difference
of net output"

-without

possible criteria for choosing between
different mappings. If language
ia seen in the context of its use as
a means of conraunicati on, then the

linguist's problems seem no worse than those of
any other scientist.
B.

Analytic Truth and Meaning

A classical defense of an absolute analytic-synthetic
distinction
would assert that (l) every proposition is either analytic (if true;
self-contradictory if false) or synthetic; (2) an analytic proposition
is true solely by virtue of the meanings ofjthe terms contained in it,

while the truth or falsity of a synthetic proposition is determined exclusively by nonverbal facts. To give the meaning of a term may be, as
130
for Morris lazerowitz, to give a "fact about verbal usage,"
and such
facts justify the necessity of the containing propositi ons, but apart
131
from "exhibiting"
facts about verbal usage, necessary propositions
132
are wholly uninf oraa tive •
Synthetic propositions are informative, and
their truth rests on extra linguistic facts. All synthetic propositions

are 3een as on an equal footing with respect to possible refutation by

adverse facts. There is a clean, clear line between analytic and synthetic propositions, and one can always tell on which side of the line to

place a given sentence by looking at it and asking, 'What could possibly

make the true proposition expressed by this sentence not tine?' If the
answer involves something happening to referent(s) of the sentence, it
expresses a synthetic truth. If the answer involves nothing but a change
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In the meaning of a term or

tern in the sentence, it expreesee
an analy-

tic truth*

Quine has taken the position that
such a line cannot be drawn,
and
such a neat division of true sentences
into these mutually exclusive
categories cannot be made. Any sentence
can be held as true despite the evidence, any sentenoe can be overturned
despite its form. Hie picture is
one of a continuum of sentences,
related to each other and to the nonver-

bal world in such a

my

that (l) no sentence is linked only to
nonverbal

experience or to verbal facts (2) sane
sentences are more secure in the
j

system than others, but none is irrevocably
secure and none is dependent
for its truth on an isolated experience. He
has also argmsd that no satis-

factory definition has been given for ’analytic’,
so that there is no way

to show that any sentence is analytically true. As
Harman renarks,
Quine’s conclusion is not merely that the distinction
is a vague one, but

that “nothing is analytically true." He compares this to the
"witch133

nonwitch distinction".

It is not only that there is a substantial area

of vagueness within which it is difficult to decide whether
an entity is

or is not a witch, but that the definitions of ’witch’ (or ’analytic’)

which have been given have no extension whatever.
Giving up the absolute analytic-synthetic distinction creates
questions about meaning and reference, meaning and experience, and sameness of meaning which were previously settled.

The dichotomist ’ s interest

in meaning is only in what might be called essential meaning. Two terms
are synonymous if they have the same essential meaning. He considers it no

great problem to get at the essential meaning of a word. It takes a dictionary plus native speakers' intuition which can be expressed by the
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formula,
analytic.

n

)

*

»

and not

.

.

•

is inconceivable.’' ("

«

t

is

.

.

,» is

If he is troubled by the criterion of inconceivability,
which

does seem irredeemably pictorial, vague and subjective, but is hard to do

without entirely, he may withdraw to facts

—

or better, rules

—

of

usage. That a rule strong enough to get at essential meanings is a rule

that presupposes necessity, and hence offers a circular criterion, does
13H
not bother him.
The rule itself is simply a convention, a matter of
135
contingent fact, and can be changed at any time.
That there are roles

with this force, and that they can be distinguished from other conventions which do not support analytic truth, he simply assumes.

Quine, however, cannot find answers to questions about meaning and

sameness of meaning that satisfy him. He therefore proposes doing without these concepts. We have seen the effects of this decision in both

translation and regimentation. The enterprise of translation, without an
" intuitively”

complete concept of meaning, has had to make do with "stimu-

lus meaning", with the resulting indeterminacy of its products* The enter-

prise of regimentation, without a concept of jameness of meaning to check
the regimented expression against its explicandum in natural language,

has taken the standard of a narrowly defined "function in a deduction"
and, where that is not adequate, the very permissive "purposes of the

paraphraser".

Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, parti-

cularly in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," have evoked considerable critical
response. It will not be possible to deal with all of these critical pro-

posals in detail, but we will consider

scroe

of them, grouped with respect

frea
to their general approach* There are five groups of crioicisms, which,
the most critical to the least critical, are

(l) the Ordinary language
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criticisms, (2) the Artificial language
criticisms, (3) the Satirical

Survey criticisms, CU) the Gradualist criticisms,
and

(5 )

the Normative

criticisms. The la3t of these does not lend itself to
the sort of point-

by-point comparison vdth Quine as do the other four. It
is in some ways
close to the Ordinary language criticisms, and in some
ways independent
of the discussion in the terms in -which Quine has formulated
it. It is

placed last, not because it is least critical, but because it stands by
itself. First we will summarize the criticisms, and then go on to evalu-

ate them.

Ordinary language criticisms.

The most important paper in this
136
category is H. P. Grice and P.F. Strawson’s "In Defense of a Dogma.

Almost all of Quine’ 3 critics acknowledge some justice in his argument,

and Grice and Strawson are no exception. Their adaptations of their position include an acknowledgment that not only matters of fact cause revisions in the truths of a theory, but also "at least partly" changes in
137
the meanings of words,
and a nod to the interrelations of statements

in their formula that two statements are synonymous if the set of confirming or disconfirming experiences "on certain assumptions about the truth-

values of other statements" confirm or disconfirm both statements "to
138
the same degree '•
However, they plead that "the existence. . .of statements about which it is pointless to press the question whether they are

analytic or synthetic, does not entail the nonexistence of statements
139
which are clearly classifiable. ..."

Grice and Strawson’s chief positive point is that the use of a distinction, by which they appear to mean the use of terms in which the dis-

tinction has conventionally been made, entails that there is such a dislliO

tinction.

Thus, in philosophical tradition and present practice, ’ana-
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lytic 1 and 'synthetic' are used, and
with considerable

«,-;reefflent.~‘

In ordinary usage, '.scans the sane'
and related expressions are used,
Ui2
and not as equivalent to 5 is true of the
same objects*.
Grice and

Strawson accuse Quine of being impractical
and unreasonable. They do not
know how impractical he is willing to be I They
ask
Id all talk of correct or incorrect
translation
of sentences of cm language into sentences of“
another meaningless? It is hard to believe that
it is.
U3
t

This may even have suggested to Quine

tire

consequences that had to be

drawn from a position that he was not willing to give
up for practical
reasons. Grice and Strawson also point out that if there
is no sameness
of meaning between sentences* then there can be no meaning
for a sentence.

Here* too* Quine has been willing to accept unpalatable conclusions.

The chief critical point of the Gri ce-S traws on paper is that Quine
has set impossibly high standards for the "adequate clarification'' of
*

analytic

1

*

and, because this clarification has not, and probably cannot*

be given* has "deniefdj its reality”.

Quine J s outline of the problem

and his requirements for clarification are summarised as follows s
(1) There is a family of expressions j

(2) If one member of the family could be satisfactorily explained*

so could all the others
(3) Each member "is in as great need of explanation as ary other"
(U)

An explanation cannot use any expression from the fa rally j

(f>)

An explanation must have the form of a formal definition* and
1h$

"specify some feature common and peculiar to all cases'

The authors remark of (H) and (£) that it is "dubious whether any such
1U6
They suggest less
axpla nation can ever be given" of ary expression.
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formal kinds of explanation which
satisfy/ the noncircularity
raquire-

Mnt

C:

Dut not

definitional requirement of (5)*^

7

Fran the

example given of explaining 'logical
impossibility* , it seems to be a
kind of verifies tionisista

Art^icial

jffflgnaso criticisms.

Since we have dealt with Quine's

criticisms of Oarnap and Martin’s defense
of Carnap earlier, (see text,

H“l^«

/

w® "d-1 consider this line of criticism
rather briefly

<,

and

8
through another spokesman, Benson Mates,
in "Analytic Sentences.”^

It is interesting, in taking these
criticisms seriatim , to see the links

connecting veiy different philosophical approaches.
Mates, for example,
is in agreement with Grice and Strawson that it
is significant that both
’analytic' and 'synonymous' are used in natural language,
and that
1)|Q

Quine's standards for an adequate definition of 'analytic*
are too high.
Taking the latter point first, Mates’ outline of Quine’s (and Morten
150
White’s)
standards is somewhat different, oriented, of course, more
toward Quine's criticisms of the artificial language approach to the
problem:
(1) A definition should be close to "standard or preferred usage"
(

2)

The syntax of the definition should conform to "ordinary" syntax]

(3) A definition should not contain the word(s) being defined, ncr

words not from natural language]
(U)

A definition must be better understood than the definiendum.

Mates says that the addition of (U) may very well make the set of requirements too high to be met.
One could test for the existence of notions of 'analytic' and ’sy-

nonymous' by sets of questionnaires, follow-up questionnaires, and revi-
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sions made by the subjects. For the former '’notion”,

erne

would teat

attitudes toward sentences with respect to the relevance of evidence

for truth. Mates holds thatihe investigator would find "a rather
remark151
able agreement”.
For the latter, one would test the inter changeability
of expressions. These tests do not ’’define" the notions, but are "prac152
tical criteria" far then.
Frcsn this

evidence of

”

’intuitive* notions of analyticity and

synonymy," Mates goes on to urge the usefulness of artificial languages

for "refining" our understanding of semantical tens. An artificial

language makes the rules behind the application of the "intuitive" notions
explicit, and "otherwise differs as little from the natural language as
153
is compatible with reasonable simplicity. "
V/hen an artificial language
uses a tern

"

1

analytio-for-LQ ’

"

"an analogy is being drawn" with

'analytic* in a natural language. The closer the artificial language is

to the natural language, "the mare adequately will
15U
explicate 'analytic'."

Empirical Survey criticisms.

*

analytic-!' or-L-

*

There is, perhaps surprisingly, con-

siderable mutual support between some advocates of artificial languages

and of empirical surveys# Arne Naess, the chief representative of "eiapiri155
whom we shall consider, takes Gamap as his philosophical semantics"
cal guide, and Gamap considers Naess's work to "provide abundant evidence
156
in support of the intensionaliot thesis."
Briefly, tbs background for this is as follows: Gamap has defended
the idea that semantical concepts arc most fruitfully examined within

constructed languages, and lias proposed the "method of extension and in—
157
Quine, in "Two Dogmas," challenged the relevance of such
tension".
Therestudies to the natural-language difficulties with these concepts.
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fore, in "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural languages,”
Carnap proposes ”to
158
clarify the nature of the pragmatical
concept of intension in natural

languages, and to outline a behavioristic, operational procedure
for it."

he expects that this "will give a practical vindication for
the scmanti159
cal intension concepts."
He wants to show "that the assignment of an

intension is an empirical hypothesis which, like any other hypothesis in
160

linguistics, can be tested by observations of language behavior."

Mates reflects Carnap in casting the problem in terms of "two basic
approaches," the extensional and the intensional, of which the former is
161
often ^mistakenly) considered "more scientific".
He points out some
162
difficulties with the extensional approach,
difficulties which Quine
makes much of in "Meaning in Linguistics" and

?

T

ord and Object, but which

Carnap does not acknowledge in "Meaning and Synonymy in Natural languages"

when he assumes that linguists can reach "complete agreement in the deter163

mination of the extension of a given predicate in a given region.
Mates defends the use of both approaches together in detcmining the "or-

dinary use" of a word* the extensional approach in observing cases of
use of the word, and the intensional approach in administering both Soc-

ratic and "anti-Socratic" (leading and open) questionnaires to get at
16U
"what Pthe subjectj means by the given v/ord.

Naess writes rather piquantly that

in spite of the in many ways appalling crudity
of the questionnaire techniques and in spite of
the manifest inability of many subjects to enter
into difficult linguistic or other fields, the
data gathered are often apt to reveal or suggest
as much to the researcher as do penetrating
meditations or introspections based on data
found in one’s own head or gathered in an inform165
al way.
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In a paper on the ’’Topology of Questionnaires
Adopted to the Study of

Expressions with Closely Related Meanings," Naess suggests
developing

different questionnaires for different philosophical criteria
or defini166
tions of 3ynonyny.
He notes that the "indirect character of most (good)
questionnaires and the non—operational character of the criteria or
definitions M make the relation between the two subtle 3 nd "intricate".
168
He proposes something like the following s

Associated ph ilosophical concept

16 "?

Questi onnaire

1#

Interchangeability salva _signlfftca flone
( in tens i ona 1
synonymy)

the
two
the
lar

2.

Inconceivability of logical
inequivalence

the subject is asked to imagine
or to judge what, if any, differences in conditions would
affect the truth-value of sentences which differed only by
the substitution of one expression for another. "Inconceivability of a difference in acceptance" is synonymy.

3*

Logical equivalence

Is x a necessary and suffi-

subject is asked whether
given expressions mean
same to him in a particucontext.

cient criterion (condition)
for the truth of y? The expressions being tested may be
used or mentioned.
1*.

5>.

Equivalent for the "logic of
argumentation (pro et contra
dicere)"

the subject is asked to imagine
or to judge arguments which
differed only by the substitution of one expression for
another. Synonymy is the sameness of pro- and contra- arguments.

Extensional synonym

the subject is asked, 'Is this
1
)?’
(or
an example of ’
or 'that is an example of
’?• or ’What is this an
*
example of?’
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As can be seen, the questionnaire

our.

be more or less direct, the

danger or the ’error being that the
subject is led, and or the latter
that the relation or the results to
the "philosophical criteria"
my become very tenuous. Saess proposes the
use or "^questionnaires" to
test
169
h°*
subject interprets "crucial" questions
or toe questionnaire.
-

He bora in Carnap's direction with the
caooent that "in term or operations, concepts or intension are not
necessarily more vague or specula-

tive than those of extension*”

Perkins and Singer's paper, "Ana lytic ity,«

171
is consonant with this

approach, proposing experimental tests for de to
raining the synonymy of

two -xoris^in context (linguistic and nonlinguistitf)
for an individual at
a time.

The only criterion they consider is saxaaness of
"testing pro-

cedures" for the subject.

and extending the

3 cope

However, they offer proposals for refining

and reliability of the results, and place this

enterprise in the context of experimental psychology, its assumptions
17u
and procedures.
In the same negative way in which Naess defends intensions, they write tnat the difficulties in testing for synonymy of words

are "not any greater than those that confront psychologists who work on
175
theories such as those about belief and drive."

Perkins and Singer are quite confident about the possibilities of

generalization and extension, through further experiments and the use of
samples, from synonymy of two words for an individual at a time to syno-

nymy of those vrords for an individual to synonymy of words for an individual (presumably an over-all mapping of his vocabulary) to, ultimately,
176
"a criterion of analyticity for a society".
Naess probably also has

hopes of such ultimate extrapolations, but because he is actually engaged
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in this &ort of ^search, he sees the
complexities more clearly. For
example, he views intrapersonal questionnaires
as much leas problematic

than interpersonal ones, because the "same”
results on separate questionnaires may be taken to indicate a "high degree
of constancy as regards.

.

.

-ho

L

meaning assigned to

’] within the system

»

of speech

habits of different persons”, nob that the meaning
(“interpretation")
of ’x’

x

or one person is the same as the meaning of ’y» for
another per-

son, even where both respond that ’x’ - ’y*.

177
He prefers to test for

interpersonal results in interpersonal situations, such as when
physicists question each other

about

'iaass ,
:

om their

tvro

interpretations of a statement

reformulating the sentence in such a way as to eliminate

some interpretationr

and.

select others. The result is

1

two maps of syno-

nymity and heteranyiaity relations, one map showing relations with the

usage of p,

lie other.

.

.•with uhe usage

o.:‘

q«

"

The correspondence between

these maps is measurable, and identically structured maps indicate
178
interpersonal synonyay with respect to ’mass’ in that context.
It can

be seen from this how great is the distance between starting such investigations and coming up with "a criterion of analyticity for a society".

Gradualist criti cisms .

This line of criticism is limited to showing

that, although Quine is right in denying an exhaustive a na lytic -synthe ti

distinction, he is mistaken in denying that there are no

am lytic

truths

at all. These critics do not believe that they are dealing Quine a decisive blow, but merely making a small necessary correction in his position.

The most important of these critic* is Hilary Putnam, althou^i Jerrcld
Aatz, with an entirely different theoretical apparatus, also falls in this
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category.

Putnam admits that the ana lytic-synthetic
distinction is "of
overwhelming unimportance" compared to an
appreciation of the "monolithic

character of our conceptual system" and of the many
different (rather
179
than merely tiro) kinds of statements.
However, he writes,
there is as gross a distinction between
fa
trivial analytic statement and a simple empirical statement ^ as between any two things
in the world. • .and no matter how long I
might fail jin trying to clarify the distinction, I should not be persuaded that it
does not exist.
180

The task of a defender of the distinction, according to Putnam,
goes

beyond pointing to clear examples of itj he must try to clarify its
181
nature and ^rationale '*
This is what Putnam attempts to do.
182
"Analytic statements properly so called"
are distinguished first
s

by showing what they are not. They are not "framework principles",
statements of high systematic import, such as the central scientific
generalisations. Framework principles may deceptively appear to be just

like traditional exmaples of analytic statements because they have defi-

nitional form and because they cannot be "jeopardized by any possible
183
experimental results".
However, framework principles are not revised

merely by redefining their terms but by substituting other, incompatible
181*

principle j which alter the permissible inferences in the system.
Analytic statements also are not statements with "cluster-concept"
18 ^
The difficulty with these werdfc is that any element of
subject-words*
the cluster may be eliminated, changing

tiie

intension of the word but not

its extension. They are clearly not suitable subjects for statements

held to be secure from revision. Putnam has shorn great ingenuity in
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demonstrating that with "cluster-concept”
(sometimes called "natural
”
kind ; '*°rd8 >
413
or ’cat*, the "discovery” can be
made
uiat any property at all does not
belong in the

cluster.^

?h® standard Putnam offers for a sentence
in a natural language
to be an analytic statement is for it to
satisfy, or coma reasonably

close to satisfying, the following criteria
for
1&7
or to be consequences of such statements*

"

Analytic definitions

5

(3)
(1) The statement has the form* ’Something (Seme
one)
Is an A if and only if it (he, she) is ’a B,’
•where A is a single word*
(2) The statement hold3 without exception, and pro-

vides u3 with a criterion for something’s being
the 3Qrt °r thinS to which the term A applies.
The criterion is the only on© that is generally
accepted and employed in connection with the
to2Ul»

(U) The term A is not a

1

law-cluster’ word*

188

Putnam then proceeds to offer a ’’rationale" for this distinction.
The advantages of having a ace
a/id

{

in ce ligibili ty

f

»

* fixed points*’

in a language are "brevity”

These are clear and rather obvious and, farther—

more, to hold just 3uch analytic statements which Putnam* s criteria ad189
rait as "fixed points" "can’t hurt.
It ’can’t hurt" because no other
*'

laws are involved in holding

5

bachelor* interchangeable with ’unmarried

male’ apart from ’All bachelors are uruasrried, 5 and also because the

one—criterion words available for analytic statements are the names of
synthetic, not natural, classes, classes constituted by that one defining

aspect alone. This limited concession to the ana lyti c-syntlie tic distinction thus has some conveniences and no real disadvantages.
Despite this, Putnam grants that there is far more danger in relying too heavily on the distinction than in denying it altogether.
Taking it to be an absolute distinction involves assimilating very dif-

%
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ferent kinds of statement!, end leads to
confusion and error* Narrowly,

which is properly, interpreted, the distinction
cannot accomplish much
with respect to philosophical problems apart
from

those directly connected

with the distinction itself s it
190

,r

bakes no philosophic bread and washes

no philosophic windows."
J errold Kate sees the significance of his
paper, "Ana lytic ity and

Contradiction in Natural language," "in its solution to the
problem of

distinguishing analytic and synthetic truths raised by W. V. Quine
in
191
his 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism. "
And yet he agrees with Quine's
'

criticisms of Carnap and joins Quine in doubting that a "full-width
ana-

lytic-synthetic distinction" can be supported even if some "obvious oases"
192
of analytic statements can be identified.
Katz attempts to offer criteria which are formal, noncircular, and "beg no questions of empirical
193
justification, "
for attributing analyticity to some statements. Ana19U

lytic statements are those which are "predicatively vacuous".

The "philo-

sophically significant oases" do not turn out analytic, and therefore the
troubling question of "their epistemological status" is not eased by this
195
The aim of a "full-width" distinction is "to leave no middle
analysis.
ground" between necessary and contingent truths. Those defending such a

distinction have rested all necessary truths on purely linguistic grounds

and all contingent truths on nonlinguistic facts. Katz, like Quine, holds
out no hope for doing this successfully.
Katz's definition of 'analytic' occurs within the context of his

semantic me ta theory. The me ta theory specifies that a semantic theory includes a dictionary, not real but "ideal", and projection rules comparable

to "what the fluent speaker has at his disposal. • .for applying the in196
A dictionary entry includes (1) syntacformation in the dictionary."

330
tical infonaation, (2) semantic “sense
characterisations" in the form of
'

"semantic markers" and "semantic distinguishere"*
and (3) optionally,
J$8
synonyms *s a "technique of cross-reference-'.
(2) is meet important.
'

Semantic marker*

’’are

the .lament* in terns of which [systematic]
semantic

relations are expressed" and distinguishere
"reflect what is idiosynora199
tic about the Meaning of the word.
For example, semantic markers which

appear in the theory’s dictionary entry far ’bachelor®
are ’Human' , ’AniAAQ
mV, and ’Male’j one of the distinguishere is ’who has never married*.
semantic markers and distinguishere are not to be thought of
as words

in the language, but as ’theoretical constructs" expressed by
words. Only

for ohus reason does suen a 'theoretical definition*’ actually
"provide

an account of [the] meaning" of words J It pairs a word,

not with other

words as a lexical definition does, but with elaments of its conceptual
201
content.

A sentence le.g., ’Bachelors are unmarried males,

9

)

is analytic on

a particular "reading" (i.e., for one fixed sense of •bachelor’) with res-

pect to one distinguisher

of ’bachelor* if and only if all the semantic

elements in the entry for the subject-word are identical to those in the

entry for the predicate-word. This concept of ’analytic* as "meaning inclusion" is, Katz acknowledges, close to Kant’s. He maintains that his

version is not open to the criticisms that have been made by Quine and
others of Kant’s view because, first, "containment of meaning" is no long-

er merely metaphorical, and second, Kats has extender the analysis to
202
apply to more than subject-predicate sentences.
Katz holds that his definition of analyticity is noncircular because

it does not use other members of the ’analytic* family in defining ’analytic*. It is "formal” because the standard of "meaning inclusion", defined

131
203

in the semantic me ta the cry,

can be applied -within a particular semantic

theory "formally", that is, by Hatching identical
constructs*"

Quine has also required that a definition of analyticity not
be

merely stipulative. Such a definition is "empty" with respect to
our use
205
of ‘analytic’ in natural language.

It was for this reason that defining

’analytic* in a constructed language was rejected.

Cfcn

defining ’analytic*

within a semantic metatheory fare better? Katz thinks so because a particular semantic theory for a particular language, constructed according to
the metatheory, can be tested fcr empirical adequacy. This is done by

testing the “correctness" of the dictionary entries and projection rules
of the theory, specifically by "comparing the claims that [the theory

makes about the semantic properties of sentences in a sampl e drawn from

£the3 infinite set f of sentences of the language with the linguistic
J
206

intuitions of speakers."

The particular "predictions" (e.g., that a

given sentence is analytic) receive their sufficient "empirical justifi207

cation" by being predictions of a "highly confirmed semantic theory".

This procedure suggssta that one will have to test the intuitions
of native speakers with respect to the technical terms of the theory.

%at,

otherwise, are the "claims that it makes about the semantic properties of

sentences"? In Katz*s more recent article in the Journal of Philosophy,
he recognizes this difficulty and proposes a more indirect procedure.

Subjects are asked to assign sentences to lists which contain, not the
words

*

analytic*,

*

synthetic*, etc., but "sentences that are clear cases
20

of That we would regard as analytic" (or synthetic, contradictory, etc*

)•

This indirect procedure raises other problems, the main one being the un-

certainty about -what the subjects take the sentences on the lists, given
as examples of "clear cases", to be "clear cases" of. Katz remarks that
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the experiment oust be "conducted properly”.

must be "sufficiently different

frcsn one

'

The paradigm sentences

another in the appropriate res-

pects, [so that! there -will be no spurious coalman
features that might lead

speakers to classify sentences on the basis of irrelevant
linguistic properties.

..."
Normati ve criticisms .

This group of criticisms takes us back to the

proponents oi a functional concept of meaning for language—descriptions.

We can speak of a "normative" approach to analyticity here in the sense
that "where there are functions or roles, there are norms or rules "which

specify what constitutes performing a function. Although the proponents
of a normative approach do not form a unified group, they can be viewed

as holding on to the traditional distinction at least in the sense of a

distinction between regularities and rules.
Quine has considered only "semantical rules" of foraal languages as
possible rule-supports for analyticity, and not the kind of "rules" at

issue here. Wittgenstein^ vacillations on the subject show the difficulties vdth "rules of language" which all their supporters must face to

some degree. Wittgenstein is so concerned to show the ambiguity, lack of
strictness and openness of rules that one is often tempted to wonder why

he calls them "rules" at all.

does not wish to speak only of the

"regularities" of language, however, as Ziff doe 3, who holds that these
211
Wittgenstein, and those
"regularities" are not "sources of constraint".

influenced by him, do want to hold that these "rules of language", although they are mare like "regularities", "conventions", "institutions",

are sources of constraint. To speak a language

is not like "operating

212
a calculus according to definite rules"

and the constraints do not
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involve penalties

fear

every illegitimate

raove

as in « game like chess.

and remain part of the language-speaking
community.
Wittgroatein, of course, spealcs of
meaning as "use" and often as
governed by "rules of use".
Cohen, with his laneuage-eentenoe/utter-

anoe-sentenoe distinction. Is much
concerned to keep “rules" separate
iron "use", '^e former give the meaning
of utterances only, and the
latter the meaning of sentences of
a language only. Combining the two,
as Wittgenstein does, may seem reasonable
because it "achieves a kind of
211;

semi-adequacy in both fields"

but it is illegitimate. For Cohen, an

utterance is a "single event", "for ever true,
or for ever false", and
never ambiguous.
The different causes of ambiguous
language-sentences

— unclear reierents

of indicator words, different senses of
contained

words, ambiguous syntactic constructions,
unexpressed intentions, and

supplementary beliefs, etc.

— cannot account for

failure to determine

the meaning of an utterance-sentence. Any given
utterance settles all of

these possible ambiguities, and thus, its meaning, "correctly
understood",
is also settled.

Remembering that the conceptual equivalents of language—sentences

and utterance-sentences are "culture-sentences" and "saying-sentences"
(and "sayings", which abstract from the "original event of utterance and
216
from certain peculiarities of wording" of the saying-*oentence),
one

finds that Cohen’s attitude toward Quine's gradualism with respect to the

analytic and synthetic is that it fits culture-sentences very well but
217

"fully determinate assertive sayings" not at all.

The former are not
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sufficiently specific to indicate on their
face whether they

are

statements about the correct use of the
subject-word or about something

true of the referent of the subject-word.
Changes in knowledge and opinion,
from place to place and person to person,
all contribute to the conception
of the truth of such statements as
"a varying reluctance on our part to

call them in question.

The latter

determinate assertive sayings"

— are

— not all

"sayings” but all "fully

either analytically true or not

analytically true.
The critical point is change of meaning. No sentence
-whose meaning
can change can be analytically true, and all language-sentences
and culturesentences are subject to such meaning-change. Only utterances
can have

fixed meanings, and those that do can, absolutely and finally, be
classi-

fied as either analytic or synthetic. Putnam takes quite a different po220
sit ion. In arguing that even such obvious candidates for necessary
truth as 'All cats are animals* are ruled out by possible future discoveries that cats have always been merely cleverly manufactured automata,

Putnam specifically disallows a "rescuing move" in terms of meaning change
(e.g.

false

,

—

the sentence was necessary at time-, and became contingent
and
1
221
at time,,).
Within the framework of Cohen's distinctions,

—

Putnam’s argument holds for language-sentences but not for utterances.

Prior to the discovery that cats are really automata, the utterance,

’AH

cats are animals,* is necessarily true, although the identical language-

sentence is not.
Cohen* 3 account seems to turn Quine on his head. The meaning of a
222
language-word or -sentence "is basically a fact about human behavior"

and no rules can set standards of correctness for these meanings, nor

halt at any moment the continuous change within a language. Quine's one

fixed point, the sotting of
stimulus mesninge, and his greater
optimism for meanings intoalinguisticalijr,
are rejected. On tee other hand,
the meaning of an utterance-word
or -sentence is best given by
a translation or paraphrase, and such
specific correlations are governed by

ruhts, although not by "uniquely
relevant" rules, but, for a given
utterance-sentence, by "one or other of
an indefinitely large disjunction of
rulcs for
or paraphrasing that sentence."
These are rales

governing the "verbal fidelity" of a
translation, its Hteral correctness,
the "legitimacy" of tee move, rather
than its "brilliance".

A trans-

lation from "particularly exotic languages"
nay alter and extend tee
22$
translating language in the process.
These changes vdthin the language
are "neither correct nor incorrect") correctness
is a standard in ap-

praising a particular word or expression

"M

*

of

— new

or old

—

in one language

old usage in another, or even as a paraphrase of
226
an old usage in the same language."
Precisely in those cases where
227
Quino believes that there is nothing "to be right or wrong
about"

—

Cohen believes that rules for appraising correctness are
applicable.
It is not surprising that Cohen finds a place in his scheme
of things

far an interlinguistic vehicle of timeless meanings on the conceptual
228
level. These are 'Mayings".
They are held to have decisive advantages

over propositions while serving all the wor thwhile purposes of propositions. They are not limited to indicative assertions, not identified

with "meanings", not subsistent entities. In abstracting from "peculiarities" of wording, on© does not abstract from wording altogether, although
some differences of language do not prevent sameness of sayings under
229
proper conditions.
Cohen proposes that Quine accept "sayings” as the

meanings represented by logical formulae in regimentation. He asserts
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that "there must be some determinate
of

•

•

•

-nay

of correlating the formulas

a calculus with the utterances of ordinary speech fur
winch

they may stand proxy, and clearly this is best achieved by
assigning
meanings to the formulas*"

He brushes aside Quine’s disclaimer chat

the regimented expression "means the same" as its explicandm ay taking

Quine* s jta;idard of "function" as an expression of a functioaial concept
230.
232
of meaning*
He denies that there are "eternal sentences",
and as-

serts that to achieve the kind of sentence with fixed truth-value that

Quine seeks, one must turn from language-sentences to utterances of one

person during a very short period, abstracting from peculiarities of
2

language and from "authorship". The results of this process are "sayings".
Cohen’ 3 particular apparatus is distinctly hi3> but any functional

approach to language will be inherently inter linguistic. Sellars and

Aune can easily speak within their framework of "linguistic roles" of a
23U

role being performed by "more than one set of sign designs."

The role

or function of a linguistic element is not to be identified with tiiat

element, but is something that the eleukant can be used to do. Tc specify
tiie

role is to separate one aspect of the element from others. It is not

a great step after that to find that different linguistic elements 3hare

that one aspect, i.e., have the same role.
Norms, or rules, are what link particular utterances to their impli-

cations* truth-conditions, inference relations, inter substitutable ex235
It is
presaions under seme conditions, relevant responses, and so cau.

misleading to speak only of the use of expres dons because speakers are
not free to use expressions as they please

•

The game/language analogy

may also be misleading in certain respects, but it is held never theless to
reveal some significant features of language*
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Do any of the above criticisms of Quine's
radical position on analytic! ty go far enough to make a difference to
the

effects of that posi-

tion on indeterminacy of translation and the
procedure of regimentation?

An effective criticism would have to accomplish the
following:
(1)

Define ’analytic* mmc5^rcj^rlyj

(2) the definition must be explanatory with
respect to the use of

’analytic* and related expressions in natural language]
(3) the definition oust be empirically justifiable:
(U) the definition must be in terms of me anings and exclude the
3

effect of "intrusive” shared information;
(5>)

every statement (sentence; must be classifiable as analytic or
not analytic; the distinction must be absolute ;

(6) the definition must be i nter lin guistically valid .

If defense is needed of these requirements for an effective criticism*

it would be that (l) is a requirement for any definition; (2) is a re-

striction cm arbitrariness: we do not simply want a stipulative definition*

but a definition which is demonstrably related to actual practice* even
if it is a critical improvement on actual practice;

(3 )

is connected to

(2): because of (2) we want the definition to be reached by sound proce-

dures. Requirements (U)*

(

5 ) and (6) are intrinsic to the particular term

to be defined here. A definition of 'analytic* which did not distinguish
validation by linguistic facts alone from validation by nonlinguistic facts

would violate the general requirement of (2) by overlooking an essential
traditional feature of analyticity. A definition which did not effect an
absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic would not serve
the purpose for which the distinction has been made: to be able to classify
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«nd locate the source of truth of all
true statements to the language,
particularly the central theoretical-scientific
and philosophical cites.
A definition which was good for one
language only would not affeot the
question of translatability.
The ordinary language criticisms* represented
by Grice and Strawson, meet the noncircularity requirement
only at the expense of the

requirement, implicit in (l), of a formal definition.
This is in harmony
iiith

Wittgenstein's insistence that many words cannot be
"defined" by

giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for their
application and
236
the camaon features of their referents.
Of the types of "informal
explanation”, whose availability is the argument against declaring
the

expressions of the analytic! ty family to represent "pseudo-notions,"
the only illustration given involves distinguishing between logical
and

physical impossibility by « distinction between not understanding and not

believing what is alleged. In the case where the subject judges both assertions to be false, but asks himself under what conditions they could

be true, he "know js ] what to prepare for" in the case of physical impos-

sibility but not in the case of logical impossibility. This is nothing
more novel than the criterion of inconceivability, and the position is,
in effect, the classical dichotooist one. (See text, pp. 116-18.) This
is not a counterproposal to Quine’s criticisms but a reiteration of the
237
view he is criticising.

With respect to (2) and (3), Grice and Strawson assume that there
238

is agreement "to a very considerable extent"

in the use of 'analytic'

and related technical terms in philosophical usage and in the use of
•means the same* and related ordinary language expressions in ordinary

13 ?

23 ?
»<»(!<>.

It

U

cm this

Mswptlon

that th«y rest their resistance
to

Quine's approach. "Instead of
oxaminlng the actual use that we
make of
the notion of meaning the same,
the philosopher measures it
ty some perhaps inappropriate standard (in this
case sen. standard of clarifiability), and bemuse it falls short
of this standard. . .denies its
reility. ...»
However, 0ri.ee and Strawson do not
"eraaine the actual
use" of the relevant terms, and do not
attempt to measure the extent of
the assumed agreement in their application,
hika other ordinary language
philosophers, they are content to roly on their
intuitions as native
speakers. (Cf. Gavell, text, p. 92.)
Apart, from their unquestioning
acceptance of the introspection of

native speakers as empirically sound for linguistic
questions, the position of Grice and Strawson

ftias

another serious flaw. Even if it were

well established that there is wide agreement in the
use of certain terms,
that fact alone would not suffice to indicate the
basis of agreement. It

would not tell us whether a concept of analytici^r or synonymy
supported
the agreement, or something else, or nothing. This is what Mates
calls
9)| T

"an armchair version of the extensicnal method",

and it has all the

weaknesses of the approach of Quine* s self-restricted linguist.
The ordinary language approach does not satisfy (U) because the

ordinary use of .’means the same* does not eliminate "shared information".
If one is content to rely on actual, unreforraed use, then one must be

satisfied with a somewhat untidy result. lacking a systematic empirical

method for examining actual use in some depth, this approach cannot elucidate either the ordinary or the philosophical uses of these terms.

Grice and Strawson concede to Quine that the distinction is not

21*2

JiiO

•bsoluf, that than are

statute

"about ahloh It Is polntleao
to

preae the question whether they
are >nalytic

.

synthetic.

They
aleo ntee no provision for an
interlinguistic standard. They are
content to deal with English*
The artificial language critics
and the empirical survey critics

are stronger together than either
is separately* As Quine has rightly
observed* an approach to analyticity
through constructed languages suffers from arbitrariness, which no
claim of "analogy" nor of ‘analytic-

for-V

"indicating* that ’analytic* (in English)
is being explicated

can evade on its own. (See text,
pp. 12-13.) One can always ask for jus-

tification of the analogy, and this justification
must come frcm outside the constructed language* It is just
such support- that empirical

surveys can provide, ty "plugging* the definitions
of the artificial

language in to natural language in use. The alliance
is of mutual bene-

fit because any survey needs hypotheses, precise
criteria, and a theory
of the relationships among its terms* those can be
offered by a formal
system. It may be the realisation of these benefits
that explains the

actual mutual support among seme members of these two superficially
30

different approaches*

With reBpect to \U), it is not difficult for a formal system to
define 'analytic* in terms restricted to linguistic relationships. As

Hannan points out, however, outside of a formal system, one must distinguish postulates, or stipulative definitions, which may not be true

at all from true statements which are "true by (linguistic) convention"*
The assignment of meaning by the rules or conventions of a language
2bk
"does not guarantee truth".
What is a fairly simple matter for a

contracted Ungusge, then, is a complex
one for

a natural language, and

there is no a priori answer to whether
a delineation of statements
true

55

^Sl^tis

firoSS^ can be made by any oonbimticw of questionnaires.

On the question of an absolute
distinction, here also it can be

drawn formally, but remains an open
question for natural languages. One
Troxld think it likely, however,

33 " iiadecld 5d " * bout
'

miW

that speakers of a natural language
will

081,03 of sentences, that

empirical research

will yield a large intermediate area of neither
clearly ‘analytic* nor
clearly ‘synthetic* statements.
The definitions of one formal system, applied
in surveys to dif-

ferent languages, would satisfy the requirement of
interlinguistic validlty. But as In any discussion of linguistic "universal!!

%

whether such

a single set of definitions would be applicable to all natxiral
languages

cannot be determined in advance of attempts to apply

2U5
thesra.

The slight sketch of Naess ’3 work should show that the results of

research in what is not philosophy but a branch of sociology will be
undrama tic , inconclusive, to be summarised in terms of less-than-perfect
correlations. In these characteristics, they are like all scientific

investigation (particularly in the social sciences) but unlike the
universal generalisations of philosophy. What i« involved is "a whole
21*6

strategy of research"

which vdH, in time, redefine the concept under

investigation. There is no guarantee that the redefined concept will bear
a close resemblance to traditional analyticity. Tt may be the only justi-

fiable way to examine synonymy in a natural language, but it may turn
out that Quine was right, after all, in deploring all traditional defi-

nitions of ‘analytic* and

*

synonymous *• As we have seen, all the important

1U2
require iMnta for . definition,
(U).

under a cosamitownt
w ‘*m>n9 as

t.o

ft

«)

(

6 ),

^

this approach.

gradualist", does not really consider
himself in

opposition to Quine. The criteria
he establishes for

analytic state-

swita make explicit defensible
standards for attributing analyticiiy
t° those few, trivial, clear cases
which have played such a role in

philosophical discussion, if not in life*
However, aa the name X have
given this group iallies, Putnam
agrees with Quine’s gradualism, his

denial of an absolute distinction between
the analytic and the synthetic.
His modification of Quine changes
nothing basic in that position.
In evaluating Katz’s position, we can
look at a response of Quine's

*hioh

iea
?

sophers.

good example of failure of oouammication between
philoQuine begins by saying that his complaint with
analyticity

has been that it is "insufficiently empirical", "A
notion having to do

with language seems peculiarly unpromising if its
relation to observable
2U8

behavior is 6b 3 cure.

«

.

•

"

He notes with satisfaction that Kata ag-

rees with him on the need far a "behavioral criterion".

Zh9
He then gug-

gosts shearing off the "apparatus” of Kata’s semantic a»ta theory
"a*

inessential to the central issue.” He includes "by-pass (in c’l the
system
250
of "semantic marker#”.
Quine considers Katz's central proposal to be
,t

tile

indirect empirical test outlined in his Journal of Pliilosophy article,

the "lists” for classifying sentences under "dear cases" of different
251
kinds of sentences, and criticizes it as not interlinguistic.
Then he

conclude® by saying that Katz's lists would measure only "degrees of analyticity" rather than effect an absolute distinction, and none of the

"really Interesting" cases (to science and philosophy) would come out
2^2
analytic.

143

This is amusing because Katz rests
his whole case for providing
a noncircular, explanatory, empirically
justifiable, wholly linguisti-

cally validated deflation of ’analytic*
(requirements (l), (2), (3) and
(4)) on the fact that the definition occurs
within the semantic xaeta-

theory. The definition is probably
interlinguistically valid as well,

although the "lists* mentioned in the article
Quine devotes his atten253

tion to do not make this so clear*
of

*

Katz grants that his definition

analytic* applies only to "predicatively vacuous* sentences!
he

does not claim to be drawing an absolute distinction. However,
everything depends on the metatheoiy. If one rejects it, on
whatever grounds,

Katz’s definition amounts to nothing! IT one accepts it, Katz
has done

better than most other critics* But one cannot, as Quine suggests,
“by-pass" the semantic markers and the "apparatus that surrounds his

account of analyticity*
It seems more reasonable to say that because of insurmountable
difficulties with the theory, particularly with the semantio markers,
Katz’s effort is unacceptable. Katz holds, on the one hand, that "waning
inclusion" is not merely metaphorical* One "path" of a dictionary entry
contains the concepts in the meaning of one sense of a word* The readings

for the subject-word and predicate-word of an analytic sentence are
254
"formally identical* *
This makes matching semantic markers in paths
of dictionary entries seem like matching truth-table columns or inscrip-

tions for identity. And yet, on the other hand, Katz insists that semantic markers are not words, although w® use words to "label" the "constructs"!
255
Furthermore, for those who don’t
they are abstract objects, ideas*
256
Katz grants that these ideas are not neceslike "ideational theories",

sarily consciously present in one’s experience*
Rather, they are
theoretioal^unobservables, "constricts” or "posits'*
like unobservables
in physios.

With this explication, the concreteness of
"meaning in-

clusion" pales, and one wonders about the
"formal" features whose

matching the definition provides for, when these

turn, out

to be formal

features of abstract entities.
This account take 3 the assignment of meaning to
a sentence to be
the result of a compositional process, and the meaning of
a word to

be a conjunction of properties. There is reason to think that
a decision
to apply a word in a given case is not the automatic result of
having

completed a check-list of properties. It is a simplified account of wcrd-

met

raeaning, and in accepting it, one

accept a great deal of "appara-

tus" as well as the transformational grammar assumptions about Innate
ideas. Katz's arguments are minimal, and perhaps the prudent course is

at least to defer acceptance of what, at present, appears a simple product in a theoretically burdensome wrapping.
It is difficult to bring the normative criticisms directly to

bear on Quine’s requirements for

a

definition of ’analytic*. Quine did

not concern himself in "Two Dogmas" with any rule-supported approach
other than the "semantical rules" of the formalists. Another difficulty
is that the proponents Of this approach are not really offering an alter-

native definition of ’analytic*. Their contribution to this discussion
is an emphasis on the existence of constraints in speaking a language

rather than on an attempt to locate the analytic-making ones. Cohen appears to leave vdde open the selection of "a workable procedure for the
258

identification of analytic-malcLng synonymies and contradictions.”.

^ne can nevertheless see that the normative
approach will not

saUaiy requirement

(U). Just as a strength of this approach in language-

description is that it view*} speech in the broader
context of actions,
intentions* and dispositions to respond to utterances
and their implioations, it is a weakijess in coming to terms with
analyifcity that it
does not, in principle, separate language from the rest
of the world. By

broadening 'meaning* beyond extension and intension, the functional

approach can
can

males

finer distinctions than an extensions! appro® ch and

those distinctions more objective and observable than an inter*-

sicnal approach. However, it is not in a good position to separate purely

linguistic truths from other truths.

Despite the differences, there are some interesting points of contact between this approach and Quine’s. The most obvious is Quine's use
of "function* in regimentation. Another is that the paradigm case of

regimentation is one in which the person who utters a sentence is the
one to regiment that sentence. This is a recognition of the "fixed

meaning " of an utterance. The sentence is "fully determinate" for the
1

person who utters itj he knows what
nymy*-, the "time 5*

Ire

means. Another is "primary syno-

and "genuine" synonymy between "sufficiently long seg2$9

raents of discourse. n

Since its specification may even Include "stage

directions", this comes close to a functional language-description.

To see why the functional approach cannot represent a solution to
the problem Quine has set for himself, let us look at these points of

contact and the difficulties they suggest to Quine. The lexicographer
cannot deal directly' with "primary synonymy" because he cannot specify
260

and catalogue "the infinitely numerous genuine pairs of long synonyms.

“

11*6

But the lexicographer

mat

go on to apecily and catalogue, and so he

finds himself dealing only in ’’quasi ayncnywa”. In
the later writings,
his task is depicted even more pessimistically. The
paimdigB case of

regimentation only leads Quine to conclude that there are no
standards

hy which cne person can reject another’s regimented expression,
not that,
for an utterance in context, a meaning (or paraphrase, or
translation)
can be given. Finally, pace Cohen, "function” in the restricted sense
in which Quine uses it is very different from the function of an exprea-

aicn in conmunicatAon. The ways in which it is different are critically

important for Quine. The function of an expression in a deduction can be
formally identified and specified. Geaer&l rules can be given from which
inferences follow mechanically. The function of an expression in commu-

nication is not generally nor precisely specifiable at all.

Alston finds himself

my

” reluctantly

forced to conclude” that there
261
be no way w to generally define ’linguistic act 1 *.
This does not

lead him to abandon the concept, but to accept a piecemeal strategy of
analysing particular linguistic acts. To compromise with generality and
exactness is certainly not Quine’s way. It is hard to see how the tension

in his aims between Quine^the-logician and Quine-the-^&mpirlci at can be
resolved with equal justice to both Quines.

At the end of section A.

,

I tried to suggest that Quine*# as soci-

al! onist behaviorism not only limits him to stimulus meaning and, consequently, lead# to indeterminacy of translation, but that it does not

allow for the kind of language that he assumes all along nor for scientific theory. TKhat was proposed in section A. was that perfectly sound

standards of evidence support a functional concept of meaning, which
gives Quine a language as enriched as he require# and theory a# well,

U*7

and .1.0 av.dea dire consequence

We

ech

a,

Uckrt^^LMoy

of t«mal,tlon.

ere doling

«tth behavloriea and «npirlcl
mj and yet also with a
preferred concept of meaning.
In this section, purportedly
limited to questions of meaning,
we
have come up again against
considerations of empirical support.
Perhaps
there is no reason to deplore
this blurring of the tidy
categories we originally drew. Quine also sees them
as different sides of one problem. He
investigates the problem of empirical
support, however, in much less detail and depth than the problem of
defining analytic! ty. I have been

critical of him for his dogmatic
acceptance of a crude behaviorism and
his equation of that position with
"empiricism". H*
b<5 accused of
complacency or carelessness for his arguments
against the analytic-synthetic
distinction. They are far better than the
arguments used against him.

None offered, if I am correct in
interpreting them, meets Quine’s challenge.

Another way of saying this is that Quine
-the-logician was the
dominant author of

ted

and Object. If it were not for his manifest and

explicit objective of finding empirical supports for
"notion [«Q having
to do with language",
the bias in favor of extension®! logic would
be merely a fact for the reviewer to record. As
it is, the inadequacies

of his empiricism do grave injustice to his own aims, and
there is

a ope

reason to think that revisions there would allow a concept of meaning

which also could not stand up to his stringent requirements. Perhaps the
stringency of the requirements needs to be called into question. The
alternatives may have been wrongly perceived as either meeting those requirements or doing without meaning. The utility of a concept of meaning

may require of philosophy something both more practical and more difficult
help in making a functional concept of meaning more precise and operational.
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